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This project examines the role of place in the socialization of young people into 
civic values, such as participation and tolerance.  Are smaller communities better able to 
foster democratic values than larger ones?  Are young people growing up in racially, 
economically and politically heterogeneous environments more likely to be politically 
active than those in homogeneous communities?  These questions are related to perennial 
issues within political science, and are also closely tied to important questions in 
education policy related to school size.  The case made by educational scholars that 
smaller schools are better for most educational outcomes is similar to the arguments 
others make about the benefits of small communities.  I test whether smaller schools are 
better for democratic values, and examine the relationship between school size and 
community context.  Are smaller schools better because of their size, or because they are 
most often found in smaller, more homogeneous communities?   
The results show that young people growing up in smaller towns, and those in less 
heterogeneous communities have higher levels of political knowledge and participation in 
  
school activities, but are less racially tolerant than adolescents living in larger, more 
diverse communities.  In addition, the findings show that school size has very little 
influence on democratic values, except that young people in smaller schools are more 
likely to participate in school activities; and, small schools are of some benefit to children 
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Places and Political Socialization 
 
 
Most of the work on American political behavior examines individual attitudes 
and choices as if individuals make decisions alone, living within a vacuum.  Except for 
one of the earliest studies of voting behavior (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee 1954), 
scholars rarely incorporate contextual factors into their analyses of individual political 
behavior.  The scholarship on political socialization is much the same.  Although there 
has been recognition that political socialization is somewhat generationally contingent 
(Sears and Valentino 1997), this literature has largely examined individuals outside of the 
contexts in which they live.  In this project, I show that the socialization of young people 
into democratic values is contingent, at least in part, on the geographic environments in 
which they come of age.   
The agenda for this chapter is to explain the major theoretical constructs that have 
shaped my project and to define and discuss the main concepts that will be used 
throughout the dissertation. First, I explain the basis for the spatially contingent nature of 
socialization, drawing from the literature on social context and adult attitudes and 
behavior.  Then, I discuss how I define “social context.”  Communities can be defined in 
many different ways, and I justify my choice to examine them in terms of the local 
geographical area in which adolescents live and go to school.  I introduce the data that I 
use to conduct my analyses, but more detail is found in the next chapter.  Here, I also 
discuss each dimension of context that I examine in the dissertation and explain my main 
hypotheses for the relationships between context and the development of democratic 
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values.  The third section of this chapter defines my conception of “democratic values” 
and discusses why I have chosen to focus on political knowledge, efficacy, participation 
and tolerance.   
The final part of this chapter introduces a separate, but related, aspect of this 
project centering on one aspect of education policy.  Public schools are both important 
agents of socialization and critical institutions within communities.  Their size and 
composition are often closely linked to the community’s size and composition.  I have 
chosen to examine school size for several reasons.  First of all, most political 
socialization research related to education policy focuses on curriculum and pedagogy.  
Even though research in education shows the importance of school organization or school 
climate (Torney-Purta 1983; Torney, Oppenheim and Farnen 1975; Bryk, Lee and 
Holland 1993), most political scientists studying political socialization have not focused 
on these factors.   
Secondly, the educational literature on school size has neglected to study political 
socialization.  Scholars have examined retention, graduation, achievement and discipline, 
but have ignored the implications of smaller school size in the development of 
democratic values, even though civic values are related to many of these other outcomes.  
Finally, school size is related to community context; smaller public schools are often 
located in smaller towns and the largest public schools are usually found in large, urban 
areas or in the suburbs surrounding large cities.  I wish to analyze the potential benefits of 
reducing school size after controlling for various aspects of the community context.  Are 
smaller schools more beneficial in some places than in others?  Advocates for smaller 
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schools argue that widespread policy change is necessary; yet, if smaller schools are only 
advantageous in urban areas, for example, widespread change may not be necessary. 
 
Political Socialization and Social Context 
Political socialization research within political science has undergone a 
renaissance in the last few years.  Interest in political socialization “tends to increase 
during periods when there are heightened concerns about the stability of democratic 
regimes…” (Flanagan and Sherrod 1998, 448).  In the 1950s, scholarship in socialization 
focused on the development of diffuse support for political systems in response to World 
War II and the spread of communism.  Work in the 1960s and 1970s responded to the 
social movements of that time.  Today, scholars are concerned about young people’s 
alienation from and disdain for government and politics.  The alarm about declining 
“social capital” (Putnam 2000) and political knowledge (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996) 
has created a resurgence in an almost extinct literature (Beck and Jennings 1991; Niemi 
and Jennings 1991; Sears and Valentino 1997; Flanagan and Sherrod 1998; Hahn 1998; 
Niemi and Junn 1998; Conover and Searing 2000; Torney-Purta, Lehmann, Oswald and 
Schulz 2001; Sherrod, Flanagan, and Youniss 2002; Gimpel, Lay and Schuknecht 2003). 
Yet, even though political socialization research is reviving, much has remained 
the same.  Most socialization scholarship examines high school and college students.  It is 
difficult to conduct research using minor students, and the younger they are, the harder it 
is to obtain consent for research.  This does not pose too much of a problem for political 
socialization scholarship, however.  The period of adolescence is the time when 
individuals begin to develop their self-identities (Erikson 1963), including civic identities 
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(Youniss, McLellan and Yates 1997).  Research points out that it is not until adolescence, 
or late adolescence that individuals begin to settle upon the opinions and values that 
many will maintain throughout their lives (Beck and Jennings 1982; Jennings and Marcus 
1984; Alwin and Krosnick 1991; Fendrich and Lovoy 1988; Marwell, Aiken and 
Demerath 1987; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995).   
Researchers today are still interested in many of the same outcomes as examined 
in studies many years ago: political knowledge, interest in politics, trust in government, 
and intention to participate.  Largely because of an interest in civic engagement, 
researchers today have also begun to analyze participation in school and civic activities, 
especially community service (Mann and Patrick 2000; Walker 2002; Astin, Sax and 
Avalos 1999).  Some are looking at political discussion and generalized trust in other 
people. 
Most scholars also continue to focus on the same agents of socialization as those 
who conducted research 30 years ago.  Even today, scholars are focused predominantly 
on the role of parents (Jennings and Niemi 1968, 1974; Langton 1969; Connell 1972; 
Tedin 1974; Beck and Jennings 1975, 1982, 1991; Dalton 1980; Niemi and Jennings 
1991), peers (Langton 1969; Tedin 1980; Campbell 1980) and the role of civics 
instruction (Hess and Torney 1967; Langton 1967; Langton and Jennings 1968; Finifter 
1974; Merelman 1980; Niemi and Junn 1998) in the process of adolescent political 
development.   
My project diverges only slightly from these works.  I examine the same 
population – high school students – as well as most of the same outcomes – political 
knowledge, efficacy, and participation.  I also include tolerance for diversity as an 
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outcome related to democratic values.  Where my project departs most significantly from 
others is with the factors that influence socialization.  Instead of analyzing the roles of 
parents, peers, or civics curricula, I focus on the communities in which these traditional 
socialization agents are located.  In causal terms, I will take a step back in the “funnel of 
causality” of attitude development by looking at the larger set of factors that then 
influence the socialization by parents and schools.  The theoretical model is illustrated in 
Figure 1.1.  I expect to find both direct and indirect effects of community context.   
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young people advantages in school and in life, those growing up in disadvantaged 
neighborhoods and communities are less likely to see these benefits. 
The indirect link is through a combination of social interaction, information 
processing and individual characteristics, such as race, grade level, or civics exposure.  
The agents of socialization impart information to young people that forms the basis of 
their political attitudes and behavior.  The social and political context influences the 
content of this information, as well as how individuals process it.  I do not mean to say 
that all agents are spatially contingent; for instance, the national media are an important 
socializing force, but the content is largely the same whether children live in Maine or 
Arizona.  However, even with the media, although the content may not vary across 
communities, the perception and meaning of the information will likely vary across 
different contexts.   
First, the environment influences the information that is given to young people in 
their schools and homes.  Information is transmitted through a variety of social 
interactions, both face-to-face discussions and non-verbal communications.  Social 
context matters because it provides opportunities and imposes constraints on the types 
and frequencies of social interactions (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995).  Cialdini indicates  
 
Individuals learn appropriate social behavior from observing each other.  
This proposition emphasizes the interconnected nature of social life, 
underlining the centrality of observing and copying others as people 
perceive, evaluate, and make decisions about how to act...Whether the 
question is what to do with an empty popcorn box in a movie theater, how 
fast to drive on a certain stretch of highway, or how to eat a chicken at a 
dinner party, the actions of those around us will be important in defining 
answers (1984, 117). 
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Individuals look to one another for information on all sorts of things – from dining 
etiquette to the candidate most qualified to hold office.  Interactions provide important 
information that is used in making choices and forming political attitudes (Mutz 2002; 
Beck, Dalton, Greene and Huckfeldt 2002; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Books and 
Prysby 1991; Huckfeldt 1983, 1986; Putnam 1966; Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee 
1954).   
Interaction can include face-to-face encounters with others in one’s family or at 
work, as well as with strangers one meets in the supermarket or the post office.  Theories 
based on social cohesion hold that intimacy or trust among friends is responsible for 
personal influence on political attitudes (Burt 1987).  Early work on vote choice found 
that informal social pressures from those with whom an individual lives and works have a 
significant impact on vote choice (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet 1944; Berelson, 
Lazarsfeld and McPhee 1954).  Recent work suggests that discussions with co-workers 
and others with whom one may have “weak ties” continue to be important for political 
attitudes and behavior (Mutz 2002; Granovetter 1973).   
Interaction also encompasses a variety of behaviors that do not entail actual 
discussion among individuals.  Political yard signs in an affluent neighborhood and 
bumper stickers on a pick-up truck offer information about the attitudes and opinions of 
those associated with a particular group.  Theories of “structural equivalence” contend 
that a person is influenced by another individual to the extent that they share structural 
characteristics, such as occupations or religions, not necessarily personal relationships 
(Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995).  Burt states, “in structural equivalence models, the 
analytical frame of reference shifts from dyads” as in social cohesion models, to the 
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“social system” (1987, 1294).  Thus, a person behaves in the way he thinks someone like 
him would or should behave.  Social interaction provides information that aids 
individuals in making their political choices, and in developing political attitudes. 
The content of the information is not the only factor that is influenced by the local 
context.  The environment also affects the processing of information.  In a social 
environment, individuals are routinely exposed to particular biases based on the 
composition of the environment.  Some communities are strongly Republican, some are 
all black, and others have many elderly residents.  These biases not only affect the 
content of information, they also make certain information more cognitively accessible.  
It would be difficult for someone to have at hand personal knowledge about the lives of 
immigrants if they live in a community where there are no recent immigrants.  The 
environment “may alter which content is most likely to be used” in making political 
decisions (Burbank 1995, 623).  Individuals develop a heightened sensibility to particular 
information based on the biases in their environments.  Because individuals consume 
massive amounts of information at all times, that which is most accessible is most likely 
to be used in making judgments about new information (McGuire 1968).   
Although the research on the effects of context has been almost exclusively 
conducted on adults, the theories translate easily to the political socialization of 
adolescents.  The traditional “agents” of socialization – parents, peers, and schools – are 
all a part of the social and political fabric of a local community.  Their opinions, and thus, 
the information they transmit to young people, are shaped by and maintained through the 
interactions within their local environment.  Based on the compositional biases within the 
context, information is passed on to children and youth as social norms and community 
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values that many young people then adopt as their own.  Just as context influences adult 
political behavior, it also shapes the socialization into these values and opinions among 
young people. 
 
What is Social Context? 
Context varies across both space and time.  Generational effects are the products 
of differences in context across time.  Children of the “Greatest Generation” often have 
different opinions from the Baby Boomers because of distinctive events and 
circumstances occurring as they came of age (Sears and Valentino 1997; Valentino and 
Sears 1998; Beck and Jennings 1991).  Context also varies across space.  Customs and 
traditions are different across different countries, which helps explain differences in 
political behavior and attitudes (Torney-Purta, Lehmann, Oswald and Schulz 2001).  I 
argue that the experience of growing up varies not only across generations and countries, 
but also across local communities, and these variations influence political attitudes.   
The term “community” can have many different theoretical meanings and could 
be operationalized in different ways.  Many perceive of communities as places with 
identifiable boundaries, as in the area immediately surrounding where one lives.  They 
can be thought of in this way as concentric circles, where in the middle lies one’s home.  
The first circle includes the neighborhood, or the town, depending on its size.  Cities are 
often broken up into several neighborhoods, while residents of small towns may either 
live “in town” or “out of town.”  After the immediate local surroundings, one also 
belongs to states, regions, and countries.  Researchers looking at communities in 
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geographic, or spatial, terms examine them using zip codes, Census areas, political 
precincts, or school districts.   
Others think of communities that do not correspond to points in space (Fischer 
1982; Wellman 1988).  One can belong to professional “communities” or support groups, 
like Alcoholics Anonymous, that become a group, or “community,” of importance for 
individuals.  Given technology, many individuals belong to online discussion groups or 
internet gaming groups.  In these cases, individuals may never meet face-to-face, but 
many insist they should still be considered communities.  Scholars empirically define 
these types of communities by asking individuals questions about feelings of belonging, 
and about their memberships and activities.   
I analyze communities as the geographic places where young people live and/or 
go to school.  This type of examination of places assumes that the social relations in these 
places constitute a particular “social fabric” that influences particular outcomes, and that 
it is possible to make inferences about the social relations by looking at the locations 
geographically.  In this way, a “community” is both a point in space that has geographic 
boundaries, as well as a social construction, consisting of “friendship and kinship 
networks and formal and informal associational ties rooted in family life and on-going 
socialization processes” (Kasarda and Janowitz 1974, 329).  Because communities and 
neighborhoods are the “foci of emotional and financial investments,” I contend that 
communities and neighborhoods are worthy of attention (Campbell and Lee 1992, 1078).  
This is especially true for adolescents and children, as they do not have the mobility and 
life experience of adults.  While it is possible for a middle class, middle-aged man to 
have a variety of contexts that influence his attitudes, this is much less likely for the 
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average student in a public high school.  Their personal networks are more closely 
fastened to their local community.  
I use two sources of survey data on adolescents in public high schools to conduct 
my analyses.  The National Household Education Survey (1999) is a set of national data 
used among both educational scholars (Schreck, Miller and Gibson 2003; Yarosz and 
Barnett 2001) and political scientists (Niemi, Hepburn and Chapman 2000).  The other 
source, the Metro Civic Values Study (1999-2000), is based on surveys conducted in 29 
distinct communities across the state of Maryland.  These data include students in 
affluent suburbs, inner cities, as well as rural schools.  The attitudinal and behavioral 
variables I use come from these data.  In order to examine young people within their 
communities, I use the zip codes in which the respondents live.  I match these zip codes 
to U.S. Census data and data from the National Center for Education Statistics in order to 
input the necessary community variables for analysis.  The next chapter gives frequencies 
of the main variables in the analysis, along with a much more detailed description of the 
sampling procedure and methodology. 
I examine four main aspects of the community context that are most likely to 
affect political socialization, and that depict the social and political fabric of 
communities:  community size, economic composition, racial composition, and political 
composition.  I am especially interested in the role that heterogeneity in the environment 
plays in political socialization, and will create measures of the diversity in the 
communities across these dimensions.  In the following section, I detail the hypotheses 




A great deal of literature in sociology and political science has examined whether 
large cities are advantageous or detrimental to their residents.  Democratic theory tells us 
that deliberation in the form of face-to-face interaction with other citizens, and as such, 
direct democracy, is only possible on a small scale.  As units increase in size, the practice 
of democracy becomes increasingly complicated (Dahl and Tufte 1973).  Small size not 
only allows for better personal communication among citizens, it makes communication 
with leaders easier, helping constituents hold their representatives accountable.   
Sociologists look at the relationship between participation and “community 
attachment” – or one’s feeling that he or she belongs in the community, knows their 
neighbors, and attends community-related events and activities.  Many discover that 
cities are not as beneficial as smaller towns in fostering strong ties to the community.  
Early sociological scholarship found that people feel alienated from one another because 
of the high population density and heterogeneity in large (urban) areas (Toennies 1887; 
Simmel 1922; Wirth 1938).  In response to sensory overload and the high stimulus level 
in urban areas, people withdraw from others.   
More recent literature supports these early findings.  People know one another in 
small communities, and thus, are better able to develop norms of trust and reciprocity, to 
hold people accountable for their behavior, and to develop habits of participation.  In 
smaller communities, individuals often have greater kinship ties to others within the 
community, and may have lived there for generations.  Cities are thought to promote 
superficial interactions among strangers and allow individuals to live anonymously.  
Civic participation is higher in smaller communities because they are contexts in which 
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people feel efficacious and are interested in local affairs (Oliver 2001; Gimpel 1999; 
Nardulli, Dalager and Greco 1996; Fischer 1975).  Robert Putnam finds high 
organizational involvement and participation in states without major urban centers, such 
as North Dakota (2000).   
 Based on this literature, one would expect that adolescents growing up in smaller 
towns and rural areas to be more knowledgeable, efficacious and participatory than those 
in urban areas.  Although this may true for these outcomes, the issue of tolerance may be 
different.  There is a paradox about small towns.  Even as they are lauded for their high 
levels of social capital and civic involvement, small towns and rural areas are 
characterized as intolerant, backward, and unaccepting of both categorical (racial, ethnic, 
religious) and attitudinal diversity.  Recent crimes against homosexuals, such as Matthew 
Shepard, and racial minorities, such as James Byrd, in rural areas are seen by many as 
illustrations of their intolerant character.  Dahl and Tufte posit that an increase in size 
contributes to “persistent and overt differences in political outlooks, interest and 
demands” (1973, 91).  Wirth (1938) and Simmel (1922) contend that urban life 
encourages greater tolerance and support for universalist attitudes as a result of density 
and heterogeneity in urban areas.  I expect that political and racial tolerance will be lower 
in rural and small towns than in urban areas.   
In short, I expect to find that the benefits and costs of living in a city or a rural 
area depend on the outcome one is interested in analyzing.  Growing up in a small town 
may be better for socialization into political knowledge, efficacy and participation, but 
not the best places for instilling tolerance and acceptance of diverse peoples and opinions.  
These differences are likely a product of the composition of small communities versus 
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larger, urban areas.  Smaller towns are much more homogeneous than urban areas, both 
in terms of their demographics (racial, ethnic, religious make-up) and their attitudes 
(political and social preferences).  Although individual urban neighborhoods are 
extremely homogeneous, the city as a whole is very diverse compared to a small town.  
For this reason, it is important to examine the composition, including indicators for the 
racial, economic, and political composition of communities.  Size effects may simply 
drop out once I control for the composition of the towns. 
 
Socioeconomic Composition  
At the simplest level, the socioeconomic composition of the community provides 
(or denies) objective resources.  Affluent communities are more likely to have public 
schools with new textbooks, excellent equipment, athletic facilities, and a plethora of 
Advanced Placement classes from which children can choose.  They attract the best 
teachers and administrators because of the salary, safety and desirability of the areas, and 
the opportunities to teach college-bound students with fewer behavioral and academic 
problems.  Impoverished communities, whether in urban or rural areas, have difficulty 
attracting good teachers, and often suffer from run-down facilities and little money for 
new textbooks, equipment and state-of-the-art athletic facilities.  Teachers and other 
personnel are often unwilling to teach in these places because of safety issues, and the 
likelihood of teaching “problem” students. 
Beyond the quality of the schools, the socioeconomic composition confers other 
objective advantages and disadvantages.  In poor communities, there are fewer libraries 
and community centers, fewer places of (legitimate) business and doctor’s offices, and 
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fewer single-family homes and more rental and public housing.  Impoverished 
communities, especially those in urban areas, have higher crime and unemployment rates.  
These objective differences do not simply mean that individuals in impoverished 
communities must travel further to the doctor or to their jobs than those in affluent areas.  
The objective criteria bestow psychological and social benefits and burdens that have 
serious consequences for socialization. 
As discussed earlier, in addition to objective resources, the socioeconomic 
composition produces a set of norms for behavior and attitudes through social interaction 
(Huckfeldt and Kohfeld 1989; Oliver and Mendelberg 2000).  In this way, the 
composition can have beneficial or detrimental effects on the socialization of young 
people.  Growing up in an affluent neighborhood is likely to bestow certain psychological 
and social benefits on all children, regardless of their own family background.  According 
to theories of collective socialization and contagion, affluent communities are better for 
all children (Jencks and Mayer 1990; Brooks-Gunn, Duncan, Klebanov, and Sealand 
1993).  With collective socialization, members of the community use both formal and 
informal methods of social control to let residents, especially children, know what is and 
is not acceptable.  Contagion describes how behaviors, both good and bad, spread from 
peer-to-peer (Brooks-Gunn 1995).  Where individuals are employed and where they are 
politically and socially engaged, young people “catch” these behaviors.  Similarly, where 
there are many who drop out of school and where many teenagers have children of their 
own, these behaviors are also contagious. 
William Julius Wilson’s work describes how the processes of collective 
socialization and contagion work, along with the structural inequalities of joblessness and 
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discrimination, to create an “urban underclass” where poverty, unemployment, and crime 
are perpetuated in each generation that grows up in that environment (1987; 1996).  
Legitimate sources of employment are increasingly located outside the neighborhood, 
and many poor, urban residents do not have transportation or child care to get to jobs.  
Young people lack role models engaged in society-sanctioned behaviors.  They see many 
of their peers drop out of school, have babies, and begin to engage in illegal activities.  
Socialization into the community’s culture involves learning to “follow one’s inclinations 
as they have been developed by influence or learning from other members of the 
community that one belongs to or identifies with” (Wilson 1996, 66).  The interactions 
with others in the neighborhood inhibit social control by creating an environment of 
social disorganization (Sampson 1997).   
These theories suggest that adolescents growing up in affluent neighborhoods and 
communities are likely to have higher levels of knowledge and other democratic values.  
Findings of this nature are likely to surprise almost no one, and so, in addition to the 
economic composition, I also examine its interaction with community size.  Much of the 
literature on the deleterious effects of poverty is located within urban politics, urban 
education and urban sociology.  Because the data I employ include an entire range of 
community types, I can examine whether poverty has the same negative consequences in 
small towns and suburbs as it does in urban areas.  Given the literature detailed above 
related to community size, it is plausible that poverty does not affect smaller towns in the 
same way that it affects urban areas.  Smaller towns are similarly impoverished and set 
apart from mainstream society as cities, and yet, political participation and interest is 
generally at higher levels in small towns versus cities.   
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Racial Composition and Heterogeneity 
Racial composition influences the development of political attitudes through the 
interaction of one’s individual racial categorization and the racial composition of the 
environment.  There are three main theories related to racial heterogeneity and political 
behavior, especially attitudes related to tolerance.  They are the power-threat theory, the 
contact hypothesis and racial group identity theory.  These theories often generate 
contradictory hypotheses, and were conceived, almost exclusively, to explain the 
attitudes and behaviors of whites and blacks.  Even so, they offer a starting point at which 
to begin setting up expectations and testing hypotheses.   
Power-threat theory holds that as the proportion of blacks in the local 
environment increases, white racial attitudes become more hostile, and whites turnout to 
vote at higher rates (Blalock 1965; Key 1949).1  According to this hypothesis, whites are 
more hostile to integration (Wilcox and Roof 1978; Fossett and Kiecolt 1989; Blalock 
1965) and are more ideologically conservative (Giles and Hertz 1994; Glaser 1994) when 
blacks make up a greater proportion of the their community because they feel threats to 
their economic, social and political standing.  Intolerance and violence is most apparent 
in places where whites have held longtime majority standing (Green, Strolovich and 
Wong 1998).  The racial environment may have different effects on some democratic 
values than others.  While an interracial community might foster turnout due to threat 
perception, it may depress tolerance.     
                                                     
1 Most of the literature on each of these theories has analyzed black/white relations, with 
little analysis of other racial minorities.  I expect there will be some differences and some 
similarities among blacks, Latinos, and Asians with regard to these theories.   
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Other scholars believe that interracial contact has the opposite effect – familiarity 
breeds acceptance, rather than contempt.  The contact hypothesis contends that an 
individual’s prejudices can be alleviated by new, positive information derived from 
contact with others from different racial groups (Allport 1954).  Interracial contact is 
thought to reduce prejudice through various mechanisms.  Contact introduces information 
contradicting group-based stereotypes through the exchange of more intimate information 
(Dixon 2001).  
There is virtually no consensus, however, that this is indeed the case.  Many 
scholars find empirical support for the contact hypothesis for both whites (Carsey 1995; 
Meer and Freedman 1966; Sigelman and Welch 1993) and blacks (Ellison and Powers 
1994; Works 1961).  Yet, literature on school desegregation indicates that mere contact 
does not automatically breed friendships and understanding among people of different 
races (Braddock, Dawkins, and Wilson 1995; Bullock 1978; Miller and Brewer 1984; 
Schofield 1989; Short 1993).  The nature of the contact is important.  Prejudice is 
lessened only in certain circumstances, such as when groups are forced to cooperate with 
one another, as in the “Robber’s Cave” experiment (Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood and 
Sherif 1961), or when contact is among people of equal status (Allport 1954; Dovidio, 
Gaertner and Validzic 1998; Jackman and Crane 1986).   
Finally, the last theory is racial group identity theory.  This theory is part of social 
identity theory, which is based on the idea that members of groups compare their in-
group with out-groups, and that members of subordinate groups feel a need to 
compensate, in some way, for this identity (Tajfel 1978).  There are several ways of 
accomplishing this, including everything from rejecting one’s identity to forming strong 
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social bonds with other members of the in-group to counteract negative stereotypes and 
discrimination within society. 
The strength of one’s racial identity is believed to vary by the racial composition 
of one’s community or neighborhood.  It may be most salient and influential on behavior 
in places where blacks (and other ethnic minorities) are in areas of high black density 
(Bledsoe, Welch, Sigelman and Combs 1995).  Evidence is mixed about the effectiveness 
of a strong racial identity in promoting political participation.  Some find that a strong 
identity aids participation and tolerance among racial minorities (Bledsoe, Welch, 
Sigelman and Combs 1994; Gurin, Hatchett and Jackson 1989; Jackson 1984; Herring, 
Jankowski and Brown 1999).  Others suggest that this identity leads individuals, 
especially adolescents, to rebel against the dominate white, middle-class culture and 
associate success, such as good grades and school participation with “acting white” 
(Fordham and Ogbu 1986; Ogbu 1991).  Thus, it is unclear whether a homogeneous 
environment that fosters a strong racial or ethnic identity will promote democratic values 
among members of racial minorities.  My study will speak to this question. 
Given that the theories generate opposing hypotheses, it is difficult to develop an 
overall hypothesis about the effects of racial composition and heterogeneity on 
democratic values.  Even so, there are good reasons to doubt the likelihood that racial 
heterogeneity and interracial contact, as practiced in this country at this time, is going to 
foster racial tolerance.  Given that contact between different racial groups is rarely 
between equals, and that in many respects, America is becoming more segregated rather 
than less segregated (Massey and Denton 1993), I do not expect young people in the most 
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diverse setting to exhibit more tolerant attitudes than those in homogeneous 
environments.   
I should note that the implications of my findings will be complicated and 
challenging, both from a normative standpoint and in terms of public policy.  For 
example, assuming my hypothesis is correct and that some racial diversity is better than 
none or a lot, this poses a serious normative issue.  Is it best to maintain stability and not 
“rock the boat” by keeping the “right” balance of racial heterogeneity?  This harkens 
back, in many ways, to arguments against the integration of schools and neighborhoods.  
Furthermore, from a policy perspective, there may be no ethical way to construct 
communities with particular racial compositions.  The political and logistic forces against 
such manipulation are enormous (for examples in education, see Stone 1998).  I will 
address both the normative and policy implications of my findings in the final chapter, 
but I realize at the outset that there are no easy answers with regard to these questions. 
 
Political Composition and Heterogeneity 
The final set of contextual variables I discuss is political composition.  I am most 
interested in the role of party dominance, or political heterogeneity, in the development 
of democratic values.  Party strength, in this sense, is the extent to which a community is 
dominated by one party.  The domination of one party within communities has been and 
is quite common within the United States.  For many years, the South was “solidly” 
Democratic, where voters would identify and vote Democratic for every office, from 
local sheriff up to president.  Although this has certainly changed, even today the map of 
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the U.S. can be thought of in terms of “red and blue America,” where some states are 
strongly Republican, and others are strongly Democratic.   
Party strongholds, by definition, have very weak party competition.  Minor parties 
generally assume that it is a waste of scarce resources to sink time and money into an 
area that has always gone to their rival.  Competitiveness fuels interest and discussion, 
and stimulates media coverage and campaign advertising.  Voters, and potential voters, 
identifying with the minor party in environments on one-party dominance are, at most, 
disenfranchised, and at least, underrepresented by their party and their elected officials.  
These residents are less likely to participate because they know their candidates is 
unlikely to win.  One-sided contexts not only affect participation, but they also influence 
levels of political efficacy and political discussion.  Minorities are less likely to discuss 
politics and share their views than those in the majority (Noelle-Neumann 1984; 
Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995).  Although noncompetitive districts dampen turnout and 
interest among all voters, because they see no reason to get involved, the effects are 
likely to be more destructive for those in the minority party.  I expect to find, then, that 
adolescents identifying with a minor party in a community of one-sided contests will 
have less support for the democratic values I am studying. 
 
What are Democratic Values? 
I have chosen to focus on four key democratic values that I believe capture the 
essence of “good” citizenship and the attributes many hope children acquire by the time 
they enter adulthood.  These are political knowledge, political efficacy, participation in 
school and civic activities, and tolerance for diversity.  Before describing why I have 
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selected these particular outcomes, I should point out that although I will consistently 
refer to them collectively as “democratic values,” I understand that political knowledge 
and participation in school activities are not “values” in the sense that psychologists and 
political scientists studying political behavior often conceive of them.  A value is 
generally thought to be an abstract concept about what is desirable or undesirable and is 
believed by some to be a building block of human behavior (Rokeach 1973).  In this case, 
I am truly only examining one value – tolerance.  Political knowledge is more about skills 
that are necessary for participation; efficacy is more of a belief in one’s ability; and 
participation is most certainly an activity, and not a value.  The main reason for referring 
to them as democratic values is for simplicity.  Yet, I did not select the term “value” 
haphazardly; instead, each of these attributes is something that is valued within 
democratic societies.  For these reasons, I consistently refer to my dependent variables as 
democratic values. 
Political knowledge is one of the best predictors of political participation among 
adults (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995).  High school 
students with more knowledge are also more likely to participate in school activities and 
to say they will vote in the future (Niemi and Junn 1998; Torney-Purta, Lehmann, 
Oswald, and Schulz 2001).  Political knowledge is an essential building block to all the 
other values.  By political knowledge, my concern is with fundamental knowledge about 
political structures, historically significant events and the identities and roles of 
officeholders in the political system (Garramone and Atkin 1986).   
However, knowledge is not everything.  Individuals must believe that they have 
the capacity to engage in politics and that if they do so, their voice is meaningfully heard 
 23
at some level of government.  It is imperative not only to teach young people the facts 
about their government, but also to impart a sense that participation is meaningful.  
Among the mechanisms of personal agency, “none is more central or pervasive than 
people’s beliefs about their capabilities to exercise control over their own level of 
functioning and over events that affect their lives” (Bandura 1993, 118).  “Self efficacy” 
has been defined as “beliefs in one’s capabilities to organize and execute the courses of 
action required to produce given attainments” (Bandura 1997, 2).  In social learning 
theory, perceptions of self-efficacy influence one’s choice in activities, the perseverance 
and level of effort one has in pursuing an activity, and ultimately, the degree of success 
achieved.  Political efficacy, like self-efficacy, is thought to be central to political 
participation – a necessary prerequisite for the exercise of duties as simple as voting and 
as complex as contacting government officials or volunteering for a campaign (Campbell, 
Gurin and Miller 1954; Abramson and Aldrich 1982).  Internal political efficacy is the 
sense that one has the necessary resources and knowledge to effectively participate in 
politics.  One could characterize it as one’s sense of self-confidence about involvement in 
politics (Almond and Verba 1963).2   
  Another common variable among socialization researchers today is participation.  
Because I am looking at adolescents, it makes no sense to focus exclusively on voting, as 
they are ineligible.  I examine students’ intentions to vote.  Although many students who 
                                                     
2 Internal efficacy is only one part of political efficacy.  External political efficacy is the 
belief that your opinion matters and that government is responsive to your needs and 
wishes.  It is not simply a reflection of what one thinks of incumbent office-holders at a 
given moment, but reflects a more enduring attitude toward the regime (Iyengar 1980).  It 
is theoretically and empirically different from internal efficacy.  An individual may have 
high internal political efficacy – he may believe in his ability to participate in politics – 
but, he might believe that government is unresponsive and that most politicians are 
corrupt, and thus have low external political efficacy (Bandura 1993).  Because of the 
restrictions of the data, I only examine internal efficacy here. 
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say they intend to vote may never actually vote, intention is still important.  Those who 
say they do not plan to vote are very unlikely to vote when they are eligible.  I focus more 
on their activities in school, such as athletics, band, student government, and academic 
clubs, as well as activities in the community, such as church, boy scouts, and 
volunteering.  Numerous scholars have found that young people who engage in school 
activities are more likely to participate in politics and civic activities as adults (Youniss, 
McLellan, and Yates 1997; Flanagan and Sherrod 1998; Astin, Sax and Avalos 1999; 
Beane, Turner, Jones and Lipka 1981; Hanks and Eckland 1978).  School activities offer 
young people opportunities to learn how to work with others toward a common goal and 
often, to become involved in their communities by selling advertising for the school 
paper or by tutoring children at the local elementary school.  Some activities, such as 
student government, give students practice in using the skills necessary for participation 
as adults, introducing them to basic political roles and processes.  It is no surprise that 
such activities help adolescents “incorporate civic involvement into their [civic] identity” 
(Youniss, et al. 1997, 624).  
Because I am interested in “democratic values” rather than simply “civic 
engagement,” I also include tolerance.  While one can be intolerant and still participate in 
politics, tolerance is still an important democratic value.  Broader conceptions of 
citizenship include democratic deliberation in which citizens discuss the issues of the day 
with one another, even (especially) those who disagree or are from different groups 
(Barber 1984).  In order to deliberate, tolerance for opposing viewpoints is necessary 
(Gutmann 1999).  I will look at racial tolerance and tolerance for immigrants, as well as 
tolerance for dissenting opinions.   
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 Finally, although I believe these values capture “good” citizenship, I examine 
them on a continuum.  Rather than conceptualize “good” citizenship versus “bad 
citizenship” in categorical terms, I examine citizenship in terms of “better” or “worse.”  
While there is understandable disagreement on the exact level of knowledge, or efficacy, 
necessary to be a “good” citizen, most scholars would agree that more knowledge is 
better than less, more efficacy is better than less efficacy, and similarly with tolerance 
and participation (Galston 2001). 
 
School Size 
One of the reasons to examine the influence of an educational policy on political 
socialization is because of the importance of schools in the lives of young people.  
Schools are important institutions within communities; they are one of the only 
institutions that everyone, at some point, must pass through.  Young people spend the 
majority of their waking hours in school, or working at some school-related activity.  In 
spite of Coleman’s findings in the 1960s that parental socioeconomic status largely 
determines school achievement and success, most Americans are convinced that 
education is the key to climbing social and economic ladders.  Indeed, education reform 
has been on the national political agenda, as well as the agendas of many states, for more 
than two decades.  Many believe that at least one of the reasons parental background is 
such a strong precursor to educational success is because upper-income families have 
access to better schools, with more opportunities and better teachers.  The achievement 
gap between low-income and affluent children is due, at least in part, to unequal 
educational opportunities. 
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I chose to examine the policy issue of reducing school size because of my interest 
in community effects on socialization.  Public schools and the communities in which they 
are located are certainly related in size and composition.  Public schools in urban areas 
are larger (see Table 1.1) and are more diverse (see Table 1.2) than schools in small 
towns.  Although there is much more to the school experience than its size, school size is 
one aspect of organization and structure, and as many educational scholars point out, size 
influences aspects of school climate (Bryk and Driscoll 1988; Bryk, Lee and Holland 
1993).   
Smaller schools feel more like a community.  The atmosphere in smaller schools 
is less formal, less institutionalized as it is often described in large urban and suburban 
schools.  Teachers and students know one another, and parents often have more trust in 
their school authorities (Wasley, Fine, Gladden, Holland, King, Mosak, and Powerll 
2000; Lee and Loeb 2000).  Students feel better about themselves and their life chances 
in small schools (Rutter 1988; Fowler and Walberg 1991; Gregory 1992).  They can 
receive individual attention, and teachers are better equipped to prevent students from 
falling through the cracks.  Advocates of small schools insist that they are especially 
beneficial to students from low-income families and racial minorities (Friedkin and 
Necochea 1988; Johnson, Howley and Howley 2002; Howley 1995; Huang and Howley 
1993).   
The tide seems to have turned against big schools, and many agree that smaller 
schools are better.  Why, then, are schools so big?  For the first part of the 20th century, 
education policymakers and academics favored large schools on the grounds that they 
could produce economies of scale (Buzacott 1982; Guthrie 1979).  Schools had to  
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Table 1.1: Public Elementary and Secondary School Enrollment, Number of Schools and 
Average Size by Type of Locale, 1998-1999 
 Number of 
Students Enrolled 
(in thousands) 
Number of Schools Average School 
Size  
Central City of Large 
MSA1 
7423 11662 680 
Central City of 
Midsize MSA2 
6616 11911 567 
Urban Fringe of Large 
MSA3 
14692 22854 655 
Urban Fringe of 
Midsize MSA4 
4555 8267 566 
Large Town5 
 
626 1330 485 
Small Town6 
 
4747 11847 413 
Rural Area Outside a 
MSA7 
4323 16159 273 
Rural Area Inside a 
MSA8 
3707 7980 471 
Total 46689 92012 521 
1 Central city of metropolitan statistical area (MSA) with population of 400,000 or more 
or a population density of 6000 or more persons per square mile 
2 Central city of a MSA but not designated as a large central city 
3 Place within the MSA of a large central city 
4 Place within the MSA of a midsize central city 
5 Place not within a MSA but with population of 25,000 or more and defined as urban 
6 Place not within a MSA with a population of at least 2,500 but less than 25,000 
7 Place with a population of less than 2,500 outside a MSA 
8 Place with a population of less than 2,500 inside a MSA 
 
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, 
Common Core of Data survey; and U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the 
Census. 
 
accommodate the growing numbers of students in the Baby Boom Generation, and rather 
than build new schools, the argument was that larger schools would better serve this 
population.  Changes in the labor market also demanded a labor force that was more 
specialized than ever, and many believed that large schools could offer more specialized 
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Table 1.2: Public Elementary and Secondary School Enrollment, by Race/Ethnicity and 





Hispanic Asian or 
Pacific Islander
Central City of Large 
MSA1 
24.9 35.2 31.9 7.2 
Central City of Midsize 
MSA2 
52.6 24.3 17.5 3.6 
Urban Fringe of Large 
MSA3 
63.1 13.2 17.0 5.9 
Place with a MSA4 
 
75.3 11.2 10.1 2.0 
Large Town5 
 
65.3 15.0 11.7 2.0 
Small Town6 
 
73.7 13.5 8.3 0.8 
Rural Area Outside a 
MSA7 
79.2 9.5 4.4 1.3 
Rural Area Inside a 
MSA8 
83.4 7.3 6.3 1.7 
Total in all public 
schools 
60.6 16.9 16.5 4.1 
*Numbers in cells are percentages. 
 
1 Central city of metropolitan statistical area (MSA) with population of 250,000 or more 
2 Central city of a MSA but not designated as a large central city 
3 Place within the MSA of a large central city 
4 Place within the MSA  
5 Place not within a MSA but with population of 25,000 or more and defined as urban 
6 Place not within a MSA with a population of at least 2,500 but less than 25,000 
7 Place not within a MSA and designated as rural  
8 Place within a MSA designated as rural  
 
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, 
Common Core of Data survey, 1999 
 
courses and afford amenities like science laboratories, athletic teams and Advanced 
Placement courses that would help this generation go to college (Conant 1959). 
Education scholars argue that the rising size of public schools (see Figure 1.2) has 
caused serious problems for schools and students.  They contend that the climate in 
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smaller schools creates a positive learning and working environment for all students.  
Statistics show that small schools have fewer problems with discipline and truancy, lower 
drop-out rates and higher academic achievement (Pittman and Haughwout 1987; Burke 
1987; Duke and Perry 1978; Gottfredson 1985; Gregory 1992; Stockard and Mayberry 
1992).  I examine whether students in smaller schools have higher levels of democratic 
values than students in larger schools.  School climate has also been shown important for 
fostering civic values (Jennings, Ehman and Niemi 1974; Ehman 1980; Leming 1985), 
but no one has looked specifically at school size.   
 I first analyze school size without community controls, in order to try to replicate 
findings in educational scholarship on the benefits of smaller schools.  I then examine 
whether the relationships between democratic values and size change as I begin to look at  
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community-level variables.  I anticipate that the benefits of smaller school size are more 
modest once I have controlled for the communities in which the schools are located.  
Given that small schools are more often located in small towns, the benefits of their small 
size may be due, at least in part, to aspects of small towns – their size or homogeneity.  
Figure 1.3 illustrates the proposed relationships between school size, community context, 
and democratic values. 
 
Outline of Dissertation 
 Chapter 2 describes the data that will be used in the dissertation.  As mentioned 
earlier, I use two different sources of survey data, the NHES and the MCVS.  This 
chapter also presents the sampling procedures and frequencies of relevant variables, as 
well as the methods use to construct my dependent and independent variables.   
 
Figure 1.3:  Predicted Causal Relationships between School Size, Community 




































 Chapter 3 examines school size and democratic values, without any community 
context variables.  Then, each subsequent chapter examines a different aspect of the 
community context.  In each chapter, I look at school size and environmental influences, 
in order to learn the role that school size plays independently of the community in which 
the school is located.  In Chapter 4, I test the hypothesis that smaller towns and rural 
areas have higher levels of political knowledge, efficacy and participation, but lower 
levels of tolerance.   
 Chapters 5 and 6 look at aspects of community composition.  Chapter 5 examines 
the socioeconomic composition of the community, and tests the hypothesis that affluent 
neighbors bestow benefits on all their residents.  I also analyze the extent to which the 
effects of poverty vary across different types of communities.  Chapter 6 looks at the 
hypothesis that children growing up in homogeneous communities may have higher 
levels of some democratic values, but lower levels of others.  Specifically, racial 
homogeneity might promote political knowledge, participation and efficacy, but dampen 
tolerance for diversity.  The last chapter summarizes the important findings and discusses 







Data and Methods 
 
In this chapter, I give information about the two sources of data I use throughout 
the dissertation.  I describe how the data were collected, and report the actual questions 
that I use to test my hypotheses.  I also present frequencies of the most important 
variables in the analyses, and detail how I construct indexes from some of the questions 
in the surveys.  This chapter should serve as a reference to all proceeding chapters, as I 
will not go through the construction of the variables, or their distributions, in subsequent 
chapters. 
 
National Household Education Survey 
The National Household Education Survey (NHES) is a data collection system of 
the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) that is designed to address a wide 
range of education-related issues.  The NHES is a system of telephone surveys of the 
non-institutionalized civilian population in the United States, including all 50 states and 
the District of Columbia.  Households are selected by using random digit dialing (RDD) 
methods, including special procedures to remove nonresidential and nonworking 
telephone numbers from the sample.  NHES surveys have been conducted in the springs 
of 1991, 1993, 1995, 1996, 1999, 2001, and 2003 on such educational issues as adult 
education, school programs and activities, early childhood programs, school readiness, 
and civic involvement.  For obvious reasons, I will be using the civic involvement study; 
the most recent civic involvement survey was conducted in the spring of 1999.   
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Interviews were conducted using computer-assisted telephone interviewing.  
There are three possible surveys a household was requested to answer:  Parent Interview, 
Youth Interview, and Adult Education Interview.3  The Parent Interview included a 
variety of educational topics, each appropriate for certain age/grade groups of children. 
Parents were asked questions about such topics as early childhood program participation, 
family involvement in learning outside of school, school practices to involve and support 
families, and about their child’s postsecondary education plans.  They were also asked 
information about their child’s demographic characteristics, household characteristics, 
and the child’s health and disability status.  The response rate for the Parent Interview is 
66.7 percent.  
The Youth Interview was conducted with young people in grades 6 through 12 
whose parents had completed a Parent Interview.  The NHES: 1999 Youth Interview 
focused on school, family environment, civic involvement, community service, and plans 
for postsecondary education.  Interviews were completed on 7,913 youths in grades 6 
through 12 (only one per household).  The average administration time for the Parent 
Interview was 14 minutes, and for the Youth Interview, it was 12.5 minutes.  
Approximately 87 percent of youth whose parents completed their interview responded 
completely to the Youth Interview.4  Because I am interested in students in public high 
schools, my analysis includes only those youth in grades 9-12 who stated they attend a 
                                                     
3 The Adult Education Interview focused on the participation of civilian adults (ages 16 
years and older and not enrolled in 12th grade or below) in a wide range of educational 
activities, such as English as a second language instruction, adult basic skills and GED 
preparation classes, courses taken toward a college degree or vocational diploma.  I do 
not use this part of the survey, since I am interested in traditional public high schools. 
4 This is a conditional response rate (conditional on the parents completing their 
interview).  The unconditional, unweighted response rate for the Youth Interview is 57.9 
percent.   
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public high school (n=3,010).  Table 2.1 shows the characteristics of the sample across 
many important indicators.   
Table 2.1: Characteristics of the Sample in NHES 
 
 Valid Percent 
Grade 
     Ninth 
     Tenth 
     Eleventh 







     Northeast 
     Midwest 
     South 







     Male 





     White, non-Hispanic 
     Black, non-Hispanic 
     Latino 
     Asian/Pacific Islander 
     Native American 





                                       2.9 
                                         .8 
                                       1.8 
Foreign Born Status 
     Native-born, in U.S. 
     Foreign born 
 
93.5 
                                       6.5 
Parental Income 
     Less Than $15 K 
     $15,001-$25,000 
     $25,001-$35,000 
     $35,001-$40,000 
     $40,001-$50,000 
     $50,001-$75,000 










     Less Than High School 
     High School 
     Vo/Tech or Some College 
     College Degree 
     Post-graduate 
 







     Planning to go to 4-yr college 




Values in cells represent the percentages of students in public high schools in the NHES 
across each category.  Values may not add to 100% because of rounding. 
 
Dependent Variables  
The Youth Interview contained a number of items related to the four dimensions 
of democratic values outlined in Chapter 1: political knowledge, political efficacy, civic 
and school participation, and tolerance for diversity.  The questionnaire includes two sets 
of standard-knowledge test questions.  Each set is composed of five questions that focus 
on political leaders, processes and constitutional issues.  Half the students were asked one 
set of knowledge questions, and the other half received the other set of questions.  This 
splits my sample for political knowledge.  Because the questions are similar in nature, 
and the first set of questions yielded a few more total responses, I use this test as my 
dependent measure throughout the dissertation.  These questions can be found in Table 
2.2.  I constructed a knowledge index by summing the number of correct answers out of 
five, and then rescaled the variables from 0-100 to ease the presentation of the results.  
The mean is 38.6 percent correct (n=1784). 
There are two efficacy-related questions (see Table 2.2).  Here again, I created an 
additive index by summing the questions.  Respondents could answer simply “yes” or 
“no” for both questions, making three possible answers when the responses were summed 
(a scale of 0-3).  The mean is 1.34 (n=3910). 
Political participation is measured by individual item indicators from the survey.  
Students were asked, “During this school year, have you participated in any school 
activities such as sports teams, safety patrol, or school clubs?” Students were also asked 
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Table 2.2:  Question Wording for Dependent Variables in NHES 
 
Political Knowledge Test 
1. What job or political office is now held by Al Gore? 
2. Whose responsibility is it to determine if a law in constitutional or not…is it the 
President, the Congress, or the Supreme Court? 
3. Which party has the most members in the House of Representatives in 
Washington? 
4. How much of a majority is required for the U.S. Senate and House to override a 
presidential veto? 
5. Which of the two major parties is more conservative at the national level? 
 
Political Efficacy 
1. People might say, “Politics and government seem so complicated that a person 
like me can’t really understand what’s going on.” Is this true for you? 
2. Also, people might say, “My family doesn’t have any say is what the federal 
government does.” Is this true for your family? 
 
Political Tolerance 
1. If a person wanted to make a speech in your community against churches and 
religion, should he or she be allowed to speak? 
2. Suppose a book that most people disapproved of was written, for example, 
saying it was all right to take illegal drugs.  Should a book like that be kept out 
of a public library? 
 
Participation in School Activities 
1. During this school year, do you participate in any school activities, such as 
sports teams, safety patrol, or school clubs?  
 
Participation in Out of School Activities 
2. During this school year, do you participate in any activity outside of school, such 




whether, during the school year, they participate “in any activity outside of school, such 
as music lessons, scouting, church or temple youth group, or organized sports team like 
soccer?”  They responded either “yes” or “no” to each question.  Sixty-nine percent of 
students participate in a school-related activity (n=3906), and sixty-four percent stated 
they participate in some type of out of school activity (n=390).  
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Finally, tolerance for diversity in the NHES is measured by examining two 
questions related to political tolerance.  Again, each individual question has two possible 




The main independent variables in the analyses are school size and the 
dimensions of community context I use in Chapters 4-6.  Because each chapter examines 
a different set of contextual variables, I save the discussion of these variables for the 
specific chapters in which they are analyzed.  School size is simply measured by the 
number of students enrolled in the child’s school.  Howley (1994) contends that instead 
of examining school enrollment, researchers should look at enrollment per grade.  A 
school with 1000 students that has twelve grades is much different from one has only 11th 
and 12th grades.  I calculated this, and ran many of my analyses.  The results did not 
change, and so I simply use enrollment in school. 
Although enrollment within school would not seem to be a complicated variable, 
it turned out to be incredibly complicated because of the way the NHES collected this 
information.  Since the survey was not conducted with school size effects in mind, 
researchers simply asked the parents the size of their child’s school.  Parents were only 
given four categories, with one of them being “under 1000.”  Half the parents responded 
that their child attends a school within this category.  First of all, the categorical nature of 
this very important variable posed a real problem because of a lack of variability.   
Secondly, I was skeptical that parents have a good understanding of the size of their 
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child’s school.  It does not seem to be a common question, like whether their child 
attends a public school or a private school. 
Since school size is such an important part of my analysis, I decided to largely 
ignore the parents’ responses to this question, and entered a continuous variable by hand, 
along with several other school-related variables (free/reduced lunch proportion, racial 
composition, charter/magnet school, and whether the school receives Title I funds).  I 
constructed this variable by matching the zip codes for each respondent with the public 
high school within its borders.5  The data were obtained from the Department of 
Education website, which allows for individuals to search for all of the public schools 
within the U.S.  In most cases, this process was straightforward, but other cases were 
more complicated.  First, not all zip codes have public high schools.  When this was the 
case, the DOE data allowed me to search with a 50-mile radius of the zip code.  I chose 
the high school closest to the zip code.  Second, some zip codes contain multiple public 
high schools.  In this case, I took the average of all the schools within the zip code.  
Although there is likely to be some error in this method of coding (i.e., there may be 
cases where a respondent does not attend the school in his/her zip code), it is simply the 
best approximation of school size one can obtain.  A continuous measure is generally 
preferable to a categorical one for multivariate analyses. 
Another important variable is school climate.  Advocates of small schools argue 
that school size matters because smaller schools provide better educational climates.  
They are more open, and feel more like a community.  The NHES includes two questions 
that directly ask about the openness of the school’s climate.  Students were asked if they 
                                                     
5 Most of the schools are traditional high schools with grades 9-12.  Others contain 
students in junior high (grades 6-8) and some contain all grades (K-12).   
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agreed that students and teachers respected one another and if they agreed that students 
were listened to in school decisions.  Both variables had 4 categories, which I recoded to 
move from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree” so that higher values indicate a more 
open school climate.  I created an index by summing the variables.  The index has a scale 
from 2 to 8.  The distribution can be found in Table 2.3.   
In addition to these main independent variables, I include indicators of civic 
education, as well as traditional individual controls.  The NHES includes two questions 
related to civic courses.  It does not ask students the number of civics courses they have 
taken, or specifically which ones they may have taken.  Instead, the survey asked 
students, “Last year, did you have any courses that required you to pay attention to 
government, politics, or national issues?”  Students simply responded “yes” or “no.”  I 
use this question to measure the influence of civics coursework, although admittedly, a 
course may require students to pay attention to politics without specifically being a civics 
course.  In addition, students were asked, “As a result of these courses (at school), would 
you say your interest in things like politics and national issues increased?”  Students gave 
one of three possible answers, which I recoded from “not much at all” to “a good deal.” 
This measures students’ attitudes toward their civics coursework.  Niemi and Junn (1998) 
show that when students enjoy their courses, they are more knowledgeable and more 
interested in learning about government and politics (see also Gimpel, Lay and 
Schuknecht 2003).  Again, distributions are in Table 2.3. 
I also control for students’ media use, specifically how often they watch television 
news or listen to national news on the radio.  Students could respond that they “hardly 
ever,” “at least once a month,” “at least once a week,” and “almost every day” watched or  
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Table 2.3: Frequencies of Independent Variables in NHES 
 
 Valid Percent 
School Size 
     Under 600 
     601-900 
     901-1500 
     1501-2000 








     Not Open/Closed 
     Somewhat closed 
     Middle 
     Somewhat open 
     Open 
 




                                             3.5 
Civics Coursework 
     No 




Civics Increased Interest in 
Politics 
     Not at all 
     Some 







     Hardly ever 
     Once/month  
     Once/week 






Discuss politics with parents 
     Hardly ever 
     Once/month  
     Once/week 





                                             7.2 
Values in cells represent the proportion of students in public high schools in NHES.  
Values may not sum to 100% because of rounding. 
 
listened to national news.  In addition to consumption of news, many scholars have found 
that discussing the news with parents is also an important method for young people to 
form their opinions about politics (Richardson 2003; Torney-Purta and Amadeo 2003).  
In the NHES, students were asked, “Thinking about the current school year, how often do 
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you usually talk about politics or national issues with (your parents or other adult in the 
household)?”  Again, they responded from “hardly ever” to “almost every day” and their 
frequencies can be seen in Table 2.3.  The individual controls are grade level, gender, 
race/ethnicity, parental income, parental education status, and whether students plan to go 
to a four-year college.  These frequencies are located in Table 2.1.   
 
Metro Civic Values Study 
The Metro Civic Values Study (MCVS) began with aim of representing a variety 
of geographic contexts in the Baltimore-Washington metropolitan area (Gimpel 1999-
2000).  The sample was selected using multistage cluster sampling techniques.  In the 
first stage, 14 clusters, in the form of school districts, were selected within the greater 
Baltimore-Washington area (including the entire state of Maryland) that represented 
urban, suburban, and rural contexts of varying levels of homogeneity on relevant 
population characteristics, such as race, socioeconomic status, political partisanship and 
political participation.   
At the next stage, researchers selected schools out of the 14 clusters by random 
draw.  They selected a few more schools in the districts with larger populations, because 
of their greater heterogeneity across the relevant dimensions.  Each district had a 
minimum of one school selected.  Once the school sites were selected, the students were 
then selected.  Ideally, students would have been selected randomly, however given the 
necessity of cooperation of school authorities, a less than perfectly random selection was 
obtained.  School authorities would not allow researchers to disrupt regular school 
activities by randomly taking students out of their classes to complete a survey.  Instead, 
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researchers were required to add something to the social studies curriculum and to survey 
students within their social studies classes.6   
Fortunately, social studies is a sufficiently ubiquitous part of the high school 
curriculum that the resulting sample is representative of the school population across 
several dimensions: race/ethnicity, gender, socioeconomic status, and grade level (See 
Table 2.4).  Although no specific data can be matched on the schools’ populations with 
regard to achievement level, researchers were diligent in making sure that they surveyed 
classes of various achievement levels.  At least half of the students at each school were in 
the “standard” academic track, and only 1-2 classes per school were A.P. or in the honors 
track.  About 70-200 students were surveyed at each school (depending on school size), 
yielding a total sample size of 3,062.  Surveys were conducted in person, by a member of 
a small 3-4-person research team in the springs of 1999 and 2000.     
Table 2.4:  Population and Sample Characteristics in MCVS, by Race/Ethnicity 
 
School  Category White  
Non-Hisp. Black Hispanic Asian 
Other/ 
Biracial*
Sample 94 1 0 0 5 School 1 
Population 94 4 0 2 0 
Sample 28 60 2 2 8 School 2 
Population 22 78 1 1 0 
Sample 55 21 5 6 13 School 3 
Population 32 28 25 15 0 
Sample 79 20 0 0 1 School 4 
Population 59 38 2 1 0 
Sample 77 8 2 9 4 School 5 
Population 74 20 1 4 1 
                                                     
6 Researchers gave a short presentation about survey research, and led a discussion 
related to the items on the surveys.   
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School  Category White  
Non-Hisp. Black Hispanic Asian 
Other/ 
Biracial*
Sample 64 5 7 21 3 School 6 
Population 67 6 4 22 1 
Sample 1 95 0 0 4 School 7 
Population 1 98 0 1 0 
Sample 84 6 4 1 5 School 8 
Population 92 5 1 2 0 
Sample 1 89 2 2 6 School 9 
Population 1 92 2 2 3 
Sample 67 22 4 2 5 School 10 
Population 71 20 4 4 1 
Sample 95 0 2 2 1 School 11 
Population 99 0 0 1 0 
Sample 65 22 1 2 10 School 12 
Population 63 31 2 4 0 
Sample 76 5 3 3 13 School 13 
Population 75 21 3 1 0 
Sample 27 35 18 10 10 School 14 
Population 40 22 26 12 0 
Sample 28 17 31 7 17 School 15 
Population 17 30 50 3 0 
Sample 19 50 5 11 16 School 16 
Population 20 60 10 10 0 
Sample 98 1 0 1 0 School 17 
Population 98 1 1 1 0 
Sample 93 3 2 2 0 School 18 
Population 87 11 1 1 0 
Sample 5 74 11 5 5 School 19 
Population 10 70 12 8 0 
Sample 4 73 4 7 12 School 20 
Population 6 80 5 9 0 
Sample 45 21 4 25 5 School 21 
Population 36 35 7 22 0 
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School  Category White  
Non-Hisp. Black Hispanic Asian 
Other/ 
Biracial*
Sample 92 1 0 0 7 School 22 
Population 89 8 1 1 1 
Sample 40 37 3 11 9 School 23 
Population 34 50 6 10 0 
Sample 76 9 2 6 8 School 24 
Population 92 4 1 3 0 
Sample 33 31 9 18 9 School 25 
Population 24 37 18 21 0 
Sample 13 36 28 13 10 School 26 
Population 16 26 46 12 0 
Sample 33 13 34 10 10 School 27 
Population 39 15 32 14 0 
Sample 56 4 4 28 8 School 28 
Population 61 4 5 30 0 
Sample 54 13 21 5 7 School 29 
Population 66 7 19 9 0 
Note: Cell entries are percentages.   Figures may not total 100 percent due to 
rounding. 
* “Other” category for the sample population includes mainly those students who 
classified themselves as biracial.  This category is listed as 0 for most school 
population statistics because these school districts do not classify their students as 
biracial or multiracial.  The vast majority of bi-racial students were African-
American-Caucasian ancestry and these students are usually classified as black by 
school officials.    
 
Dependent Variables 
The MCVS allow me to test all of my dependent variables of interest except for 
civic and school activities.  To measure political participation, I use a question about 
whether the students would vote in the next presidential election if they were eligible.  
This is a simple dichotomous variable, and about 70 percent of students indicated they 
would vote in the next election.   
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The political knowledge test in the MCVS is similar to the one in the NHES.  
There are seven questions that address specific leaders and constitutional issues.  I 
summed these variables to construct a knowledge index, and rescaled the index from 0-
100.  The questions are listed in Table 2.5.  The mean is about 70 percent correct 
(n=2879).   
Table 2.5:  Question Wording for Dependent Measures in MCVS 
 
Political Knowledgea 
1. How many Senators are elected from each state? 
2. Who is elected to preside in the House of Representatives? 
3. Where can you find the Bill of Rights? 
4. Presidential elections are held every ____ years. 
5. What is the system called in which power is divided between the states and the 
federal government? 
6. Who is the current Vice President? 
7. Who is the current Chief Justice of the Supreme Court? 
Political Efficacy 
1. Other people understand government better than me. 
2. I have a good understanding of the issues facing our nation. 
3. I’m as well informed as others. 
4. Government is too complicated for people like me to understand. 
 
Racial Intolerance 
1. Immigrants should learn to speak English ASAP. 
2. It is better for different race/ethnicities to live apart. 
3. Asian immigration will contribute new ideas and customs to this community. 
4. There would be fewer problems in this country if there were fewer immigrants. 
5. Hispanic immigration will contribute new ideas and customs to this community. 
6. This town would be a better place if more immigrants moved in. 
 
a Students were given a multiple choice of four possible answers.   
 
The other dependent measures, political efficacy and racial intolerance, were 
constructed using principal components, a type of factor analysis.  The wording of the 
questions that make up the factor scores is in Table 2.4.  The means are 49.7 (n=3016) 
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and 46.1 (n=3002), respectively, and each was scaled from 0-100.  Factor analysis is 
often used in connection with opinion surveys when complex attitudes cannot be 
adequately measured by single questions.  The goal of factor analysis is to take a matrix 
of correlations among related variables and explain them in terms of a single or small 
number of underlying factors (Kline 1994).  A factor is a dimension, or construct, which 
is a condensed statement of the relationships among a set of variables.  Principal 
components is a type of factor analysis used to “extract” these factors.  The first factor, 
called the component, always explains the most variance in a correlation matrix of survey 
items.  If more than one factor is extracted, the factors are ordered from highest to lowest 
in terms of the amount of variance they explain. 
Principal components is simply another way to reduce several related variables 
into one measure.  When several items are found to be indicative of a single underlying 
factor, the principal components procedure produces a “factor score” derived from the 
weighted combination of the individual surveys items that are highly associated with that 
factor.  The eigenvalue tells how much variance the factor score explains, and in general, 
values less than 1 are not used because they explain such a small proportion of the total 
variance of the construct.  The main advantage over an additive index is that this 
technique provides the variation explained by the new factor.   When items to be 
combined are not correlated highly (over .5), it is often best to use factor analysis rather 
than an additive index.  Indeed, only one of the variables that I combine for political 
efficacy and racial intolerance is correlated higher than .5.  Tables 2.6 – 2.7 give the 
results from the principal components analysis for political efficacy and racial 




School size is again measured by the number of students enrolled at a school.  
There is a continuous measure of this, but the categories are presented in Table 2.8.  In 
the MCVS, there are many larger schools and very few small schools.  Small school 
advocates would probably not think of 800 as a “small school,” but it is one of the 
smallest in these data.  This is primarily because the sample was pulled from a region 
where the schools are located in major metropolitan areas, where schools are typically 
larger.   
 
Table 2.6:  Factor Analysis for Political Efficacy in MCVS 
 
Initial Eigenvalues 





Component 1 2.05 51.20 51.20 
Component 2 0.86 21.42 100.00 
 
 
Component Matrix Component 
1 
  
Variable     
Other people understand better 0.73  
I have a good understanding -0.70  
I'm as well informed as others -0.72  
Government is too complicated 0.72  
 
 
Correlation Matrix   
Other 
people 





Other people understand better 1.00 -0.28 -0.32 0.47
I have a good understanding -0.28 1.00 0.44 -0.29
I'm as well informed as others -0.32 0.44 1.00 -0.30




Table 2.7: Factor Analysis for Racial/Ethnic Intolerance in MCVS 
 
Initial Eigenvalues 





   
Component 1 2.50 41.70 41.70    
Component 2 1.02 17.00 58.70  
Component 3 0.91 15.18 73.88  
Component 4 0.65 10.77 84.65  
Component 5 0.52 8.72 93.36   







Variable     
Asian immigration contributes 0.72 0.45  
Hispanic immigration contributes 0.77 0.36  
Better place if more immigrants 0.73 0.01  
Fewer problems if less immigrants -0.72 0.31  
Better for race/ethnic to live apart -0.43 0.29  
Immigrants speak English ASAP -0.38 0.71  
  












Asian immigration contributes 1.00 0.60 0.39 -0.32 -0.15 -0.10
Hispanic immigration contributes 0.60 1.00 0.44 -0.37 -0.21 -0.14
Better place if more immigrants 0.39 0.44     1.00 0.44 -0.19 -0.21
Fewer problems if less immigrants -0.32 -0.37 -0.44 1.00 0.30 0.29
Better for race/ethnic to live apart -0.15 -0.21 -0.19 0.30 1.00 0.08
Immigrants speak English ASAP -0.10 -0.14 -0.21 0.29 0.08 1.00
 
School climate is measured by one question on the survey that asked students, 
“Do you receive the grades you deserve?”  Respondents chose from 4 categories that 
ranged from “never” to “always.”  This question is designed to measure the students’ 
perceptions of the fairness of school authorities.  It does not specifically examine the 
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Table 2.8:  Frequencies of Independent Variables in MCVS 
 
 Valid Percent 
School Size 
     0-800 
     801-1200 
     1201-1600 
     1601-2000 








     Always Deserve Grades 
     Usually Deserve Grades 
     Sometimes Deserve Grades 





                                 3.0 
Number of Civics Courses 
     None 
     Less than ½ year 
     ½ year 
     ½ year – 1 year 
     1 year 
     Over 1 year 
 
                                 5.5 





Attitudes towards Civics 
     Like Studying Government 




Watch TV News 
     0 Days per Week 
     1-2 Days 
     3-4 Days 
     5-6 Days 
     7 Days per Week 
 





Discuss Politics with Family/Friends 
     0 Days per Week 
     1-2 Days 
     3-4 Days 
     5-6 Days 





                                 6.2 
                                 4.1 
Plans for College 
     Planning to go to College 




Values in cells represent the proportion of students in schools in MCVS.  Values may not 
sum to 100% because of rounding. 
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openness of the school climate, as does the NHES, but looks at another aspect of school 
climate.   
The MCVS includes many of the same individual-level information about the 
students as the NHES (Table 2.7).  The MCVS asked students the number of civics 
courses they had taken, from less than a half-year to more than one year (0-5).  The 
survey also includes a question about the students’ attitudes toward their civics courses.  
Students were asked, “Do you like your civics courses?”  They responded on a scale of 0-
4, from “not at all” to “quite a bit.”  I use a dummy variable in multivariate analyses, 
where 1 = “does not like studying government” and 0 = “likes government.”  The main 
reason for this is that we cannot assume that the distance between each category is 
exactly one point above the previous category.   
I also control for students’ levels of television news viewing.  They were asked, 
“How many days per week, on average, do you watch the news on television at home?” 
and gave responses from 0-7 days per week.  The MCVS also asks students about the 
levels of political discussion with parents and peers.  They responded that they talked 
about politics with their parents and friends from 0-7 days per week.  The distributions 








“The real benefit of a small school is that you can change everything…The whole idea is 
to engage kids in new and effective ways.” – Ann Cook, co-principal of Urban Academy 
in New York City7 
 
  
The quote above was taken from a recent front-page article in The Washington 
Post.  Ms. Cook, like other advocates of small schools, argues that the main reason for 
the improvements her students have seen at Urban Academy is that it is a small school, 
with only 120 students.  The article discusses the many studies that confirm that smaller 
schools have substantially lower dropout rates, fewer disciplinary problems, and higher 
levels of achievement than larger schools.  Advocates claim, “What makes a school work 
is vision and a sense of community…” (Dobbs 2003, A8).   
 This chapter reviews the literature on school size, and investigates whether 
smaller schools are better able to foster democratic values than larger schools.  Although 
scholars have examined many different educational outcomes, they have not looked at 
political socialization.  Are students in smaller schools more politically knowledgeable, 
efficacious, participatory and tolerant?  Given that academic achievement and self-
efficacy are higher in smaller schools, there is good reason to expect that smaller schools 
might also benefit the political development of young people. 
If this is the case, are smaller schools in the United States better because of an 
open or democratic school climate?  For the most part, small school advocates argue that 
size is so important because it the chief structural phenomenon of organizations, and that 
                                                     
7 Dobbs, Michael.  “Big Schools Reborn in Small World” The Washington Post, A1. November 28, 2003. 
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it creates certain types of environments.  Large schools must be run as bureaucracies, 
with defined hierarchies and “chains of command.”  Smaller schools, however, are often 
seen as “communities” rather than organizations, and are places where all involved, from 
administrators down to students, are given greater discretion and trust.  This environment 
is thought by many to be the chief ingredient in small schools’ success. 
 
School Size and Educational Outcomes  
Between 1930 and 2001, the number of public elementary and secondary schools 
fell dramatically, from 247,000 to 92,000.  At the same time, however, enrollment almost 
doubled, from 25 million to 47 million students (Figures 3.1 and 3.2).  This substantial 
jump in the average size of public schools has changed the face of education in the 
United States.  The age of one-room schoolhouses where a single teacher instructs 
children of all ages and aptitudes is long gone.  Now, millions of children attend high 
schools that closely resemble small colleges in their architecture, course offerings, and 
activities.   
Until the 1970s, most of the literature on school size insisted that larger schools 
were better.  These arguments developed out of some major trends in the early to mid-
twentieth century.  First, according to simple microeconomics, larger schools could 
produce economies of scale, and would therefore save money while providing a better 
education for more people.  By consolidating small schools into larger schools, schools 
could reduce redundancy and increase efficiency, much like Ford’s factories and other 
industry in the early 20th century (Buzacott 1982; Guthrie 1979; Michelson 1972).  
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In the mid-1900s, other trends fueled the move toward consolidation.  On the one 
hand, the Baby Boomers increased school enrollments, and on the other, the economy 
changed, making a college education a must-have.  Many scholars argued that smaller 
schools simply could not provide adequate resources that students needed in order to 
obtain either a decent job or admission into a good college.  James Conant, former 
president of Harvard, is the most-cited proponent of this view (1959).  He argued that 
rural schools needed to consolidate so that children from small towns could have the 
same opportunities as those in the cities and suburbs.  He believed that smallness invited 
the tyranny of rural communities’ willingness to overlook those who could succeed in 
college and become professionals (Hampel 2002).8  Larger schools would benefit those at 
both margins.  College-bound students could take college-prep courses, while struggling 
students would have remedial reading and math that would allow them special instruction 
that would be impossible in a small school with few teachers (Monk 1987). 
Starting in the late 1970s, however, the tide began to turn against large, mega-
schools.  Many scholars have begun to believe that an increase in course offerings is not 
necessarily a good thing.  Increased offerings are generally confined to specialized 
courses, and usually result in a decline in “core” offerings (Monk 1987).  Generally only 
a small minority of students – usually the more academically talented – in larger schools 
avail themselves of specialized class offerings (McGuire 1989; Monk 1992; Haller, 
Monk, Spotted Bear, and Moss 1990).  Disadvantaged students are the ones who suffer 
most in these circumstances, thereby exacerbating inequalities inherent in the school 
                                                     
8 Interestingly, Conant argued that schools should have at least 100 students per grade, 
for a total of 400 students in an average high school.  This would hardly be classified as a 
“large” school by today’s standards.  Whether he would approve of today’s mega-schools 
is unclear. 
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population.  In fact, smaller schools are found to be most beneficial for those students 
from low-income families and racial minorities (Fowler and Walberg 1991; Johnson, 
Howley and Howley 2002; Howley 1995; Huang and Howley 1993; Friedkin and 
Necochea 1988). 
Powell, Farrar and Cohen contend that a wider selection of courses does not 
benefit even those who avail themselves of the opportunities (1985).  They argue that few 
high school students are capable of making good decisions about their education when 
they are offered a vast array of courses.  The choices they make are based on the 
knowledge they have at very young ages about what they will need to fulfill their 
occupational and educational goals.  Scholars in human development point out that there 
is often a large mismatch between what a child says he wants to do, and what he thinks 
he needs to do to get there (Schneider and Stevenson 2000).  They simply do not have the 
skills or maturity to understand the intermediate steps necessary to obtain their goals.  
What they may lack in variety, small schools make up for, then, in academic coherence 
(Rogers 1992). 
Small school advocates are quick to point out that, contrary to the economy of 
scale argument, larger schools are also not necessarily more cost effective.  They claim 
that factors such as teacher satisfaction and turnover, graduation rates, truancy and 
disciplinary measures, and student achievement are large parts of total expenditures and 
per-pupil costs.  It costs money, time and energy when schools must expend their scarce 
resources to maintain order, constantly train new teachers, keep children in school, or 
worry about test scores.  Small schools, on the other hand, have fewer problems with 
discipline and truancy, lower dropout rates, and higher levels of achievement (Pittman 
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and Haughwout 1987; Burke 1987; Duke and Perry 1978; Gottfredson 1985; Gregory 
1992; Stockard and Mayberry 1992).   
Finally, small school advocates are adamant that students in larger schools do not 
achieve at higher rates than those in smaller institutions.  In her review, Cotton (1996) 
points out that about half the literature on student achievement finds no difference 
between large and small schools (see Huang and Howley 1993; McGuire 1989; Howley 
1996; Smith and DeYoung 1988; Walberg 1992).  The other half finds small schools to 
be superior (see Klonsky and Klonsky 1999; Wasley et al. 2000; Lee and Loeb 2000).  
Lee and Smith find a curvilinear relationship between student achievement and size of 
high school, suggesting that the best schools lie somewhere between tiny and enormous 
(1997).  There is, however, no literature showing large schools to be superior to small 
schools.   
 
School Climate and School Size 
The main reason smaller schools are more beneficial is that school size defines, 
along with other factors, “elements of any school’s academic and social organization,” 
and “these organizational elements in turn influence outcomes” (Lee 2000, 327).  The 
organization, or climate, of a school creates a particular environment in which teachers, 
students and administrators interact.  In large schools, this environment tends to be more 
hierarchical and structured; in small schools, the climate is more fluid and feels more like 
a “community” than a bureaucracy.    
Many educational scholars point out that in the rush to provide space for students 
and to save money, schools neglected the negative side of increasing size and 
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specialization.  In his seminal work on bureaucracies, Max Weber contends that while 
specialization often increases efficiency, it also depersonalizes and formalizes 
relationships between individuals (1947).  Bureaucracies centralize control, create formal 
hierarchies, and specialize functions.  The transmission of information is often more 
complex, going from higher departments to lower ones through a “chain of command.”  
This increases the space between individuals and the source of the information, creating a 
more formal communication system and diminishing individual accountability.   
Educational scholars believe this depersonalization has come to define the climate 
or culture in many large schools.  Teachers often have so many students that it is nearly 
impossible even to learn all their names, much less to know personal problems that might 
inhibit their ability to learn.  “Problem students” are seen, often out of necessity, in long 
lines outside the dean or principal’s office, and there is not much time to truly begin to 
understand why a student is fighting, skipping, or cheating.  Punishment is handed out 
based on rules established by a school board, with very little discretion given to teachers 
and administrators to do what they feel is best.   
Schools with open climates are those in which the structure of decisionmaking 
allows for teacher and administrative discretion (Hepburn 1982; Hoge 1988; Wood 
1988), and where possible, student input.  Size influences many aspects of school 
climate.  Because of the sheer numbers of employees and students, large schools must run 
as a bureaucracy in order to keep track of everyone.  In small schools, teachers interact 
more often with fewer students, and thus, they know their students better.  This 
knowledge facilitates interest, concern and care about students’ success and achievement.  
Teachers may have the same students in consecutive years, and since there are fewer total 
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teachers, they have opportunities to discuss particular students with one another.  In one 
small school of 300 students, young people stated, “A lot of teachers are our friends. 
Some of them…develop real relationships with us. We can go to them when we need 
help” (Rogers 1992).  Where teachers have hundreds of students to keep track of, it is 
more difficult to develop “real relationships” with students.   
Students benefit greatly from a more open school climate.  They feel invested in 
their education, and understand that someone will hold them accountable.  The 
community atmosphere in smaller schools help students to be more positive toward 
school in general and toward particular school subjects (Gregory 1992; Smith and 
DeYoung 1988; Walberg 1992; Fowler 1995).  In addition, students’ attitudes about 
themselves – their self-concepts – are better when they attend small schools than larger 
schools (Rutter 1988; Stockard and Mayberry 1992).  Small schools strengthen 
interpersonal relationships, and students report a greater sense of belonging and lower 
levels of alienation (Fowler and Walberg 1991; Gregory 1992; Rutter 1988; Klonsky and 
Klonsky 1999).  In large schools, subcultures and cliques more easily form, threatening a 
“focused mission” that is often associated with small schools’ effectiveness (Duke and 
Trautvetter 2001, 2). 
School climate is also an important predictor for attitudes like political trust and 
efficacy (Jennings, Ehman and Niemi 1974; Ehman 1980; Leming 1985) as well as 
political knowledge and skills (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995; Niemi and Junn 
1998).  When school authorities are perceived as fair, for example, young people have 
more political trust (Jennings et al. 1974, 224).  Additionally, when students can make 
minor decisions about school and classroom operations that affect them, they are often 
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more tolerant and more supportive of democratic processes in general (Boyer 1990; 
Eveslage 1993).   
Open classroom climates, like open school climates, are those in which students 
feel they can discuss controversial social and political issues freely and where their 
opinions are solicited and respected.  A “classroom norm” develops, in which teachers 
lead discussions and provide a safe environment for students to learn to express 
themselves (Torney-Purta 1983).  In these climates, students develop trust in their 
teachers and fellow students, which often generalizes to other authorities, including 
political authorities (Leming 1985).  Classrooms that are open in this sense are positively 
related to political knowledge, effective interpersonal skills, a commitment to democratic 
values, and a sense of obligation to participate in democratic processes (Angell 1991; 
Torney-Purta and Richardson 2002; Ehman 1980; Torney, Oppenheim and Farnen 1975).   
Thus, in summary, smaller schools facilitate open school climates, which have 
been found to positively influence democratic values, among other educational outcomes.  
Yet, neither political scientists studying socialization nor educational scholars who study 
school size has examined the effects of school size on democratic values.  If the 
relationships between size, climate and values is as many suggest, then we should see a 
significant link between school size and democratic values, such that smaller schools 
should be associated with higher levels of political knowledge, efficacy, tolerance and 
participation.9 
 
                                                     
9 Another logical reason for expecting a link between school size and civic values is 
because the outcomes are likely related.  Political knowledge is related to overall 
academic achievement.  Political efficacy is a sub-category of general self-efficacy 
(Bandura 1997), such that students with high overall efficacy are also more likely to have 
high political efficacy.   
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What Is a Small School? 
 In multivariate analyses, I examine a continuous measure of school size, and thus 
speak in terms of “smaller” and “larger.”  For bivariate analyses, it was necessary to 
develop a logical system of categorization.  This proved to be no easy task, because even 
though many educational researchers agree that smaller is better, they disagree as to how 
small is small enough.  Deborah Meier argues that the optimal size is between 300 and 
600 students (1995).  Fowler (1992) and Howley (1994) argue that schools must have at 
least 400 students in order to have an adequate curriculum, and Lee and Smith (1995) 
contend that high school students learn best when enrollment is between 600 and 900.10   
 In initial analyses of school size and various outcomes, I found support for Lee 
and Smith’s range as the most optimal, and therefore, when I use the NHES, I categorize 
the smallest schools as those with fewer than 600 students.11  The MCVS do not have 
enough schools that fit these criteria to make it a worthwhile categorization scheme, so I 
use a slightly different system, with the smallest schools as those with fewer than 800 
students.  For this chapter, the NHES results are likely the stronger of the two, given the 
paucity of very small schools in the MCVS.  I use these data to point out the similarity of 
the results across two very different data collections. 
                                                     
10 Howley also argues that instead of examining school enrollment, researchers should 
look at enrollment per grade, as a school with 1000 students that is K-12 is much 
different from one that is 11th-12th grades only.  I calculated this, and ran many of my 
analyses.  The results did not change.  
11 These results are not reported in tables.  Using quintiles of the school size variable, I 
find that students in schools between 629-1092 are a) more positive about their school 
climate and b) have the highest levels of political knowledge.  In order to make my 
results consistent with others studying school climate, I chose not to use quintiles, but use 




Because many education scholars contend that school climate and school size are 
closely related, I first analyze bivariate results between school size and school climate.  
Table 3.1 shows results from a cross-tabulation of school climate and school size in the 
NHES (for variable descriptions, see chapter 2).  The two are not significantly related.  
Students in smaller schools are not statistically more likely to say their schools have open 
climates than those in larger schools.12   
Table 3.1:  Openness of School Climate across School Size in NHES  
 
















































































491 996 775 916 
 
 
Values in cells represent the number of students.  Percentages should be across columns 
(i.e., 3.2% of students in schools with fewer than 600 students believe their school’s 
climate is closed). 
Pearson Chi-Square = 17.902 (p< .33) (Two-tailed test) 
 
                                                     
12 A t-test reveals the mean response for the openness of school climate is .05 points 
lower for students in schools with over 2000 students compared to those in schools of 
less than 600 (p<.01).  There are no differences between the smallest schools and schools 
of other sizes.    
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Similarly, Table 3.2 shows a cross-tab from the MCVS, where the relationship 
between school size and the students’ perceptions of fairness is stronger, but still 
marginal (p<.10).  Students in smaller schools are slightly more likely to say they 
“always” receive the grades they deserve; 21.1% in schools with fewer than 800 students 
compared to 17.8% in schools with over 2000 students.  Yet, students in the largest 
schools, of over 2000 students, are slightly more likely to say they “usually” get the 
grades they deserve, and are much less likely to say they “never” receive fair grades than 
those in the smaller schools.   
Table 3.2:  Student Perception of the Fairness of Authorities across School Size in MCVS
 




































































Total 376  441 834 90 493 
 
Values in cells represent the number of students.  Percentages should be read down 
columns (i.e., 21.1% of students in schools with fewer than 800 students believe their 
school authorities are “always” fair). 
Pearson Chi-Square = 19.831 (p<.10) (Two-tailed test) 
 
Small school advocates claim that smaller schools have more open, positive 
climates where students believe they are respected and treated fairly.  These analyses, 
with two very different sets of data, indicate that school climate and school size are not 
 63
closely related.  Majorities, or near-majorities, of students in both sources rated their 
schools’ climates as “medium” (in NHES) or that they are “usually” treated fairly (in 
MCVS).   
Before turning to multivariate analyses, I present a simple bivariate analysis of 
school size with two of my dependent measures: political knowledge and participation in 
school activities.  Table 3.3 shows that political knowledge is not significantly related to 
school size (p<.65).  I ran the same tests for political efficacy and tolerance, and found 
the same non-significant relationship.  At least directly, school size does not have an 
effect on these outcomes.   
Table 3.3:  Political Knowledge across School Size in NHES 
 
School Size  















































































Total 345 225 465 347 401 1783
 
Values in cells represent the number of students.  Percentages should be read down 
columns, such that 15.7% of students in schools with fewer than 600 students answered 0 
questions correctly. 
Pearson Chi-Square: 17.350 (p<.65) 
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However, in the next table I present a cross-tab for size and participation in school 
activities.  Students in schools with enrollments over 1500 are significantly less likely to 
participate in school activities than those in smaller schools.  This may be cause for 
cautious optimism, but it is also important to note that the smallest schools are not much 
different from medium-sized schools.  Approximately three-quarters of students in the 
smallest schools up to those with enrollments of 1500 say they participate in school 
activities.   
Table 3.4:  Participation in School Activities across School Size in NHES 
 
School Size  































Total 728 491 994 775 916 3904
 
Values in cells represent the number of students.  Percentages should be read down 
columns, such that 27.3% of students in schools with fewer than 600 students said that 
they do not participate in any school activity. 
Pearson Chi-Square: 18.610 (p<.001) 
 
Multivariate Analyses in NHES 
To conduct multivariate analyses, I use regular OLS regression techniques to 
examine political knowledge, efficacy and tolerance in the NHES; I use logistic 
regression to analyze participation because these are dichotomous variables (see chapter 
2).  Again, the results in this chapter are designed to examine school size absent any 
community characteristics.  Table 3.5 shows the results for each of my dependent 
measures, absent any other indicators other than school size.  Most noticeably, school  
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Table 3.5:  Bivariate Regressions for School Size and Dependent Measures in NHES 
 













    -.001*  
    (.001)  
      .0001 
     (.0005)  
      .0002 
     (.0004) 
  -.0001**** 
  (.00004) 
  -.00003 
  (.00004) 
Constant  36.318**** 
   (1.145) 
 44.341**** 
     (.761) 
 47.631**** 
     (.601) 
  1.019**** 
   (.067) 
   .623**** 











1 Values in cells are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients and their standard errors 
are underneath.   
2 Values in cells are unstandardized Logistic regression coefficients and their standard 
errors are underneath. 
*p<.10  **p<.05  ***p<.01 ****p<.001 
 
size is only a significant predictor for political knowledge (p<.10) and school activities 
(p<.001).  These results are as expected:  students in smaller schools are slightly more 
knowledgeable and much more likely to participate in school activities than those in 
larger schools.  Students in the largest school are 15 percent less likely to participate in 
school activities than students in the smallest school.13  Thus, even without adding 
control variables to the analysis, we see no relationship between school size and efficacy, 
tolerance or out-of-school activities.  For this reason, I simplify the results and only 
present the full models for political knowledge and school participation. 
Once I control for civic education, political discussion, and background characteristics, 
school size is no longer significant for political knowledge, but remains marginally 
significant for participation in school activities (Table 3.6).  The strongest predictor of 
political knowledge is whether a student is black; black students score almost 12 points 
                                                     
13 This is based on the probabilities of the occurrence lowest and highest values of school 
size, based on the logistic regression. 
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lower than other students on the political knowledge test.  Similarly, Latino students and 
those who do not plan to go on to college score seven points lower on the test than Anglo 
students and the college-bound.  Girls score about five points lower than boys, and 
knowledge increases by about three points with each grade level. 
Civic education positively influences political knowledge.  The NHES does not 
include questions about the number of civics courses an individual has taken, but instead 
asks whether his/her courses require “attention to government.”  The survey also included 
a question about whether students agree that their class “increased interest in 
government.”  Interestingly, whether courses require attention to government does not 
seem to matter much.  On the other hand, when students say that their classes increase 
their interest in government, they are significantly more knowledgeable.  In fact, students 
whose interests were piqued in class scored 5 points higher on the knowledge test than 
those who were not interested in government.   
The more meaningful results regarding participation are found in Table 3.7.  
These are the probabilities of the minimum and maximum values for each variable from 
the logistic regression model.  As you can see, school size is just as significant as political 
discussion with others and parental income.  Students in the largest schools are 11% less 
likely to participate in school activities compared to those in smaller schools; and, 
students whose parents are the wealthiest are 11% more likely to participate in activities 
than those whose parents are the poorest.  Many argue that parental background is the 
most important predictor of any educational outcome, but these results suggest that 
reducing the average school size, at least for participation in school activities, may be as  
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Table 3.6:  Full Regression Models for School Size and Political Knowledge and 
School Participation 





Student Enrollment                -.001 
               (.001) 
              -.0001* 
              (.00006) 
School Climate                -.717 
               (.758) 
               .035 
              (.059) 
Courses Required Attention to 
Gov’t 
               4.130* 
              (1.614) 
               .015 
              (.119) 
Class Increased Interest in 
Gov’t 
               4.720*** 
                (.987) 
               .289*** 
              (.077) 
Frequency of Watching TV 
News  
               1.991** 
                (.751) 
               .024 
              (.054) 
No College Plans                -7.766***  
              (1.406) 
              -.564*** 
              (.104) 
Discuss News with Family 
and Friends 
               2.463** 
                (.756) 
               .220*** 
              (.058) 
Parental Education Level                4.637*** 
                (.645) 
               .089 
              (.050) 
Parental Income                  .484 
                (.278) 
               .058** 
              (.021) 
Grade Level 
 
               3.520*** 
                (.604) 
               .039 
              (.046) 
Black             -11.822*** 
              (1.820) 
               .148 
              (.140) 
Girls               -5.644*** 
              (1.350) 
               .262* 
              (.103) 
Latino               -7.123** 
              (2.761) 
              -.397*  
              (.201) 
Constant             -27.822** 
              (8.029) 
              -.959 





1 Values in cells are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients and their standard 
errors are underneath.   
2 Values in cells are unstandardized Logistic regression coefficients and their 
standards errors are underneath. 




important as parental income.  From a policy perspective, it is much simpler to reduce 
school size than it is to adjust parental incomes. 
 
Discussion 
 I set out to do three things in this chapter.  The first was to test whether smaller 
schools were better able to foster democratic values than larger schools, and the second 
was to examine the link between school climate and size.  I discovered mixed results on 
the benefits of school size, and very little support that smaller schools have more open 
Table 3.7:  Probabilities from Logistic Regression for School Participation 
 
 School Participation 
 
Student Enrollment Diff            -.11 
School Climate Diff           +.03 
Courses Required Attention to Gov’t Diff           +.00 
Class Increased Interest in Gov’t Diff           +.09 
Frequency of Watching TV News  Diff           +.01 
No College Plans  Diff           -.10 
Discuss News with Others Diff           +.11 
Parental Education Level Diff           +.06 
Parental Income Diff           +.11 
Grade Level Diff           +.02 
Black Diff           +.02 
Girls Diff           +.04 
Latino Diff           -.07 
 
Values in cells are the percentage differences from the minimum values to the 
maximum values of each variable, based on the logistic regression models presented in 
Table 3.6. 
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climates.  For the most part, school size does not matter.  Even though students are said to 
achieve at higher rates in smaller schools, using the NHES, they were not more politically 
knowledgeable.  Similarly, although students are said to have higher self-efficacy in 
smaller schools, they do not have higher political efficacy.   
The only real advantage smaller schools have over larger ones in that students are 
more likely to participate in school activities.  Many are unlikely to be surprised that 
participation is greater in smaller schools than larger schools.  In one of the pioneering 
studies on school size, Barker and Gump examined whether more students participate in 
school activities in larger schools, given their supposed benefits of increased types of 
activities (1964).  Theoretically, in a large school, there should be more opportunities, 
providing more outlets to interest more students.  Yet, Barker and Gump discovered that 
a twenty-fold increase in school population leads to only a five-fold increase in 
opportunities for participation.  Large schools may have more offerings, but they do not 
translate into more students becoming involved.  In small schools, every student is 
needed to fill spaces on athletic teams and clubs; thus, even marginal students will be 
encouraged to participate.  Students in small schools are more likely to hold important 
positions in extra-curricular activities and will derive greater satisfaction out of those 
activities (Cotton 1996; Pittman and Haughwout 1987; Lindsay 1982). 
If smaller schools are such better places for general achievement and self-
efficacy, then why would they not do a better job of fostering political knowledge and 
political efficacy?  It is possible that all the scholarship on school size that finds higher 
achievement and efficacy is mistaken, although this is unlikely.  It could be that political 
knowledge is not related to general achievement – that there is a different skill set 
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students must have in order to score highly on a political knowledge that is not necessary 
on general tests.  And, political efficacy may be different from personal feelings of worth 
and confidence.  Yet, this is illogical, as we know that political efficacy is a sub-category 
of general efficacy (Bandura 1997).   
We could blame the data, and claim that the measures of political knowledge and 
efficacy are not valid.  Yet, here again, these are quite similar to measures in many other 
data that scholars have used for decades.  In the end, we seem to be left with the 
conclusion that school size does not influence political socialization.  Yet, this is 
unsatisfactory, as it forces us to ignore all the logical arguments about the benefits of 
smaller size.   
Instead, the most likely explanation is that size is relative, and that the benefits of 
smaller schools depend on something else.  An emerging line of evidence suggests that 
the benefits of smaller size vary by the school’s composition (Friedkin and Necochea 
1988; Bickel and Howley 2000; Howley and Bickel 1999; Johnson, Howley and Howley 
2002).  Not only do poorer students benefit from smaller schools, but all students in an 
impoverished community benefit from a smaller school.  Students growing up in an 
affluent suburb may fare better in larger schools, where they can avail themselves of 
specialized opportunities, and where their parents and teachers are able to provide 
adequate guidance.  In smaller towns or urban areas, where parents and teachers are less 
educated and have fewer experiences and cannot provide this guidance, students benefit 
from smaller schools, with more coherence and fewer specialized opportunities.  Urban 
and rural communities are also likely to suffer from many of the same structural 
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difficulties that make smaller schools easier to navigate (i.e. children with behavioral and 
learning disabilities, difficulty in attracting the best teachers, inadequate resources, etc.).    
In the coming chapters, I examine various aspects of communities and analyze 
whether smaller schools are more effective in urban areas versus suburbs, or in 
impoverished communities versus very affluent ones, or in racially homogenous versus 
racially diverse communities.  In so doing, I have two main interests.  First, I aim to 
examine whether the effects of school size on these democratic values vary across 
different types of communities.  I am also very interested in the community-effects 
themselves.  In other words, are students in small towns better politically socialized than 
those in the suburbs or in urban areas, despite their poverty and isolation?  The next 
chapter examines urban/rural/suburban differences and similarities and seeks to answer 




Are Smaller Towns Better Places to Instill Democratic Values? 
 
 
 Although there were good theoretical reasons to believe that smaller schools 
would provide a better atmosphere for the development of democratic values, in the last 
chapter, I found this not to be the case, except for participation in school activities.  In the 
aggregate, students in smaller schools were no more knowledgeable, efficacious or 
tolerant than those in larger schools. Why would the literature indicate that smaller 
schools do such a good job on most other educational outcomes, but not create 
environments that are more conducive to democratic values?   
This conundrum may not be as worrisome, or as surprising, as we might initially 
think.  It may be the case that although school size does not seem to affect civic values in 
general, instead school size matters more in some environments than others.  It is 
probably unrealistic to think that there is a “one best size” for schools, and that the effects 
of school size would be the same regardless of other aspects of context.  Although much 
of the literature on school size insists that smaller is better across the board, other 
scholars argue that the effects of size on traditional education outcomes vary, and that 
what may be an ideal size in one environment is too small, or too large in another.  Lee 
and Smith (1997) find that the influence of school size varies according to the 
composition of schools, with stronger effects in low-SES schools and those with high 
concentrations of minority students.  In a study of Arkansas schools, Johnson, Howley 
and Howley (2002) find that poverty plays a more significant role in student achievement 
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in larger schools than in smaller ones, and that impoverished students benefit greatly 
from small schools (see also Friedkin and Necochea 1988).   
Although these scholars study school composition, public schools are a part of 
their local communities, and thus, the size and composition of the community are likely 
to have similar effects as school composition.  Smaller schools are, for example, of 
greater benefit to students in poorer communities, versus those in affluent ones.  Thus, to 
the extent that some types of communities are better able to foster civic values than 
others, we should expect that school size will have varying effects on these values in 
different environments.  This chapter begins this type of analysis, and examines the 
effects of school size across communities of different sizes.  Are smaller schools more 
important in the development of democratic values in urban areas, as opposed to small 
towns or suburbs? 
Community size has long been a concern for democratic theorists and social 
scientists.  In Bowling Alone, Putnam shows that social capital, which he defines as 
“features of social organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate 
coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” (Putnam 1995, 65), is highest in many 
of the states consisting of small towns and rural areas (except the South), and lowest in 
states with major urban centers.  Many scholars before Putnam pointed out the same 
relationship between civic participation and city size (Toennies 1887; Wirth 1938; Dahl 
1967; Dahl and Tufte 1973).  Interaction between individuals, which provides 
information that helps people make decisions and form opinions, is of a different 
character in small towns as opposed to communities of larger sizes.  In this chapter, I 
discuss how these theories, all based on adult attitudes and behavior, also explain the 
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political socialization of young people.  I discuss how communities of different sizes 
differ, and why smaller communities are better places to socialize young people into 
politics and democracy. 
 
The Variability of School Size 
 Although much of the research on school size examines it generally, as I did in 
chapter 3, there are some scholars who contend that while schools should not become too 
big, smaller schools are more important for certain types of students, or in certain types 
of environments than in others.  Most of this scholarship looks at the interaction of school 
size and poverty, generally in the form of individual student SES or a measure of poverty 
within a school (usually measured by the proportion of children on free or reduced 
lunch).  An early study of this kind was based on data from California schools (Friedkin 
and Necochea 1988), but Howley and his colleagues have conducted studies in many 
other states.  They have consistently found that the relationship between school size and 
achievement is negative in some places, positive in others, and in some places very weak, 
and others, very strong (see Bickel and Howley 2000; Howley and Bickel 1999; Huang 
and Howley 1993; Johnson, Howley and Howley 2002).   
 Their basic argument is that first, school size is determined at the state level, and 
thus, to the extent that each state is unique (or at least that types of states are different 
from others), school size will vary across states.  What is considered a small school in 
rural Vermont is not the same thing that is considered small in New York City; similarly, 
rural Montana is very different from rural Vermont.  Second, the composition of the 
student body varies within states, so that some schools are very affluent, others quite 
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poor.  Given all the characteristics that go along with affluence, such as access to 
resources, good teachers, educated parents, etc., the effect of school size is likely to vary 
within states, according to the SES of the students.  Howley’s research finds that small 
schools disrupt the strong relationship between SES and achievement, such that students 
in poorer schools achieve at much higher levels when the schools are small than when 
they are large.  In other words, school size matters much more in disadvantaged 
communities than in affluent ones. 
 Educational scholars are generally more concerned with schools than they are 
with communities.  Even so, the composition of public schools is derived from the 
composition of the communities in which they are located.  Affluent schools are found in 
affluent communities; poor schools result from poor communities.  As such, just as the 
effects of school size vary by the SES of the school, they would also differ according to 
the composition of the community.  I address racial and economic community 
composition in the next chapters, but I begin in this chapter by examining community 
size.  Size is, after all, the most general attribute of a community.  And, in many cases, 
community size is closely related to racial, economic and political composition.   
 Given smaller school size is more important in poor schools than affluent ones, I 
would expect to find that larger communities would also benefit more from small school 
size than smaller communities would.  Urban areas, especially central cities, are quite 
poor and have higher than average school sizes.  Also, even though many suburbs are 
almost as large as cities, they are more affluent, and thus, would benefit less from small 
schools.  Students in suburbs are more likely to have well-educated parents, good 
teachers, and adequate resources that give them the ability to take advantage of 
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opportunities that large schools offer.  Finally, I would not expect smaller towns to 
benefit greatly from small schools mainly because most small towns already have small 
schools.  Even after years of rural school consolidation, the average school size in 
Montana or Iowa is much lower than in most other places.   
 
Community Size and Political Behavior 
 Community size is only one of many characteristics of communities.  I begin by 
examining community size because it is the most general attribute of a community, and is 
largely devoid of content.  Later chapters examine various aspects of the composition of 
communities, but I start by looking simply at community size before adding other layers 
to the analysis.  Another reason for beginning with city size is because many political 
theorists and social scientists have discussed the important role that it plays in a 
democracy.  Early democratic theorists discussed the city-state of Athens, and how its 
size affected civic participation, accountability, and representation.  Robert Dahl later 
wrote that there is an optimal city size, and other social scientists have long proclaimed 
that urban life has deleterious effects on behavior. 
The city-state was small enough to “insure extensive opportunities for direct 
participation by all free (male) citizens in the management of the community…” (Dahl 
1967, 954).  Dahl wrote that once a “unit” becomes too large, true democratic 
participation becomes unwieldy and impossible.  Democratic deliberation in the form of 
face-to-face interaction with other citizens, such as that in ancient Greece, is only 
possible on a small scale.  Assuming more democracy is better than less, smaller states 
are optimal because individuals can only directly participate when the size is manageable.   
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In addition to participation, small states (or communities) also facilitate other 
democratic values.  In smaller communities, information may be more easily accessible, 
and somewhat less complex.  Most importantly, however, individuals in smaller 
communities can have a real impact on decisions.  They are more likely to perceive their 
voice makes a difference, and that their participation or interest is worthwhile because, 
just as in small schools, everyone is necessary in smaller communities.  It is more 
difficult to “shirk” or to go unnoticed, and individuals keep others accountable. 
Sociologists have also long proclaimed that smaller is better, and that urban life 
has negative consequences for social (and political) behavior.  As the size of a 
community increases, civic participation falls, and efficacy declines, because people 
become less “attached” to their communities (Dahl and Tufte 1973).  The more closely 
individuals are attached to their communities, the more likely they are to feel a sense of 
belonging and to feel as though they have a stake in the community.  Community 
attachment is thought of as the ties individuals have to their local environments, both 
physically and psychologically.  According to many scholars, these ties can be measured 
by objective criteria, such as length of residence in a community, home ownership, 
marital status, and whether individuals have children in the local schools (Putnam 1966; 
Kasarda and Janowitz 1974; Sampson 1988).  Individuals that have these characteristics 
are more likely to participate because they have financial, as well as emotional ties to 
their community (Campbell and Lee 1992). 
  In addition to objective factors, others contend that life in the city depresses 
community attachment because of its heterogeneity and population density.  Cities are 
defined by their heterogeneity, while smaller towns are similarly defined by their 
 78
homogeneity across several dimensions – racial, religious, social, economic, and 
political.  Toennies labeled these as differences between “gemeinschaft” and 
“gesellschaft,” or “community” versus “society” (1887).  He, and later Simmel (1922) 
and Wirth (1938), contended that because of the high population density and 
heterogeneity in cities, people become alienated from one another, social relationships 
are strained, and participation in social and political activities is depressed.  In smaller 
communities, individuals are surrounded by others who are like them, and people are 
more likely to keep track of one another.   
 There are, of course, more types of activities in cities than there are in small 
towns.  One could argue that because of this, participation is spread around, so that 
simply because one isn’t participating in politics, she may be active in the arts 
community, or through aid work.  Fischer speaks of this phenomenon as “subcultures,” 
and that urban areas offer a groups to which one can belong (Fischer 1975, 1995).  Even 
so, more opportunities do not generally translate into greater overall participation, and 
just as in large high schools, those who participate in one activity are more likely to 
participate in others; while, those who do not participate are unlikely to be drawn in by 
new opportunities.  
 The bottom line is that social and political attitudes and behavior are based, at 
least partly, on social interaction.  Social interaction is qualitatively different across 
places.  Interactions provide important information that is used in making choices and 
forming political attitudes (See Mutz 2002; Beck, Dalton, Greene and Huckfeldt 2002; 
Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Carsey 1995; Huckfeldt 1983, 1986; Berelson, Lazarsfeld 
and McPhee 1954).  In small towns, “human relationships are intimate, enduring and 
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based on a clear understanding of where each person stands in society” (Bell and Newby 
1972, 23).  People know one another, and often, they know whose child, sibling or friend 
one might be.  In cities, individuals are more likely to run into complete strangers, and 
because they cannot place them within a personal context, they designate people more 
formally, by race or ethnicity, for example.  The perceived familiarity with one another in 
smaller towns fosters trust and altruism (Coleman 1988; Elder and Conger 2000).  It 
affords individuals a degree of accountability that they do not have in cities where they 
can often be anonymous.   
 These differences in the environment have implications for the types of 
interactions that take place, which influence the information individuals obtain in order to 
make decisions and form opinions.  Where individuals infrequently encounter strangers, 
for example, they may learn only to trust those they know well, thereby skewing the 
content of the information they receive.  Because they are unlikely to obtain information 
from a variety of sources, with differing viewpoints, their own opinions are based on 
limited information.  Similarly, in communities that have very few immigrants, or 
African-Americans, for example, residents are unable to obtain first-hand information 
from individuals within these groups.  They must acquire information solely from 
television or other media, which may be biased.  The compositional biases that exist 
within every community, large or small, indirectly influence attitudes and behaviors. 
 Social interaction is also the principle mechanism behind political socialization.  
Attitudes and behaviors are not formed once we reach adulthood, but instead, are 
developed over time, as we come of age politically.  The type and frequencies of social 
interaction not only affect adult attitudes and behaviors, but also children and youth.  
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When young people do not have opportunities to encounter others who have different life 
experiences or challenges, they too must base their opinions on limited information.  
Children growing up in poor, urban neighborhoods have vastly different socialization 
experiences than those in either wealthy suburbs or impoverished rural areas.  The 
immediate social, political and economic context provides constraints on the types of 
information and experiences adolescents are privy to as they develop their political 
attitudes.   
Based on the scholarship on the benefits of smaller towns for adult civic 
participation, efficacy and knowledge, we should expect smaller communities to be better 
places in which to socialize young people into democratic values.  Children often learn 
by modeling the behaviors they see around them, so if adults in smaller towns are more 
knowledgeable, more efficacious and more participatory, so should their children be.  
And, if children are surrounded by adults and peers who do not pay attention to politics, 
who believe that their voice is not heard and does not matter, and who never get to the 
polls or the community center, they are highly unlikely to venture into these behaviors on 
their own.  
If, indeed, smaller towns are better places for political development, then school 
size may not add much to the socialization experience.  Schools in small towns are 
already small, and, children probably learn their civic values at home, or in the 
community. By contrast, school size may play an important role in urban areas, where I 
expect democratic values to be at lower levels.  Children in central cities are less likely to 
have knowledgeable and participatory parents and neighbors, and thus, schools are likely 
to be one of the only institutions that can foster these values here.  Smaller schools, where 
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fewer students are likely to go unnoticed, may counteract many of the forces acting 
against good democratic citizenship in the central city. 
 
What Is a Small Town? 
 Before turning to the results of my analysis, I must say a few words about 
definitions.  Although we all probably have a picture in our heads of a “small town” or a 
“central city,” it is likely to differ depending on our experience in these places.  If one has 
never spent much time in a small town, he may imagine them all to be like Mayberry, 
USA on the Andy Griffith Show.  Similarly, someone who has not spent time in cities 
may see them all as pictured on the news, during the L.A. riots of 1992, for instance.  
More precision is required. 
 What makes a community a small town or a suburb?  There is no clear-cut 
definition for communities; it is not the case that at a particular cut-off, a community is 
automatically a suburb, or a “small town.”  The Census does designate metropolitan 
statistical areas (MSA), but this is not very helpful, as 93% of Americans live in a MSA.  
Many would argue that any designation should be based on perceptions of the people 
who live there.  Does it “feel” like a small town?  Would people describe to others that 
they live in a suburb of a major city, or would they classify their community as a town?  
These distinctions are murky, at best, and are based purely on individual experiences and 
perceptions.  While one might claim they live in a small town of 30,000, those in 
communities of 2,500 would describe this as a city.  The best classification system would 
ideally be based on some combination of perception and objectivity. 
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 For my purposes, the data prohibit me from using any sense of the respondent’s 
perception of his/her community.  Since the data were collected for very different 
purposes, the questions were not asked.  I am left with three options.  First, I could use 
Census categorization for the MSAs in the data, and then create a classification system 
for those communities that are not found in a MSA.  The biggest problem with this 
method is that because so many communities are considered MSAs, there would be 
limited variability in order to conduct analyses.   
 I could also base community classification on population.  Towns with fewer 
people are smaller than those with more people, and no one would quarrel that a 
community of 3,000 would never be considered urban; likewise, one of 2 million could 
never be a small town.  My problem with this is that while it certainly differentiates 
between the poles – the central cities from the rural areas – it does not sufficiently 
differentiate between suburbs and small towns that are not located within a metropolitan 
statistical area.   
For example, Greenbelt, Maryland, has a population of about 21,000 and 
Paducah, Kentucky has about 28,000 residents.  If I were to use population as my 
measure of community size, Paducah would look to be a slightly bigger town than 
Greenbelt, and arguably in a literal sense, it is.  However, population fails to recognize 
that Greenbelt is a suburb in the Washington/Baltimore area, while the nearest major city 
to Paducah is at least 120 miles away, making it very different in character than 
Greenbelt.   
 A better method of capturing this distinction is by using population density as the 
continuous measure of community size.  Paducah has a density level of about 375 people 
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per square mile, while Greenbelt’s is almost 10 times this level, at 3,350 people per 
square mile.  This indicates that although the two towns are similar in population, they 
are quite different places in which to grow up.  Paducah is a contained community, where 
the majority of residents lives in single-family homes and does their working, shopping, 
schooling, and worshipping in town.  Although Greenbelt was established as a small, 
cohesive community in the 1930s, today it contains one of the largest apartment 
complexes in the nation and its residents commute to Washington and Baltimore to work.  
Thus, in multivariate analyses, I use population density as a measure of community size. 
 For bivariate analyses, I simply use quartiles based on population density.  There 
are problems with this categorization as well: we know that 25 percent of the population 
does not live in small towns.  And, many suburbs of large cities are just as dense as the 
cities they surround.  However, this method does give us a clear sense of the effect of 
living in close surroundings with those around you, of having thousands of people in a 
building versus communities where the nearest neighbor is a mile away.  Arguably, those 
living in highly dense communities have a more urban socialization experience, while 
those in less dense communities have an experience closer to that of a rural area or small 
town.  Rather than repeating the phases “least dense quartile,” and “second least dense 
quartile,” throughout the dissertation, I refer to these categories “small towns,” “large 
towns,” “suburbs,” and “central cities,” respectively.  However, I realize there is some 
overlap between these categories, especially in the middle categories. 
 Table 4.1 shows how the types of communities differ across several common 
indicators.  Each category is compared to small towns in order to examine their 
differences and similarities.  The characteristics are not particularly surprising.  Small 
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towns have very little diversity; the vast majority of people own their own homes (76 
percent); and, the people have much more space, as population density is quite low.   








Population Density 61.16 410.24 2127.74 11498.68 
Mean Income $35,441 $45,238 $51,218 $41,393 
Percent College Degree 15 23 29 22 
Percent Black 10 11* 17 22 
Percent Latino 8 10* 13 28 
Percent Foreign Born 3 6 11 23 
Percent Unemployed 6 6 5 8 
Percent Homeowners 76 72 68 52 
Percent Female-headed 
Households w/ children 
9 10 11 15 
Enrollment in Schools 739 1373 1706 1939 
N= 974 969 976 974 
Numbers in cells represent the mean level within each category.  Figures are rounded.  
Differences of means were calculated by comparing small towns against each other 
category. 
a Categories are derived using quartiles of population density. 
* Indicates an insignificant difference of mean.  All other values are significantly 
different from those in rural/small towns (p<.001). 
 
Those in small towns also make less money than those in other communities, with those 
in the suburbs making the most per year.  Even though many would think the cities would 
have lowest incomes, the average income is higher in urban areas because the range is 
much larger than in small towns.  The range between the poorest and the wealthiest 
median income in small towns is almost $66,000; this range in the central cities is about 
$105,000.  Poverty is, thus, more widespread in rural areas, whereas there are some very 
wealthy people in cities. 
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 I point out these results because these are the types of characteristics that form 
biases within a community, which in turn, influence the socialization process.  
Adolescents coming of age in a rural community have almost no contact with 
immigrants, and comparatively little contact with blacks or Latinos.14  Their parents are 
much less likely to have graduated from college.  And, children in rural areas are more 
likely to live in single-family homes that are owned by their families than in any other 
community.  Why would these factors influence socialization?  Young people must rely 
solely on second-hand information about people who are different from them.  They may 
not be as encouraged to go to college as those in other communities.  Given the smaller 
range of incomes, they are likely to have more in common with their neighbors.  The high 
rates of home ownership indicate that these children and their families are closely 
attached to their community.  They have likely lived in one place much longer than those 
in cities.  All together, these characteristics form a safer, more secure place in which to 
grow up.   
 The high level of population density in large cities and suburbs indicates a much 
different experience than in rural areas and small towns.  Residents of cities are literally 
living on top of one another, with over 11,000 people per square mile.  Only 52 percent 
of residents own their homes, and unemployment is substantially higher here than in any 
other community, with 8 percent of residents out of work, compared to 5-6 percent 
elsewhere.  Given the sheer numbers of residents in large cities, this means that there are 
millions of people renting a home or apartment, and out of work.  Because these numbers 
are averages, unemployment is much higher in some communities within a city than in 
                                                     
14 This is beginning to change in some rural areas as immigrants move to many 
Midwestern states for jobs in factories.   
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others.15 Similarly, on average, over 16 percent of families in large cities are headed by 
females, meaning that in some communities, this percentage is much higher.  The 
children growing up in these cities experience an almost entirely different existence than 
those in small towns.  This is bound to have significant influences on all their attitudes, 
including democratic values. 
 Finally, those in many suburbs are wealthier and more highly educated than 
others.  Granted, there are several different types of suburbs – white, middle class, 
affluent gated communities, predominantly black, and relatively poor suburbs, to name a 
few.  So, while suburbs are generally thought of as white, middle- and upper-class, this is 
somewhat of a misnomer.  Yet, on average, residents of suburban areas generally have 
higher incomes and education levels than their urban counterparts.  Children in many 
suburbs grow up with some diversity, and with more resources than those in any other 
community.  Unemployment is lower here than anywhere else.  Schools are large, but 
given the incomes and education levels of many parents here, children are likely able to 
mine their way through the system with guidance.   
 
Results 
Educational researchers have found that the effect of school size varies according 
to the composition of the school, especially the average SES of the school.  I have argued 
that the community size (and composition, in subsequent chapters) plays the same role.  
The effect of school size will vary by the type, or size, of the community, and smaller 
schools are going to be more beneficial in urban areas than in smaller communities.   
                                                     
15 Remember, a community is defined as a zip code here.  So, there are several 
communities within one central city, especially for the large central cities. 
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Given that rural school consolidation has reduced the number of small schools, 
one might argue that community size and school size have little in common today.  
However, Table 4.2 shows a very strong relationship between school size and community 
size.  Sixty-five percent of the smallest schools are found in small towns.  Similarly, 
almost a majority of the largest schools are found in central cities, with another third of 
them in suburbs.   
Table 4.2:  Average School Size across Types of Communities in NHES  
  
Student Enrollment in School 
 





















































Total 727 489 991 771 915 3893
 
Values in cells represent the number of schools.  Percentages are column percentages, or 
the percent of the schools of a particular size in a particular type of town (i.e., 65.0% of 
schools with fewer than 628 students are in small towns).   
Pearson Chi Square = 1428.00 (p<.00001) 
a Categories are derived using population density quartiles.   
 
I first examine the general effects of community size and school size on 
democratic values.  Table 4.3 shows these results, and again, in the aggregate, we see that 
school size is not significantly related to democratic values, except for participation in 
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school activities.  From the smallest to the largest schools, there is a 12 percent drop in 
the likelihood that a student will participate in school activities.   
Table 4.3:  Simple Regressions for Community Size, School Size, and Dependent 
Measures 
 














  -.0003**** 
   (.0001) 
   .0000002 
  (.00005) 
  -.00008** 
  (.00004) 
  -.00001*** 
  (.000004) 
   -.00001** 
   (.000004) 
School 
Enrollment 
   -.001 
   (.001) 
   .0002 
  (.0005) 
    .0004 
   (.0004) 
  -.0001*** 
  (.00004) 
   -.00001 
   (.00004) 
Constant  36.769**** 
  (1.139) 
44.347**** 
   (.761) 
 47.685**** 
    (.601) 
  1.029 
   (.067) 
    .630**** 












1 Values in cells are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients and their standard 
errors are underneath.   
2 Values in cells are unstandardized Logistic regression coefficients and their standard 
errors are underneath. 
*p<.10  **p<.05  ***p<.01 ****p<.001 
 
Even though there is a close relationship between school size and community 
size, and school size does not influence democratic values, community size does help 
explain each of the democratic values except political efficacy.  Thus, even though 
smaller schools are found in smaller communities, and school size does not matter, there 
is something about living in a smaller town that benefits democratic values.  The biggest 
differences are between small towns and central cities, especially for tolerance – a 10,000 
person per square mile increase leads to a three point drop in knowledge and a 100,000 
increase in density leads to an eight point drop in political tolerance.  Given the range of 
density in the sample, this means that from the smallest town, Tonopah, Nevada (with .5 
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persons per square mile) to the biggest city neighborhood, New York, New York (with 
98,000 persons per square mile), knowledge declines by 30 points and tolerance declines 
by 8 points.  Similarly, participation in school activities drops by 32 percent, and outside 
activities drop by 24 percent, in the largest community.  In general, without controlling 
for individual characteristics, the socialization experience in the city seems to foster in 
children fewer political skills and information they will need in order to be able to 
participate effectively in politics.  
 Next, I include typical controls for civics coursework, interest in politics, 
educational aspirations, and parental SES (Table 4.4).  Given that neither community 
size, nor school size were significant for political efficacy, I did not run a full model.  
First, the model for political tolerance does not explain these attitudes at all.  Only one 
variable is marginally significant, and very little of the overall variance is explains.  
Because tolerance is predicted by factors outside this model, it is a much different 
construct than my other dependent measures.   
 Community size remains significant for political knowledge and participation in 
school activities.  Students in smaller towns are more knowledgeable and participatory 
than those in large cities, even controlling for all of these individual indicators.  In fact, as 
shown in Table 4.5, school participation drops by 19 percent from the smallest town to 
the largest urban neighborhood.  All of the most important indicators for political 
knowledge and participation among adolescents are included here – parental income, 
civics instruction, and a student’s education aspirations.16  An alternative hypothesis may  
                                                     
16 I ran correlations between several of my independent variables, in order to examine 
multicollinearity, as well as to look at the relationships between civics coursework and 
classes that increased interest in government, and political discussion with parents and 
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Table 4.4:  Full Regression Models for Community Size, School Size, and Dependent 
Measures in NHES 
 







Out of School 
Activities2 
Population Density      -.0002** 
     (.0001) 
      -.0001 
       (.00005) 
     -.000009* 
      (.000005) 
     -.000003 
     (.000005) 
School Enrollment      -.001 
      (.001) 
       .0001 
      (.0005) 
      -.0001** 
      (.00005) 
     -.00009* 
     (.00005) 
Courses Required 
Attention to Gov’t 
     2.944* 
    (1.559) 
      1.069 
      (.909) 
       .080 
      (.110) 
     -.130 
     (.105) 
Class Increased 
Interest in Gov’t 
    4.705**** 
     (.959) 
      -.089 
      (.573) 
       .248*** 
      (.072) 
      .169* 
     (.065) 
Frequency of 
Watching TV News 
    2.053** 
     (.717) 
       .648 
      (.412) 
       .019 
      (.049) 
      .108* 
     (.046) 
Discuss News with 
Family and Friend 
    2.737**** 
     (.730) 
       .063 
      (.432) 
       .249**** 
      (.054) 
      .180**** 
     (.049) 
No College Plans    -6.287**** 
   (1.359) 
    -1.509* 
      (.796) 
      -.664**** 
      (.096) 
     -.471**** 
     (.090) 
Parental 
Education Level 
    4.732**** 
     (.613) 
       .433 
      (.362) 
       .103** 
      (.045) 
      .166**** 
     (.042) 
Parental Income     1.035**** 
     (.265) 
       .051 
      (.156) 
      -.040** 
      (.019) 
      .045*** 
     (.017) 
Grade     3.297**** 
     (.578) 
       .323 
      (.341) 
        .027 
      (.042) 
     -.062 
     (.039) 
Constant  -39.357**** 
    (7.043) 
   40.677**** 
    (4.078) 
      -.333 
      (.501) 
       .005 










1 Values in cells are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients and their standard 
errors are underneath.   
2 Values in cells are unstandardized Logistic regression coefficients and their standard 
errors are underneath. 
*p<.10  **p<.05  ***p<.01 ****p<.001 
                                                                                                                                                              
frequency of watching the news.  The highest level of correlation was .32, between 
watching the news and discussing politics.   
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predict that any advantage students in small towns would have over those in the city 
would disappear when one controls for resources of the parents and schools.   
Even controlling for community size, smaller schools are important indicators of 
participation in school activities.  Given the close relationship between school size and 
community size, I had anticipated that the relationship between school size and 
participation would diminish or disappear once I entered community size into the model.  
Yet, these results show that smaller schools are important for school participation 
independent from the size of the town in which one lives.  It is not the case, then, that 
small schools foster participation in school activities simply because students in smaller 
towns are more participatory. 
 
Table 4.5:  Probabilities from Logistic Regression for School Participation and 
Community Size in NHES 
 
 School Participation 
 
Population Density Diff            -.19 
Student Enrollment Diff            -.12 
Courses Required Attention to Gov’t Diff           +.01 
Class Increased Interest in Gov’t Diff           +.08 
Frequency of Watching TV News  Diff           +.01 
Discuss News with Others Diff           +.12 
No College Plans  Diff           -.12 
Parental Education Level Diff           +.07 
Parental Income Diff           +.07 
Grade Level Diff          +.01 
 
Values in cells are the percentage differences from the minimum values to the maximum 
values of each variable, based on the logistic regression models presented in Table 3.6. 
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An easier way of interpreting whether smaller schools are more effective in some 
communities than in others is to examine the same regressions across different 
community types.  Table 4.6 presents these results for knowledge.  Looking across the 
different town sizes, it is important to note both the similarities and the differences.  First, 
while we see that school size does not matter for most towns, it is important in central 
cities.  A 1000 person increase in enrollment in school corresponds with a three-point 
drop in knowledge in central cities.  Thus, from the smallest school in cities with an 
enrollment of 40 students, to the largest, with 5000 students, knowledge declines by 15 
points.   
Parental education is extremely important across all community sizes, as are 
educational aspirations.  In small towns and suburbs, those who do not plan to go to 
college are 8 and 7 points less knowledgeable than those who plan to go to college.  
Although the effect of civics coursework varies across communities, when students say 
their courses spark interest in government, they have much higher knowledge in all 
communities.  The differences across communities are as interesting as the similarities.  
Political discussion makes a positive impact on knowledge in large towns and central 
cities, but does not matter in small towns or suburbs.  In small towns, seniors are no more 
knowledgeable than freshmen; this is either a testament to the high levels of knowledge 
freshmen have, or possibly to the fact that students do not gain much as they progress. 
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Table 4.6:  Predictors of Political Knowledge across Different Types of Communities in 
NHES 
 
 Community Size/Type 
 Small Townsa Large Towns Suburbs Central Cities
 
Student Enrollment           .001 
         (.003) 
         -.002 
         (.002) 
         .002 
        (.002) 
       -.003** 
       (.001) 
Courses Required 
Attention to Gov’t 
        5.063* 
       (3.002) 
      -5.483* 
      (3.142) 
       6.813** 
      (3.247) 
      3.536 
     (3.288) 
Class Increased 
Interest in Gov’t 
        4.663** 
       (1.889) 
       3.322* 
      (1.924) 
       5.594*** 
      (1.906) 
      5.090** 
     (1.978) 
Frequency of 
Watching TV News 
        2.767* 
       (1.503) 
       1.212 
      (1.486) 
       2.755** 
      (1.382) 
        .967 
     (1.401) 
Discuss News with 
Family and Friend 
        1.276 
      (1.516) 
       4.731*** 
      (1.546) 
       2.217 
     (1.426) 
      3.258** 
     (1.406) 
No College Plans       -8.483*** 
      (2.716) 
      -2.896 
       2.813) 
     -7.842*** 
     (2.753) 
     -4.150 
     (2.689) 
Parental 
Education Level 
       5.011**** 
      (1.339) 
       4.619**** 
      (1.219) 
      6.111**** 
     (1.177) 
      2.632** 
     (1.205) 
Parental Income        1.370** 
        (.551) 
        -.008 
        (.547) 
       1.719*** 
        (.521) 
      1.146** 
       (.501) 
Grade Level        1.243 
      (1.180) 
       4.036*** 
      (1.162) 
       2.676** 
      (1.123) 
      5.081**** 
     (1.220) 
Constant     -23.064 
    (14.471) 
    -28.444** 
    (14.373) 
   -54.167**** 
    (14.098) 
   -51.271**** 










Values in cells are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients and their standard errors 
are in parentheses underneath.   
*p<.10  **p<.05  ***p<.01 ****p<.001 




 It is true that the benefits of smaller school size on democratic values vary by 
community size.  Students in urban areas have higher levels of knowledge and are more 
likely to participate in school activities if they attend smaller schools.  Schools in cities 
are of the highest average size compared to those in other communities.  Children 
growing up in the city are generally attending extremely large schools, with well over 
2000 students.  Many of these children are also victims of high poverty.  They are more 
likely to live in a single-parent home, and are raised among neighbors with lower levels 
of education and higher unemployment than are children in other communities.  Smaller 
schools, to the extent that their advocates are right that they are better places for 
disadvantaged students, may diminish some of the negative effects of poverty on the 
teaching of democratic values in urban areas. 
 Furthermore, we might not expect smaller schools to make much difference in 
suburbs or in small towns.  Suburban children, to a much larger extent, have parents that 
can guide them through what Powell et al. refer to as the “shopping mall high school” 
(1985).  School size initially began to increase, in part, because education policymakers 
believed they were necessary in order to offer college-bound students greater 
opportunities.  In large suburban schools, this is just what they do; students here can take 
advantage of the numerous opportunities for specialized courses and A.P. classes that can 
help them gain admittance into college.  Suburban schools have more resources and they 
attract better teachers, giving students advantages over their counterparts in urban 
schools, which suffer from a tremendous lack of adequate resources and have much 
difficulty attracting and maintaining good teachers.  Overall, children growing up in 
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suburbia are better off in large schools, and reducing school size here might actually give 
them a worse education. 
 In small towns, smaller schools add only modest benefit because they are simply 
redundant.  Although school consolidation has increased their average size, small towns 
still maintain many traditional, small neighborhood schools.  Since the average school is 
already quite small, it is unlikely that reducing their size would influence democratic 
values.  In fact, in small towns, school size is not significantly related to my democratic 
values.  Interestingly, the schools here suffer from many of the same problems as those in 
urban areas: it is often difficult to attract teachers to rural areas, they do not have ample 
resources, and parents are not highly educated and do not make enough money to offer 
their kids additional educational opportunities.  Indeed, if schools in small towns were as 
large as they are in urban areas, school size might have the same effects. 
 Or perhaps they would not.  After all, the other results indicate that growing up in 
smaller towns increases political knowledge and participation in school activities.  
Independent of school size, it is better to be raised in a smaller town than a larger 
community.  This is unlikely to be due solely to differences in the income and education 
of the residents, as average income and education is actually lower in small towns than in 
urban areas.  There seems to be something more happening in small towns that helps 
foster these democratic values. 
 This “something more” is difficult to pinpoint exactly with these data.  However, 
the literature on the role of social interactions in political attitudes and behaviors 
indicates that one of the main differences is the interaction among the members of 
communities.  Residents of small towns have more familiarity with one another, which 
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fosters trust and a greater sense of “attachment” to their community.  These ties form the 
basis of a common socialization of young people into the norms and values of the 
community, which include political knowledge and participation.  These results help 
pinpoint where to focus resources:  there is no need to break up large schools in suburbs, 
and, the consolidation of rural schools should be discontinued in places where it is still 
ongoing.  Instead, we should focus on feasible ways of reducing school size in cities.  At 
least as far as community size is concerned, targeting urban schools is the first step. 
The results of this chapter also introduce the difficulty in drawing policy 
conclusions from this research.  After all, we cannot turn back the clock 120 years and 
move everyone out of the city and back to the farm.  We have too much of our economy 
wrapped up in cities and their suburbs.  Furthermore, it is quite unlikely that we would 
have very many urban residents jumping at the chance to move to Smallville.  Dahl once 
quipped that many of those who loudly extol the virtues of small-town life have never 
lived in one (1967).  Many residents of rural areas and small towns are itching to leave, 
and although many later return to their roots, enough stay away to make a difference. 
How can we use this information to help the socialization experience of those in 
larger communities?  Is there a way to replicate the processes in small towns, or are their 
strengths within suburbs and cities that have the potential to foster civic values?  These 
are the primary questions taken up in the last chapter, and I will wait until all the results 
are in before discussing this at this point. 
In the next chapter I examine more closely the role that SES, both of the 
individual and the community, has on democratic values, and how SES interacts with 
school size.  Some scholars have found that poor children, and children growing up in 
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poor communities, are much better off in smaller schools.  Thus, while we should expect 
affluent children, and those in wealthier communities, to have higher levels of 




Political Socialization in Poor Communities 
 
 
 The last chapter showed that children growing up in smaller towns had higher 
levels of political knowledge and were more likely to participate in school activities than 
those in large, urban communities.  We also saw that smaller schools did provide benefits 
to students living in central cities, but that reducing school size in small towns and 
suburban communities will not give these students the same advantage, at least with 
regard to their political development.  Most of the literature on the variable effects of 
school size examines the interaction of socioeconomic status (SES) and achievement.  
These scholars argue that poorer students, and those living in poorer communities, gain 
advantages in smaller schools.  Ultimately, they conclude that smaller school size 
disrupts the normally strong bond between SES and academic achievement. 
 In this chapter, I examine this contention with regard to democratic values:  do 
poorer students, and those growing up in poorer communities, have higher levels of 
political knowledge, efficacy, tolerance and participation when they attend smaller 
schools, than they do in larger schools?  Just as in the last chapter, I am also interested in 
the contextual effects on political socialization, as well as the effects of school size.  I 
investigate the links between the affluence, or poverty, of a community and democratic 
values.  We would not be surprised to find that affluent students, and those living in 
wealthier communities, would have more knowledge and efficacy.  Poverty is not simply 
an urban phenomenon, and I anticipate that not all poor communities have similar effects, 
and that poor small towns may not be as detrimental to civic values as are impoverished 
central city neighborhoods. 
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School Size and Poverty 
 Although the literature is not extensive, there are some educational scholars who 
have found that smaller schools are of most benefit to disadvantaged students (Johnson, 
Howley and Howley 2002; Lee and Smith 1997; Howley 1995; Huang and Howley 1993; 
Fowler and Walberg 1991; Friedkin and Necochea 1988).  I discussed these findings and 
their arguments in the last chapter, so I will not repeat them here.  The basic theory is that 
disadvantaged students, typically defined as students with low-SES and/or racial 
minorities, are often trapped inside very large schools, where they are more likely to “slip 
through the cracks” because they do not have adequate support at home, nor can their 
teachers take as much of interest in them because the large numbers of children in school.   
Smaller schools often allow teachers to get to know their students more 
personally, and are places where students are held accountable and encouraged.  More 
individualized instruction is possible, and so struggling students can get the help they 
need.  Teachers can spend more time with fewer students, and they learn their students’ 
strengths and weaknesses, making it easier to tailor lessons so that students can learn.  
When this kind of individual attention is given to students, they want to learn, to stay in 
school, and to plan for their futures in college or in a job.   
 In fact, much of the movement behind reducing school size is focused in 
disadvantaged urban neighborhoods.  Many of the case studies on the benefits of smaller 
schools are based on particular schools’ or school districts’ efforts to reduce school size 
in large urban communities (Meier 1995; Clinchy 2000; Raywid 1996; Toch 2003; 
Wasley, et al. 2000).  The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation has invested $590 million 
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to support 1,600 small schools nationwide, most of which are high schools.  The schools 
on which they focus are in “underserved communities,” many of which are in low-
income, urban areas.  In 2003, the Gates Foundation donated more than $50 million to 
help start 67 small high schools in New York City, and $11 million to the second-largest 
district in California, San Diego City, to transform three large high schools into small 
“learning communities.”  Gates sited among his reasons that this “will help poor and 
minority students prepare for college and for jobs in today’s economy” (Montagne 2003).  
These schools will serve primarily minority, low-income students and will focus on 
“personalization, high performance, and college-readiness” (“$51 Million Grant…” 
2003). 
 Thus, even though the average size of high schools has increased all over the 
country over the last few decades, those who are involved in actual school restructuring 
have focused their efforts largely on schools in poor urban neighborhoods.  Given what I 
found in the last chapter, this may also be the best strategy for the development of 
democratic values, especially political knowledge and participation.  To the extent that 
smaller schools diminish the negative effects of poverty for academic achievement and 
dropout rates, they should do the same for democratic values.  In this chapter, I add the 
economic composition of the community to my analysis of community size from the last 
chapter.  There are have three main questions: 
 1) Are poorer students better off in smaller schools? 
 2) Are students living in poor communities advantaged by smaller school size? 
 3) Does poverty have the same effects on democratic values across communities
 of different sizes?  
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The first two questions directly follow from the research on small schools.  The third 
question comes out of scholarship on urban sociology.  This literature, which was jump-
started in the early 1990s after the publication of William Julius Wilson’s The Truly 
Disadvantaged (1987), has examined the effects of neighborhoods, especially poor 
neighborhoods, on many aspects of child development.  Researchers have not looked 
specifically at political socialization, however.  And, these scholars have focused almost 
exclusively on urban poverty.   
In this chapter, in addition to the influence of school size, I also address 
differences in the effects of poverty within central cities and small towns on democratic 
values.  Small towns are often just as poor as many urban areas, but at the same time, 
residents of small towns are more likely to be engaged in their communities than are 
those living in the city.  Thus, poverty may not, then, have the same deleterious effects in 
all environments.  If true, this would get closer to explaining the underlying mechanism 
behind the effects of poverty in urban areas, as opposed to rural ones, as well as why 
smaller schools are so much more beneficial in these communities. 
 
Political Socialization in Poor (Urban) Communities 
Children from affluent schools know more, stay in school longer, and end up with 
better jobs than children from schools that enroll mostly poor children.  Children 
who live in affluent neighborhoods also get into less trouble with the law and 
have fewer illegitimate children than children who live in poor neighborhoods 
(Jencks and Mayer 1990:111). 
 
 While some may argue that this quote merely points out that children with 
affluent parents are better off regardless of where they live, others contend that 
neighborhoods and communities influence socialization independently from parental 
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status (Conover and Searing, 2000; Brooks-Gunn, Duncan and Aber 1997; Jencks and 
Mayer 1990; Duncan, Brooks-Gunn and Klebanov 1994; Wilson 1987, 1996).  First, the 
level of affluence, or poverty, within a community determines the amount of resources 
and the quality of services.  Wealthier communities have more of and better quality in 
almost every objective indicator on neighborhood status:  stronger tax base that affords 
good public services, better public safety, good public schools and private alternatives, 
professional services such as legal advice and health care, and, most importantly – access 
to employment.  They have amenities that are rarely found in poor communities, such as 
community centers and extra-curricular activities for children.  Poor communities – 
whether they are urban neighborhoods or small towns – struggle to find adequate health 
care, jobs, schools, safety and enough resources for basic services such as trash removal. 
 These indicators of a community’s economic composition are not only important 
because they determine the resources of a community, but they also become part of the 
society’s culture, thus shaping the context in which young people are socialized.  Social 
interaction is the major mechanism translating the local environment into behavioral 
outcomes (Beck, Dalton, Greene and Huckfeldt 2002; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Mutz 
2002).  Individuals learn from those around them about their community’s norms and 
values.  Children and adolescents are especially sensitive to social interaction, as they are 
still developing their cognitive and affective sensibilities.  The community context creates 
a particular culture, or bias, that is transmitted from generation to generation through 
interaction in the community (Huckfeldt and Kohfeld 1989; Oliver and Mendelberg 
2000).   
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 These interactions convey information about normal and acceptable behavior.  
Socialization into the community’s culture involves learning to “follow one’s inclinations 
as they have been developed by influence or learning from other members of the 
community that one belongs to or identifies with” (Wilson 1996, 66).  Structural aspects 
of communities, such as unemployment and poverty, provide the context in which 
individuals interact, and thereby affect the socialization children receive into their 
community’s values.   
Unemployment, for instance, has effects on relationships, and relationships affect 
employment (Lin 2000).  For example, the availability of work, and the type of work, 
influences families’ and schools’ support of career ambitions.  Wilson points out that one 
of the most important functions of social interaction within a neighborhood is the 
informal job network.  Teachers often help their students negotiate obstacles to 
employment, and friends alert one another to available jobs and contacts.  In many poor 
communities, these relationships are strained or absent.  There are several reasons:  
concerns over safety, which cause people not to associate with their neighbors as they 
once did; lack of available jobs in the community, and lack of transportation to jobs 
outside the community, which serve to exacerbate and concentrate joblessness within 
particular areas; poor school quality, and teachers that do not live in the community, and 
therefore cannot help students negotiate their lives there.  Thus, even if children have 
aspirations that would pull them out of poverty, parents and teachers often communicate 
that more modest ambitions are more appropriate (O’Connor 2000).  Although some of 
this behavior is arguably based on discriminatory attitudes of teachers toward the poor 
and racial minorities, much of it is more likely due to ignorance and lack of knowledge 
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about existing opportunities, due to the environment in which these people are living 
and/or working. 
Similarly, Young (2000) describes the damaging effects of unemployment and 
underemployment among young, black men.  First, these men have the desire to work, 
and to provide a good life for their families.  However, their knowledge of the job market 
is often based on outdated information that they learned from others in their community 
or in their schools.  They described to Young their search for jobs in manufacturing or in 
other skilled and semi-skilled jobs that did not require additional education beyond high 
school.  These jobs are no longer available in most places, but these men do not realize 
that their trouble in finding this type of employment is not due solely to a personal 
failure.  Many men got very discouraged, and some actually pass up certain opportunities 
not because they are “too lazy” to work, but because they are holding out for jobs that 
simply do not exist (Young 2000).   
I point out these examples because they help illuminate the type of environment 
in which many poor children are currently being raised.  It is not simply that the majority 
of their neighbors are out of work and that money is tight, but there is a substantial 
psychological toll on both individuals within the community, and the community itself, as  
a result of unemployment and other structural elements of communities.  Similar 
examples can be given for the damaging effects of single parenthood (Hicks-Barlett 
2000), lack of adequate housing, poor medical care, and crime (Barclay-McLaughlin 
2000) that also make up the socialization experience for many young people in poor 
communities.  
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Affluent neighbors are thought to have positive influences on children from all 
backgrounds.  It is not simply that affluent neighbors have more money, but that they are 
generally more highly educated, steadily employed and more participatory in civic life 
than adults in poor communities.  They are believed to provide good role models for 
children, teaching them the value of work and education.  Collective socialization 
theories suggest that adults within a community can bestow benefits or burdens on young 
people (Jencks and Mayer 1990).  Wilson argues that one of the main problems with 
ghetto neighborhoods is that there is a dearth of good role models for children because so 
many adults are unemployed and have dropped out of school (1987).   
 Peer-to-peer interactions are also important.  Theories based on the idea of 
contagion describe how behaviors, both good and bad, spread almost like a disease 
through peer interaction.  They assume that if children grow up in communities where 
their peers steal cars, for example, they will more be likely to steal cars; and likewise, if 
their peers all go to college, they are more likely to go to college (Crane 1991; Schelling 
1978; Granovetter 1978).  Negative peer interaction is even more likely to lead to 
negative behaviors in communities where adults are not able to provide adequate social 
control for children (Sampson 2001). 
 According to Sampson, the feature that best describes many poor neighborhoods 
is social disorganization (1992; 2001).  Social organization is “the ability of a community 
structure to realize the common values of its residents and maintain effective social 
controls” (Sampson 2001, 8).  The characteristics of poor communities, and thus the 
social interaction within them do not facilitate the kind of environment where individuals 
can come together to achieve common goals.  Social organization is similar in many 
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ways to the concept of social capital.  Although the term has come to mean many things, 
originally, social capital referred to the capabilities lodged within a community (not an 
individual) that would facilitate individuals to pursue a collective good (Coleman 1990).   
 The recent scholarship on the negative effects of poverty on many social 
outcomes is almost entirely based on urban neighborhoods, stimulated by Wilson’s work 
on the urban underclass.  The urban focus is also largely practical – indeed, one look at a 
sampling of indicators of social and economic status confirm that life in certain parts of 
cities is abysmal.  I believe that the exclusion of impoverished communities outside of 
urban areas is an important weakness of this research.  It should come as no surprise to 
anyone that affluent children growing up in affluent or middle-class suburbs achieve at 
higher rates, go to college at higher rates, and go on to occupy higher status rolls within 
society than those living in impoverished urban neighborhoods that are characterized by 
high crime, low educational attainment, high unemployment, and general despair. 
 These findings have led policymakers to focus on eradicating poverty, and 
alleviating the myriad social and economic problems in the city.  I do not disagree with 
attempts to make life better for those suffering from so many problems, yet, I believe that 
the exclusive focus on only two types of communities (poor and urban in contrast to 
wealthy suburbs) prevents a very interesting analysis that could actually bring 
policymakers closer to understanding underlying dynamics that contribute to poverty in 
the inner city.  If there are impoverished communities that do not have the same negative 
social outcomes as in the inner city, we may be able to better understand why some 
policies have more success than others, and, there may be ways to replicate parts of what 
works in these other communities in the city.  Indeed, I would simply expand Wilson’s 
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original ideas to a different type of community:  the rural community, or small town.  I 
believe an examination that includes small towns will actually strengthen many of the 
arguments Wilson and others have made about the importance of networks. 
 Along with Wilson, Robert Sampson’s theory of “social disorganization” and 
Coleman’s “social capital” posit that social interaction, or networks, is the key to 
understanding the complexity of problems in inner cities.  These theories, however, could 
also be employed to explain the reason why those rural areas and small towns that suffer 
from the same problems as urban neighborhoods do not always have the same outcomes.  
In the next section, I discuss some of scholarship on rural poverty, and how social 
networks differ in small towns, compared to urban areas.  In essence, if poverty levels are 
similar, why are the outcomes different? 
 
Poverty and Small Towns 
“Neighborhoods characterized by an extensive set of obligations, 
expectations, and interlocking social networks connecting adults facilitate 
the informal social control and support of children…Neighborhoods are 
differentially characterized not only by network-related structures…but 
also by cultural expectations...The expectation that neighborhood residents 
can and will intervene on the behalf of children depends on…the shared 
values among her neighbors”(Sampson 2001, 9).   
 
Children in urban America are not alone in their deprivation.  Poverty levels are 
actually higher in rural areas than in urban areas.  In 1996, the percentage of children in 
poverty was slightly higher in rural areas than urban areas (24% compared to 22% 
respectively).  In 2000, the average urban resident made over $12,000 more per year than 
the average rural resident.  These differences are due in part to the wider income 
distributions in urban than rural areas.  Poverty is likely to be more common and 
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widespread in rural areas, while it is found in pockets within cities.  And, even though the 
average cost of living is lower in rural than urban areas (Nord 2000), rural residents often 
have higher costs for transportation and medical care (Rogers 1988).   
Rural poverty is “geographically concentrated in the same way that urban poverty 
is confined by neighborhoods; and rural children in poverty face the same challenges as 
poor urban children – substance abuse, teen pregnancy, and educational failure” (Nadel 
and Sagawa 2002, 12).  It is often assumed that urban communities are the only places 
that suffer from a lack of adequate institutions, such as good schools, community centers, 
and health clinics.  However, these facilities are often as bad in rural communities, which 
also lack the money to hire and maintain the best teachers, to pay for new textbooks and 
equipment for school activities, and to attract medical practitioners and community 
leaders to these remote areas.  In fact, although 40 percent of the nation’s schools are in 
rural areas and small towns, and twenty-six percent of the nation’s students are enrolled 
in these schools, only about twenty-three percent of federal education money is targeted 
to rural schools. 
Rural areas suffer from many of the same problems that urban neighborhoods 
face:  high levels of unemployment, low levels of educational attainment, geographic 
isolation, and intergenerational transmission of poverty.  One major difference, of course, 
between rural and urban poverty is that, except in the Deep South, rural poverty is largely 
a white phenomenon. 
 Based on the levels of poverty in rural areas and small towns, we might expect 
similar social outcomes as in impoverished central city neighborhoods.  In some cases, 
this would be right.  Rural school children score much lower on standardized tests and are 
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more likely to drop out of school than those in the suburbs or urban areas (Roscigno and 
Crowley 2001). Single parenthood is on the rise in rural communities (Lichter and 
Eggebeen 1992).  With the losses in the agricultural and industrial sectors that once 
typified the rural labor force, jobs in the low-paying service sector have been unable to 
replace the wages and benefits to which many were accustomed.   
Even so, many scholars continue to extol the virtues of small town civic life.  In 
spite of their poverty and hardship, individuals in rural areas are more likely to vote and 
to engage in other civic activities than those in poor urban areas (Putnam 2000; Gimpel 
1999; Monroe 1977; Verba and Nie 1972; Fischer 1975).  Nardulli, Dalager, and Greco 
find that much of decline in voter turnout in the last 30 years can be explained by looking 
at the declining levels within the nation’s largest 32 metropolitan areas (1996).  Outside 
of these cities, turnout has remained steady.  For example, Perry, Alabama is small (only 
11,800 residents) and is one of the poorest places in America (with an average income of 
$20,000 in 2000), but in the 2000 election, nearly 70 percent of adults in Perry County 
voted, and in 1996, 67 percent turned out.  According to a Perry County Commissioner, 
“Voting is part of our culture, and we continue to preach it” (Arizona Daily Star 2004). 
Oliver argues that rural residents are more efficacious than those in suburbs and 
urban areas, and efficacy fosters participation (2001).  Putnam’s work on social capital 
indicates that residents of states like North Dakota, where there are few urban centers and 
many small towns, are especially participatory and efficacious (2000).  Communities 
with a substantial stock of social capital are more stable and efficient, and are places 
where residents know and trust one another.  
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In the last chapter I reviewed the extensive literature on community size and 
democratic values.  I will not review it again here, but I add that the fact that people are 
more engaged in and knowledgeable about public affairs in small towns is even more 
surprising given the scholarship on the depressing effects poverty has on most social 
outcomes, including political participation and knowledge.  I discovered in the last 
chapter that children in small towns had higher levels of political knowledge and 
participation in school activities than those in larger communities, even controlling for 
SES.  If small towns are similarly impoverished as central cities, what accounts for the 
differences in socialization outcomes?   
As Sampson (1992; 2001) and Wilson (1996) argue, the key to understanding 
these differences is in the interactions within the communities.  It is not simply about the 
presence or absence of social networks, but rather the content of the interaction within the 
networks, as well as the ability of these relationships to empower individuals.  Thus, I do 
not believe that individuals in inner cities are socially inept, or that they do not have 
strong bonds with other people.  Research suggests just the opposite, in fact (Danziger 
2000).  Neighbors in poor inner cities, as well as small towns, often rely on one another 
for childcare, financial support, as well as emotional support.     
The difference between these networks and those in small towns, and thus why 
outcomes are somewhat more positive in small towns, is what Sampson refers to as “the 
believed capacity for collective action” (2001, 13).  It is similar to Oliver’s contention 
about the importance of efficacy (2001).  People can come together for any number of 
reasons.  If people do not believe they can effect change, or somehow obtain some of 
what they need, however, the relationships are less likely to support the sort of values and 
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behaviors that would allow the community to overcome its impoverished status and 
participate in the political system.   
Thus, just as the benefits of school size vary across different communities, the 
negative effects of poverty may also vary according to the type of community in which 
one is poor.  To the extent that negative social networks are detrimental to socialization in 
poor, urban neighborhoods, positive social networks may enhance socialization in poor, 
small towns.  Adolescents in small communities are believed to have better role models 
than those in urban areas.  Even though many rural residents have similarly low levels of 
education and income as those in poor urban neighborhoods, the presence of 
grandparents and other extensive social networks provide young people with close ties 
and guidance that are lacking in many urban communities.   
 Thus, once I examine the effects of poverty on democratic values, I then analyze 
differences among the urban poor and the poor in small towns.  I expect that poverty in 
small towns will be at similar levels as in urban areas, but that the poor students will have 
higher levels of political knowledge, tolerance, efficacy and participation than those in 
impoverished central cities. 
 
Results 
 The first question this chapter addresses is the contention that disadvantaged 
students are better off in smaller schools than larger ones.  Many believe that poor 
students benefit from the personal attention they can receive in smaller schools, and thus, 
their achievement is higher and their attitudes are better.  Table 5.1 shows that the poorest 
students in the sample are no more politically knowledgeable, efficacious, or tolerant in 
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the smallest schools (under 600 students) than the largest (over 2000 students).  The 
poorest students are defined as those whose parents make less than $15,000 per year.  
The only advantage these students have in smaller schools is that they are significantly 
more likely to participate in school activities than in larger schools.  Whereas 65 percent 
of poor students in small schools participate, only 48 percent of them participate in the 
largest schools.  Given Lee and Smith’s (1997) finding that schools with 600-900 
students are optimal, I also examined comparisons of poor students’ performance in these 
schools.  I found no significant differences between poor students’ democratic values in 
the smallest schools and those in slightly bigger schools.  Poor students are not 
necessarily better off in smaller schools, at least for democratic values.   
 The second question to address is the idea that students in disadvantaged 
communities are better off in smaller schools.  The first question looked at whether poor 
children – regardless of the affluence of their community – had higher levels of 
democratic values in smaller schools.  Now, I examine whether all students in poor 
communities – regardless of their own families’ levels of affluence – are better off in 
smaller schools.  I find that students in the poorest communities (those in the lowest 
quartile of median income) are only more participatory in smaller schools, but that once 
again, school size has no effect on knowledge, efficacy or tolerance (Table 5.2).  
Interestingly, students in smaller schools within poor communities are not only more 
likely to join school activities, but also to get involved in activities outside their schools.  
Based on these results, I cannot conclude that reducing school size would have much of 




Table 5.1:  Differences of Means for Poor Children in Smallest versus Largest Schools in 
NHESa 
  N Mean 




       21.11 
       22.22 




         1.14 
         1.21 




         1.44 
         1.35 






           .65*** 
           .48 






           .51 
           .45 
Differences were calculated using independent samples t-tests. 






Table 5.2:  Differences of Means for Children in Poor Communities in Smallest versus 
Largest Schools in NHESa 
  N Mean 




       29.51 
       26.39 




         1.29 
         1.39 




         1.37 
         1.46 






           .69* 
           .59 






           .60*** 
           .54 
Differences were calculated using independent samples t-tests. 
a Poor communities are those within the lowest quartile of median income for the 
community, based on 2000 figures. 
*p<.10 ** p<.05 ***p<.01 
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 These findings are somewhat surprising, especially given my results in chapter 4 
that smaller schools enhance the acquisition of political knowledge in urban areas.  After 
all, many neighborhoods within central cities are the poorest communities within the U.S.  
How could smaller schools help students in urban communities, but have no significance 
in the poorest communities?  Part of the reason, I believe, is that poor communities are 
not synonymous with urban neighborhoods.  In fact, 40 percent of the poorest 
communities in these data are in small towns or rural areas, and only 28 percent of them 
are in central cities.  Given the benefits of small schools in urban neighborhoods, it is 
likely that poverty does not have the same effects in small towns as it does in the city. 
 Table 5.3 outlines some of the differences between poor urban communities and 
poor small towns.  Poverty in small towns takes a much different face than in urban areas.  
On average, poor small towns are slightly better off than poor central cities.  Yet, the 
median income is still quite low in both communities.  Small town poverty is largely a 
white, native phenomenon – they have very few immigrants and Latinos, and 
comparatively few African-Americans.  Unemployment is more severe in urban areas, 
with 13 percent of eligible workers unable to find a job. However, with 8 percent of the 
workforce out of work, this is no small problem in small towns.  Although over 10 
percent of families with children in poor small towns are headed by females, fully one-
quarter of families in impoverished urban neighborhoods are run by women.  Sampson 
(2001) argues that one of the effects of widespread single parenthood is a persistent lack 
of social control of children.  When adults are not present, children supervise themselves. 
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Table 5.3:  Differences of Means between Poor Urban Communities and Poor Small 
Towns in NHES 
 
 Poor Urban Poor Small Towns 
Mean Income $25,376 $27,853 
Percent College Degree                     .119                     .121 
Percent Black .38 .16 
Percent Latino .34 .12 
Percent Foreign Born .23 .04 
Percent Unemployed .13 .08 
Percent Homeowners .36 .73 
Percent Female-headed 
Households w/ children 
.25 .11 
Enrollment in Schools 1754 652 
N= 277 389 
Differences were calculated using independent samples t-tests. 
Numbers in cells represent the mean level within each category.  Figures are rounded.   
Scales 
* All differences are significant at p<.0001 
 
The starkest difference between urban and small town poverty is the rate of 
homeownership.  Three-quarters of families in poor small towns own their own homes, 
while only a third of those living in poor urban areas own theirs.  Homeownership 
provides stability to families, and requires adults to be financially responsible.  Using the 
National Longitudinal Study of Youth, researchers found that parents who own their 
home help boost their child’s educational achievement and reduce behavioral problems 
(Haurin, Parcel and Haurin 2002).  Homeownership also has a positive influence on the 
community.  The financial investment gives people a shared interest in maintaining and 
supporting the neighborhood. 
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 Finally, we see that schools are much larger, on average, in poor urban 
neighborhoods than in poor small towns.  The average school size in an impoverished 
small town is only 652.  This average is barely above the limit for a “small” school, 
meaning that several of the schools in these towns are quite small.  In contrast, children in 
poor city neighborhoods are attending schools with thousands of students.  It is not 
surprising, then, that urban children benefit more from a smaller schools than those in 
small towns.   
 The next step, then, is to examine whether the differences in impoverished small 
towns and urban neighborhoods are associated with different levels of democratic values.  
Table 5.4 shows these results.  Both the differences and the similarities are worth noting.  
First, although the affluence (or poverty) of a community does not matter in small or 
large towns, there are significant gaps between those living in a wealthy suburb and a 
poor suburb, as well as those growing up in a wealthy neighborhood in a central city and 
those in a poor urban neighborhood.  Students in the most affluent suburbs and urban 
communities are significantly more knowledgeable than those in the poorest suburbs and 
urban areas.  Conversely, the affluence of small towns and large towns does not give 
adolescents significant advantages. 
Economic composition does not seem to have much impact in any community for 
political efficacy or tolerance.  Based on the results from the previous chapter and those 
here, I am beginning to conclude that efficacy and tolerance are not as dependent on the 
context of the school or the community as are knowledge and participation.  I discuss 
these measures, and their problems, in the last chapter. 
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We can clearly see that just as participation depended upon school size and 
community size, it also fluctuates according to the economic composition of the 
community.  Young people growing up in affluent communities are more likely to 
participate in school activities and out of school activities than those in poor 
communities, largely regardless of the size or type of community.  Children in poor 
suburbs, however, are equally likely to join in out of school activities as those in affluent 
suburbs.   
Table 5.4:  Differences on Democratic Values Between the Poorest and Most Affluent 
Communities within Types of Communities 
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(72)        
N=278 
(136)      
N=145 
(58)         
N=422 
(193)      
N=164 
(142)       
N=278 
(97)         
Numbers in cells represent the mean level within each category.  Figures are rounded.  
Differences were calculated using independent samples t-tests. 
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1 Numbers in parentheses are the number of respondents in the political knowledge 
category.  Because only half the students took this knowledge test, the Ns are lower than 
for the other questions.   
 
a These categories were derived using quartiles of population density. 
**p<.05  ***p<.01  ****p<.001 
 
 Although I would like to compare the effects of school size in poor small towns 
and poor urban neighborhoods, as I continue to split the sample into smaller and smaller 
categories, the number of respondents diminishes.  For example, while there are hundreds 
of respondents in the smallest schools in poor small towns, there are only five 
respondents in schools with more than 2000 students in the poorest small towns.  Even 
bivariate analyses are difficult with such small numbers; and multivariate analyses would 
be impossible.  
 
Metro Civic Values Study Results 
 The MCVS offers some advantages over the NHES for the multivariate analyses.  
Because it is a national random sample, only one or two respondents per community were 
sampled in the NHES.  The MCVS, however, sampled 70-150 students per community, 
making the analysis of communities more precise.  This is important because I am not 
simply looking at phenomena that occur at one level of analysis.  Instead, I am interested 
in how individual characteristics of students – their levels of poverty, for instance – vary 
across different communities, as well as in schools of different sizes.  In the past, 
researchers would simply create a series of interaction terms in a regular ordinary least-
squares (OLS) regression model to account for these cross-level interactions.  They 
would multiply, for example, the income of the student by the size of the school.   
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 Not only is this type of analysis difficult to interpret, but also OLS regression 
does not provide accurate estimates for data at multiple levels of analysis.  Hierarchical 
Linear Modeling (HLM) maintains the assumptions of linearity and normality that are in 
OLS regression, but deals with the special statistical challenges of data analysis when 
individual observations are clustered within schools, geographic jurisdictions, or distinct 
temporal periods, rather than independently distributed.  The main difference between 
HLM and OLS is in the error terms; the HLM model provides a more conservative 
estimate of the standard errors of coefficients than OLS models.   
 An analysis using HLM, however, requires a substantial number of respondents 
per group.  This is why I cannot do complex multivariate analyses with the NHES – there 
are only one or two respondents per community.  I could aggregate the data to particular 
types of communities, but here again, HLM analyses require a minimum number of about 
30 groups in order for accurate results (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002).  The MCVS solves 
these problems because the data were collected with this type of analysis in mind.  I can 
examine poor children in urban neighborhoods versus those in small towns, as well as 
whether poor students are better off in smaller schools than larger ones.   
 Before turning to these results, however, it is helpful to get a better idea of the 
type of communities within the MCVS, and their average levels of poverty.  Figure 5.1 
shows a simple scatterplot with the average political knowledge scores crossed with a 
measure of poverty within the community (the percent making less than $15,000 per 
year).  One should notice that the suburbs are more affluent than either the small towns or 
the urban areas.  Additionally, although the students in the smaller towns are similarly 
poor to urban neighborhoods, they have much higher levels of knowledge than those in 
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urban areas.  Finally, there does seem to be a strong relationship between poverty and 
knowledge – the slope of the line is largely flat. 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Mean Political Knowledge Score and Community-Level Poverty Across 
29 Communities in MCVS 
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Interestingly, when you remove the small towns from the analysis, the slope 
declines dramatically (from -.06 to -.40), and poverty appears to have a much stronger 
effect on knowledge (Figure 5.2).  The relationship more closely resembles what social 
scientists would predict:  poverty is correlated with negative social outcomes.  This 
underscores the importance of including small communities in any analysis of poverty, 
and makes me wonder whether the other negative social outcomes attributed to poverty 
would look quite different if small towns were included in the analyses. 
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Figure 5.2:  Mean Political Knowledge Score and Community-Level Poverty Across 
Urban and Suburban Communities in MCVS 
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The HLM results, examining the cross-level interactions, are presented in Table 
5.5.  The MCVS does not have a comparable participation construct to the NHES, so I 
only look at the MCVS constructs for knowledge, efficacy and tolerance.  Looking 
simply at the intercept, we see poorer students have lower levels of knowledge and 
efficacy.  Moving down one row in the table, I find that poor students in urban 
neighborhoods also are less knowledgeable and efficacious.  This likely does not come as 
a huge surprise.  However, the next row examines poor students in impoverished 
communities, controlling for urbanization.  These are largely the small towns in these 
data.  The poor students in these communities are more knowledgeable and efficacious 
than poor students in affluent, non-urban communities (i.e. suburbs).  Thus, poor students 
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Table 5.5:  Estimation of Fixed Effects for Poverty and Political Knowledge, Efficacy 
and Racial Intolerance in MCVS 
 Political 
Knowledge 










 (Standard Errors) 
Intercept            17.459 
         (17.923) 
         35.088**** 
          (5.031) 
        42.497**** 
         (3.302) 
Inverse Income (higher values=low-income) 
Intercept             -.463*** 
            (.128) 
            -.257** 
           (.098)            
            .118 
           (.115) 
     Density             -.00004*** 
            (.00001) 
            -.00002** 
           (.0002)          
           -.00001 
           (.000009) 
     % Less than $15K              .016*** 
            (.005) 
             .007** 
           (.003)            
            .010** 
           (.004) 
     School Size              .00003 
            (.00005) 
             .00005 
            (.00004) 
           -.00005 
           (.00005) 
Race (1=Black) 
Intercept         -14.656*** 
          (4.066) 
          -2.153 
         (2.674)            
           -.490 
         (2.832) 
     Density              .00005 
            (.0002) 
            -.0002 
           (.0002)          
            .0008*** 
           (.0002) 
     % Less than $15K              .005 
            (.090) 
             .197 
           (.104)            
           -.329** 
           (.127) 
     School Size             .001 
           (.0009) 
            -.0008 
            (.001) 
            .0007 
           (.001) 
Controls 
Civics Courses Taken             -.150 
            (.351) 
             .606*** 
           (.205)            
            .376* 
           (.214) 
Female           -4.758*** 
          (1.258) 
          -6.909**** 
         (1.502)            
          -.582 
           (.556) 
Grade Level            6.124*** 
           (1.847) 
           2.077*** 
          (.561)             
            .035 
           (.304) 
No Plans to Attend 
College 
          -8.738*** 
          (2.342) 
         -5.355**** 
        (1.148)             
            .743 
           (.743) 
Dislikes Civics Courses           -7.829**** 
          (1.638) 
        -11.620**** 
         (2.245)            
          1.202* 
           (.673) 
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Percent Reduction in 
Error from FUM 
11 % 7 % 3 % 
NOTE: Regression coefficients were derived using HLM.  Italicized variables are 
individual, level-1 variables.  The level-2 variables are indented and placed underneath 
the level-1 variable for which it was controlled.  *p<.10  **p<.05  ***p<.01  ****p<.001 
 
in urban neighborhoods have lower levels of knowledge and efficacy, but those in small 
towns have higher knowledge and efficacy. 
 Finally, we see that school size does not make any difference for poor students.  
Poor students are not better off in smaller schools.  In a separate model, I controlled only 
for school size, to test whether the effects of school size were captured in the economic 
composition or size of the community.  I found that even once I exclude the size and 
poverty of the community, poor students are still no better off in smaller schools than in 
larger ones.  One might argue that this is because many of the largest schools in these 
data are in the suburbs.  Yet, when you examine the results from the NHES (see Table 
5.1) along with these results, it becomes clear that school size does not make much 
impact on democratic values, even for poor students. 
 Another important consideration is that the differences between small town 
poverty and urban poverty are non simply attributable to differences between the white 
poor (in small towns) and the black poor (in urban areas).  My results show that African-
American students have much lower levels of political knowledge than non-black 
students; they score almost 15 points lower on the test than their counterparts.  This 
relationship is not contingent upon the community size and poverty, or school size.  
Black students are not worse off in urban areas; conversely, they are not better off in 
small towns.  The important factor is that the effects of poverty remain significant even 
when I control for race. 
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 Fortunately, the MCVS includes a construct to measure racial intolerance.  Higher 
values on this variable indicate higher levels of intolerance.  Thus, although poorer 
students are no more intolerant than affluent students, low-income students in poor small 
towns are significantly less tolerant than affluent students in small towns.  So, while low-
income youth coming of age in poor small towns are more knowledgeable and 
efficacious than are poor youth in larger communities, they are significantly less tolerant 
of individuals of other races and ethnicities.  This is the main reason I included tolerance 
as an indicator of democratic values, and this inclusion raises questions about small 
towns as the best places to instill democratic values.   
 For many people, the main disadvantage to living in small towns is their 
reputation as stifling and unaccepting of any difference.  It may be the case, then, that the 
same tight social networks that strengthen political efficacy and contribute to high levels 
of interest and knowledge also socialize young people into fearing what they do not 
know.  It may be that growing up in a rural area or small town does make one fearful, and 
even angry, at any type of difference.   
Interestingly, black students in small towns are actually much more tolerant than 
black students in urban areas.  It is important to note that the construct measuring racial 
intolerance includes many questions about immigrants (see chapter 2).  Blacks in inner 
city Baltimore may feel their future job prospects are threatened by the arrival of 
immigrants.  Or, their intolerance may stem from attitudes they learn in their 
neighborhoods in response to the feelings of hopelessness and discrimination they 
experience.  I delve deeper into these issues in the next chapter, where I examine how the 
racial composition of the community influences democratic values. 
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 Before closing, I want to focus on the control variables.  Although unsurprising, 
many of these findings are worth some consideration.  Although adult women vote at 
higher rates than men, young girls are still less knowledgeable and efficacious than are 
boys.  Educational aspirations are extremely important, and those who do not plan to go 
to college have lower levels of knowledge and efficacy than those who plan for college.  
Finally, each additional semester of social studies coursework adds very little to these 
democratic values – less than one point in efficacy.  However, students’ attitudes about 
their civics courses are very important.  Students that dislike their government classes 
score almost 8 points lower on the knowledge test, are 12 percent less efficacious and 1 
percent less tolerant than students who like these courses.  Although it is difficult with 
these data to know why these students dislike their courses, it is very important that civics 
teachers consider that what they do in the classroom is very important in the development 
of democratic values.   
 
Discussion 
 The results from this chapter have several important implications, which build 
upon what I have found in the last two chapters.  First, the benefits of school size are 
simply not widespread.  In fact, I was not able to find the size of the school to make any 
difference even for the group of students that are believed to benefit most from smaller 
schools: poor students.  Low-income students, and those growing up in impoverished 
communities did not have higher levels of knowledge, efficacy, participation or tolerance 
in smaller schools.  This held true both in Maryland (with larger-than-average schools in 
very wealthy suburbs) and in the United States as a whole.   
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 Small school advocates do not simply claim that smaller schools will help 
academic achievement and discipline, but also that they help “prepare students for 
college, work, and citizenship” (Toch 2003, xi, italics mine).  Many find evidence that 
students have higher levels of personal efficacy, and they experience a sense of belonging 
with other students and teachers that does not occur within a traditional comprehensive 
high school.  Advocates claim that higher graduation rates, college completion, positive 
attitudes about school and self, taken together, give students the skills necessary to 
become good citizens.  Granted, they do not look specifically at political participation or 
knowledge, but the implications of their arguments indicate that they would support this 
belief. 
 Other than the finding that small schools improve political knowledge in urban 
areas, I have not been able to find overwhelming support for reducing school size.  I have 
one more group to analyze: racial and ethnic minorities.  Small school advocates focus 
specifically on children of immigrants, Latinos, and African-Americans.  Certainly, 
members of these groups are in some of the worst schools in the nation, so it is quite 
possible that they would benefit greatly from smaller schools.  This may be especially 
true in certain environments – urban areas, for example.  However, given the results so 
far, I am quite skeptical about a widespread policy that would restructure schools by 
making them smaller as a way to improve the political development of our students. 
 In addition to the implications for school size reduction, this chapter also provides 
further support for the benefits of small towns.  Low-income children are not nearly as 
disadvantaged in small towns as they are in urban neighborhoods.  Children whose 
parents make similar incomes have very different outcomes depending on whether they 
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are coming of age in a small town or in a city.  Poverty does not have the same 
detrimental effects within small towns as it does in urban areas.  Once again, I find 
support for this both within the state of Maryland, as well as the nation as a whole. 
 To some, this is not at all surprising.  I showed that poverty in small towns is in 
many ways, not as severe as in urban neighborhoods.  Urban areas have much higher 
unemployment, lower levels of home ownership, and much higher rates of female-headed 
households.  Add to these indicators the differences in cost of living from cities to small 
towns, as well as the concentration of racial minorities, and many would argue that 
“poverty” does not mean the same thing at all across these two types of communities. 
 Even conceding that small town poverty is not as much a hardship as is urban 
poverty, one cannot ignore the fact that students in small towns had similar levels of 
political knowledge to those in affluent suburbs.  Thus, the surprise may not come from 
comparing small town children to urban children, but that children from small towns in 
Maryland performed at equal levels, or at better levels, than students from suburbs.  
Adolescents growing up in very small, struggling communities on the Maryland border 
performed as well as students from Montgomery County, Maryland – one of the 
wealthiest suburbs in the U.S.   
 Although we might attribute the higher levels of democratic values to high 
parental incomes or education in the suburbs, these conditions are less prevalent in small 
towns.  Small towns are able to compensate for their low levels of income and education 
through strong social networks that enhance the socialization experience and teach 
children the benefits of learning about politics and government, and of participating in 
community activities.  Replicating the positive outcomes in urban areas is probably going 
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to require some combination of reducing poverty, and strengthening the networks that 
give individuals a belief that political knowledge and participation are worth time and 
effort.   
 Finally, it is important to point out that while growing up in small towns helps to 
strengthen knowledge, participation and efficacy, it has the opposite effect on racial and 
ethnic tolerance.  Students in small towns are significantly more intolerant than those 
growing up in suburbs or in cities.  This is a point that cannot be glossed over or ignored.  
If we care about socializing children into democratic values, broadly construed, this must 
include fostering the value of acceptance of people who are different, or have different 
backgrounds.  To the extent that the strong social networks within small towns inculcate 
conformity and fear of the unknown or unfamiliar, they may not be worth replicating in 














Racial Composition and Democratic Values 
 
  
 In the last chapter I discovered that children who grow up in poverty have 
significantly higher levels of knowledge and efficacy if they live in small towns than in 
urban neighborhoods.  In fact, growing up in a small town is actually more beneficial for 
poor students than growing up in a wealthy suburb.  The results of the last chapter also 
showed that contrary to many arguments of education policy analysts, poor students are 
not advantaged by attending smaller schools.   
 This chapter examines another critical element of community context: racial and 
ethnic composition.  For many years, social scientists have examined the effects of living 
in racially homogeneous environments versus racially heterogeneous ones on political 
attitudes, especially tolerance.  These scholars have mostly examined how whites respond 
to the proportion of blacks living in their communities, or attending their schools.  Two 
main theories seek to explain the tolerance (and intolerance) of whites in racially 
heterogeneous environments.  One predicts that whites will respond with anger, violence, 
and intolerance (Blalock 1965; Giles and Hertz 1994; Green, Strolovich and Wong 1998).  
Another theory expects that whites will learn to accept their black neighbors (Allport 
1954; Sigelman and Welch 1993; Slavin 1996).   
 Given the changing demographic make-up of the country, it makes little sense to 
analyze only black/white composition.  How do individuals of various racial and ethnic 
backgrounds respond to living around others who are different from them?  And, are 
democratic values, including tolerance, found at higher levels in racially diverse 
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environments as opposed to racially homogeneous ones?  In other words, do white 
students have higher levels of political knowledge, etc. in communities where they are 
surrounded by other whites; do blacks perform better in predominantly black 
communities, and are Latinos better off in heavily-Latino communities?  Or, are all of 
these values enhanced by growing up in a racially and ethnically diverse community?  
This chapter addresses these questions. 
Building from the previous chapters, I would expect that heterogeneity is not 
likely to provide the best environment for some values, while it may be quite necessary 
for the development of others.  Specifically, to the extent that smaller towns are racially 
homogeneous, and values such as political knowledge, efficacy and participation are 
higher in smaller towns, racial homogeneity may be a good thing.  However, the last 
chapter also showed that poor individuals living in smaller towns are less racially tolerant 
than others.  This is likely due, in part, to the racial homogeneity in small towns and the 
lack of exposure these young people have with people from different backgrounds.  Thus, 
some degree of racial heterogeneity is likely to be important for tolerance. 
Before examining these theories, however, I continue my analysis of school size.  
Just as education scholars argue in favor of smaller schools for poor students, they argue 
that they can help members of racial minorities to overcome many of the problems they 
encounter in large, urban schools.  I examine this contention by looking at whether 
African-Americans, Asians, and Latinos benefit more from smaller schools than white 
students.  I am skeptical, however, given that thus far, the results do not support much of 
school size literature. 
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Racial Differences in Educational Outcomes 
 The average African-American or Latino student in primary or secondary school 
achieves at about the same level as white students in the lowest quartile of white 
achievement (Chubb and Loveless 2002).  The achievement gap, as this phenomenon has 
become known, has been found to exist for many years.  The gap is not simply about 
achievement on standardized tests, but is a problem on many important educational 
indicators, such as graduation rates and college attendance.  It is blamed for the necessity 
of controversial affirmative action policies in higher education, and for the continued 
disparities between racial minorities and whites in occupational status and income as 
adults.   
The achievement gap persists into the realm of political knowledge (Niemi and 
Junn 1998).  Whites outscored Latinos on nearly every one of the 150 knowledge items 
on the NAEP test; whites outscored blacks on 144 of the 150.  African-Americans were 
only more knowledgeable on items that dealt directly with racial matters, such as 
questions about the Montgomery bus boycott or Martin Luther King, Jr.  Even controlling 
for various aspects of the home environment, school curriculum and individual 
achievement, African-American students and Latinos scored about 6 points and 9 points 
lower, respectively, than whites in political knowledge (Niemi and Junn 1998, 120). 
In 1966, James Coleman’s now-famous study documented vast differences in the 
achievement of whites and blacks.  He attributed this gap mainly to family background.  
Over the years, several studies have confirmed the gap, and there have been many 
explanations for its existence.  Liberals have tended to blame the gap on poverty, racial 
segregation and inadequate funding of schools; conservatives have traditionally explained 
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racial differences as a function of genetics, culture, or family structure, especially single 
parenthood (for a discussion of this debate, see Wilson 1987, chap 1). 
Each of these explanations, however, is difficult to square with available 
evidence.  For example, even though the number of affluent black families has risen since 
the 1960s, their children’s test scores continue to lag behind those of white children 
(Jencks and Phillips 1998).  Similarly, black students score only marginally better in 
integrated schools than they do in segregated schools.  On the conservative arguments, 
there is no direct evidence showing that blacks are inherently less intelligent than whites 
(Nisbett 1998).  And, cultural or familial structure explanations fall apart because the gap 
persists with affluent black children and black youth in traditional two-parent homes. 
Scholars have begun to turn away from this liberal/conservative schism, believing 
that it has hampered theoretical discussions, as well as empirical analyses of the 
achievement gap.  Instead, new theories examine psychological factors, such as family 
interactions and stereotyping.  For example, racial differences in child rearing practices 
are related to differences in achievement (Phillips, Brooks-Gunn, Duncan, Klebanov, and 
Crane 1998).  The scholarship of John Ogbu (1987; 1994; Gibson and Ogbu 1991), as 
well as Claude Steele (1997), suggests that the achievement of black students is often 
dependent upon their reactions to a perceived lack of opportunities and negative 
stereotypes about blacks.  According to Ogbu, African Americans have “developed a folk 
theory of getting ahead that does not necessarily emphasize the strategy of academic 
pursuit” (1987, 154).  Steele and Aronson (1995) claim that black students perform more 
poorly on standardized tests than others because they “face the threat of confirming or 
being judged by a negative stereotype” held about African Americans’ intellectual 
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capacities.  Negative stereotypes add an element of frustration and stress that is not felt 
by individuals that do not suffer from such stereotypes.  Each of these theories assumes 
that individual behavior is, in part, a reaction to the situation or environment around 
them.  It is important to note that both of these theories are very controversial, and have 
not gone uncontested (see Cook and Ludwig 1998).   
Other theories have looked more carefully at the way different students react to 
the same classroom and school experience, rather than focus exclusively on resource 
differences between schools.  For example, in a large-scale, random-assignment 
experiment in Tennessee, smaller classes in grades K-3 helped reduce the black/white 
achievement gap by about 15 percent (Krueger and Whitmore 2002).  Ferguson finds, for 
instance, that teachers lack faith in the potential of racial minorities, and these 
perceptions negatively influence the achievement and aspirations of racial and ethnic 
minorities (1998).  Other curricular reforms that have shown some promise include 
focusing on reading and other core material, annual testing and reporting disaggregated 
data on the results of the tests, and creating schools with a specific “culture of 
achievement” (Chubb and Loveless 2002). 
Reducing school size is another such policy that involves different students 
reactions in the same environment.  Small school advocates contend that smaller schools 
are especially beneficial to African-American and Latino students (Johnson, Howley and 
Howley 2002; Lee and Smith 1997; Howley 1995; Huang and Howley 1993; Fowler and 
Walberg 1991; Friedkin and Necochea 1988).  For the same reasons as poorer students 
are believed to be advantaged in smaller schools, black and Latino students are thought to 
benefit from individualized attention from teachers, as well as the more coherent 
 134
curriculum that focuses on basic skills rather than electives.  As cited in the last chapter, 
one of the main reasons Bill Gates has contributed so much on behalf of small schools is 
that he believes a reduction in school size would give opportunities to racial minorities to 
go to college and prepare for jobs in today’s economy.  Based on these assertions, we 
should assume not only that racial minorities will perform at lower rates than whites on 
political knowledge and other democratic values, but also that their achievement is higher 
in smaller schools than in large ones.  
 
Social Identity and Racial Composition 
 The racial composition of a community influences political attitudes and values 
through an interaction of an individual’s racial identification and the particular racial 
context in which ones lives.  This racial identification is both a social identity, as well as 
a psychological feeling of belonging to a particular racial group.  Much of the scholarship 
on racial identity stems from social psychology, and specifically, social identity theory.  
Social identity theory is “that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his 
or her knowledge of membership in a social group, together with the value and emotional 
significance attached to that membership” (Tajfel 1981, 255).  The theory begins with the 
following assumptions.  First, individuals are predisposed to categorize objects and 
people into units composed of similar others (in-groups) and dissimilar others (out-
groups).  Social categorization gives individuals a group membership, providing a basis 
for determining appropriate values and behaviors.  Second, individuals seek to view 
themselves and their group in a positive way.  In order for individuals to evaluate their 
group positively, they compare their group to out-groups (Festinger 1954).   
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This group-based comparison is arguably the most important aspect of the theory. 
Individuals belong to several groups at one time; however, some of these groups are more 
important in influencing attitudes and values than others.  As groups compare themselves 
to one another, in most cases, there exists a “dominant” group and several subordinate 
groups.  Group membership is often most important, and salient, for members of 
subordinate groups.   
However, the salience of a particular identity depends greatly on the context of 
the situation.  For example, males are generally considered the dominant group in 
gendered identities; thus, one would expect that this identity is not particularly salient for 
most men at any given time.  Yet, when a man enters a situation where he is one of only a 
few men, his male identity suddenly becomes ever-present.  Similarly, whites may not 
have a strong racial identity in most situations, but in contexts in which they are a 
minority, their racial identity may be quite strong.  In cases “when members of high-
power groups are threatened” by the presence or “the demands of other groups, …their 
in-group identification increases and they generally react defensively to protect their 
privileges” (Gurin, Peng, Lopez and Nagda 1999, 140). 
Although some scholars of human development contend that all humans go 
through universal stages of cognitive and moral development (Piaget 1932; Kohlberg 
1976), racial attitudes are generally believed to develop through an interplay of the 
environment and one’s individual cognitive development.  The patterns of socialization to 
which “children are exposed within their families…and in contact with other important 
institutions have enormous implications for the development of interethnic and interracial 
relations.  Theories of socioemotional development suggest that the foundation for these 
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processes is established during the earliest interactions experienced with others…” 
(Garcia Coll and Vazquez Garcia 1995, 116).  Just as the economic composition of the 
community influences democratic values through the interactions that take place in 
particular communities, the racial composition affects these values through a combination 
of social interactions, psychological attachments to one’s in-group, and the racial context 
in which one lives.  The next two sections identify the main theories about how the racial 
composition works in conjunction with racial identities and interactions to influence the 
values of knowledge, efficacy, participation and tolerance. 
 
Racial Composition and White Political Attitudes  
 Although there are several theories about the sources of white racial attitudes, 
there are two major theories that deal directly with the effects of racial composition of a 
community on white racial and political attitudes: power-threat theory and the contact 
hypothesis.  Both of these theories were developed at the time that U.S. society was 
beginning to integrate its schools and public facilities.  Thus, they were developed 
looking mostly at white attitudes toward African-Americans.  Even though the 
demographic make-up of the country is quite different today than 50 years ago, and racial 
attitudes are no longer simply attitudes about blacks, the basic tenets of these theories 
should correspond to attitudes toward other racial or ethnic groups. 
The power-threat theory holds that proximity to different racial and ethnic groups 
produces hostile and prejudicial attitudes among whites (Blalock 1965; Key 1949; 
Shanahan and Olzak 1999; Olzak 1992; Beggs, Villemez and Arnold 1997).  This is 
based on the idea that white racial identity becomes more salient in areas where they may 
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not have a majority position.  As the proportion of blacks and other ethnic minorities in 
the community increases, whites begin to feel threatened.  According to this theory, 
whites are more hostile to racial integration (Wilcox and Roof 1978; Fossett and Kiecolt 
1989), vote at higher rates (Key 1949), engage in more racial violence (Corzine, Creech 
and Corzine 1983), and are more ideologically conservative (Giles and Hertz 1994; 
Glaser 1994) in response to the threat posed by racial and ethnic minorities to their social, 
economic and political power.  Green, Strolovich and Wong (1998) find that the highest 
rates of racial violence occur in areas where whites have been a longtime majority, but 
where racial minorities are beginning to move in.  And, Sears, Citrin, Chelden and van 
Laar (1999) show that this phenomenon is not only true for whites’ attitudes about 
blacks, but that whites are also defensive about protecting their privileges as diversity 
increases through immigration. 
According to this theory, whites in relatively homogeneous communities are 
likely to exhibit greater tolerance than those living in more heterogeneous communities 
where people of different backgrounds interact more regularly.  Majority-white 
communities are found both in suburbia and in small towns.  For whites, growing up in 
the suburbs or in small towns is not likely to introduce a plethora of people of different 
races and ethnicities, and their racial identity may never become salient.  We have also 
seen that in these communities individuals are more politically knowledgeable and 
participatory than are those in traditionally heterogeneous urban neighborhoods.   
There is evidence that this phenomenon holds at the state level.  Hero (1998) 
discovers that whites in states with large minority populations, for example, are much 
more likely to support policies that are detrimental to racial minorities than are whites in 
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predominantly white states (see also Tolbert and Hero 2001).  Hill and Leighley (1999) 
find that racial diversity at the state level is associated with lower levels of voter 
mobilization, weaker mobilizing institutions and higher barriers to voter participation.  
The argument is that because of whites’ racial attitudes, they erect these barriers to keep 
minorities from gaining too much power.  Thus, we should expect that as the levels of 
diversity increase, whites respond to a perceived threat by becoming increasingly 
intolerant, and yet more politically interested and participatory.   
Blalock argues that hostility is most intense among those that are in direct 
competition with racial minorities for power and resources – whites with low 
socioeconomic status (1965).  Personal economic threat, then, may play an important role 
in racial and ethnic attitudes, indicating that poor whites and whites in small towns may 
feel more threatened by diversity than affluent whites and whites in the suburbs.  Even 
though adolescents are probably not in direct competition with one another for jobs or 
housing, they may make prospective judgments about their chances in the job market 
when they come of age (MacKuen, Erikson and Stimson 1992).  Low-income white 
youth may fear that when they enter the labor market, they will have to compete for work 
with racial minorities and immigrants.  This may be especially true for young people with 
low educational aspirations, who do not plan to attend college after high school.   
The second major theory about the influence of the local environment on racial 
attitudes is the contact hypothesis.  Contrary to power-threat, the contact hypothesis 
claims that interracial and interethnic contact is beneficial for tolerance and other 
democratic values.  This theory holds that an individual’s prejudices can be alleviated by 
new, positive information derived from contact with individuals from a different racial or 
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ethnic group (Allport 1954; Carsey 1995; Voss 1996; Ellison and Powers 1994; Welch, 
Sigelman, Bledsoe and Combs 2001).  Contact introduces information contradicting 
group-based stereotypes through the exchange of more intimate information.  Contact 
with others also decreases intergroup ignorance, which is part of the foundation of 
prejudice and racial hostility.  By breaking down stereotypes and giving new, more 
accurate information about others, contact heightens perceptions of intergroup similarity 
(Dixon 2001).  There is some evidence suggesting that although analyses conducted at 
the state level are more supportive of power threat, those conducted at the neighborhood 
or precinct level are more supportive of the contact hypothesis (Liu 2001).  It may be the 
case, then, that personal interactions in neighborhoods and communities are conducive to 
tolerance and participation, while whites may feel more threatened by racial minorities 
they cannot see and do not know.  
The racial integration of schools provided an excellent test of this hypothesis, but 
the results were not entirely positive.  Mere “contact” is often not enough to change racial 
prejudices (Braddock, Dawkins and Wilson 1995; Bullock 1978; Miller and Brewer 
1984; Schofield 1989).  Contact has a small impact on friendship with other groups even 
in settings designed to be congenial (Nesdale and Todd 1998).  Smith (1981) discovered 
that whites were only supportive of racial integration when integration meant only a few 
blacks would enter the school, and thus, when their majority status was not threatened 
(see also Kinder and Mendelberg 1995; Bobo, Schuman and Steeh 1986). 
Scholars have pointed out several conditions for contact to be positive, and 
without which, contact is likely to have little influence on racial attitudes.  Early on, 
Allport suggested that the contact must be in settings that are institutionally sanctioned, 
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that groups must not be in competition with one another, and that groups should work 
together to achieve common goals (1954; see also Sherif et al. 1961).  One of the most 
important criteria is that groups should be of equal status (Allport 1954; Dovidio, 
Gaertner and Validzic 1988; Jackman and Crane 1987; Sigelman and Welch 1993; 
Welch, Sigelman, Bledsoe and Combs 2001).  When groups are not of equal status, the 
majority group will likely hold on to their prejudices and stereotypes in order to maintain 
their dominant position.  When these conditions are not met, any positive affect toward 
an individual may not transfer to the group as a whole, but instead, the person will be 
regarded as an “exception to the rule” (Cook 1985; Jackman and Crane 1986).  But, when 
Allport’s conditions are met, “students are more likely to have friends outside their own 
racial groups than they would in traditional [segregated] classrooms” (Slavin 1996, 631). 
To the extent that the preconditions are met, this theory predicts that young white 
adolescents living in communities that are somewhat heterogeneous will be more tolerant 
than their counterparts in homogeneous, predominantly white areas.  Interracial and 
interethnic contact combats negative stereotypes about racial minorities, and facilitates 
friendship and trust.  These theories generate contradictory hypotheses, and thus, this 
analysis is an interesting test of opposing ideas, and will have interesting implications for 
the benefits of integrated versus segregated communities. 
 
Racial Minorities and Political Attitudes 
 Although much of the scholarship on power-threat and contact theories examines 
the attitudes of whites, the ideas translate into the attitudes of blacks and other racial 
minorities.  At the base of these theories are the opposing ideas of individuals feeling 
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threatened by out-groups on the one hand, and individuals learning from and about out-
groups, thereby facilitating positive attitudes toward them on the other hand.  Cummings 
and Lambert (1997), for example, discover that blacks often feel threatened by Latinos 
and Asians when they live in close proximity to these groups.  African American young 
people may believe they will compete with other racial minorities for jobs, political 
power, and other resources.  There is no reason why power-threat should only apply to 
whites. 
 Similarly, interracial and interethnic contact should not only allow whites to 
confront their negative stereotypes about other groups, but should also give racial 
minorities an opportunity to counter stereotypes about whites and other racial groups.  
Ellison and Powers (1994) find that among African Americans, interracial friendships can 
be generalized to the out-group as a whole, especially if this interracial contact begins 
early in life.  Similarly, Works (1961) finds that blacks living in an integrated housing 
project have less prejudice toward whites than those in a segregated housing project. 
 The key aspect of social identity theory is that members of groups compare their 
groups with out-groups.  Identification with a subordinate group indicates that one’s 
group does not compare well with the dominant group.  To compensate for this, members 
of subordinate groups have several strategies, which have important effects on political 
attitudes, including the democratic values in this study.  In general terms, when one’s 
social identity does not measure up to other groups, he either will seek to change his 
group affiliation, or change the evaluation of the in-group so that one can see his group in 
a self-enhancing light (Tajfel 1978).   
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  Specifically, scholars have pointed to several strategies that members of 
subordinate racial groups have used to compensate for their position.  It is difficult, if not 
impossible in most cases, for one to change his racial group affiliation.  Even so, Ogbu 
(1991) contends that some blacks have chosen to disaffiliate with the black community.   
Yet, most strategies involve changing the evaluations of one’s in-group, or conversely, 
changing the positive evaluations of the out-group to more negative ones.  One of the 
most common ways of accomplishing this is forming strong social and psychological 
bonds with others in the in-group.  These bonds, referred to commonly as “group 
consciousness,” are characterized by an “expressed…dissatisfaction with the group’s 
current status, power, or material resources in relation to that of the out-group” and a 
belief that the “responsibility for a group’s low status in society is attributable…to 
inequities in the social system” (Miller, Gurin, Gurin and Malanchuk 1981, 495).    
Black consciousness, for example, is an awareness among blacks that they share a 
status as an unjustly deprived and oppressed group (Shingles 1981).  A strong racial 
identity is an important source for deprived groups “as they try to redress group-based 
inequalities and mobilize for political influence with less money, less education, and 
fewer political positions than other groups have in the U.S.” (Gurin, Peng, Lopez and 
Nagda 1999, 137; Verba and Nie 1972).  Some find that a strong racial identity aids 
participation and tolerance among racial minorities (Bledsoe, Welch, Sigelman and 
Combs 1994; Gurin, Hatchett and Jackson 1989; Jackson 1984; Herring, Jankowski and 
Brown 1999).  This identity gives many members of racial minority groups a sense of 
self-worth (Lewin 1948), and helps propel them into political participation and the 
collection of information.   
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 Racial solidarity, or group consciousness, is often strongest for African 
Americans in areas of high black density, where the “saturation of intraracial contact” 
precipitates a “high degree of group awareness of cohesiveness” (Bledsoe, Welch, 
Sigelman and Combs 1995).  It is also in these areas that blacks have traditionally held 
the most political power.  In cities, for example, with a high concentration of black 
residents, black leaders have found their first forays into politics.  This is not only the 
result of a black constituency, but the presence of black leaders also serves to strengthen 
racial solidarity and give blacks a sense of efficacy and empowerment (Bobo and Gilliam 
1990).   
 A strong racial identity, however, may not always be beneficial to democratic 
values, such as political knowledge, efficacy, participation and tolerance.  While group 
solidarity can manifest itself in ways that are consistent with mainstream values, such as 
enhancing knowledge and participation in politics, there are other strategies used by 
members of racial minorities to compensate for a perceived (or real) sense of 
subordination.  Some African Americans develop a collective identity in opposition to 
mainstream culture, which is often seen as a white, middle-class culture.  This is largely a 
response to the limited opportunities blacks confront in the U.S.  Black schoolchildren 
may begin to define “academic learning as ‘acting white,’ and academic success as the 
prerogative of white Americans” (Fordham and Ogbu 1986, 177).  This orientation “is 
not simply a cognitive adaptation to a limited set of opportunities; it is internalized as part 
of ‘black identity’” (Ogbu 1989, 195; Oliver 1994).   
Young people develop “survival strategies” that are not always congruent with the 
behaviors and attitudes that are required to do well in school.  Some of these strategies 
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include “attending private schools, encapsulating oneself in peer group logic and 
activities, camouflaging one’s efforts in school in acting as a jester or clown, and 
involving oneself in church activities which also promote school success” (Spradlin, 
Welsh and Hinson 2000, 19).  In addition, Rotheram-Borus (1993) finds that young 
people with a strong ethnic identity engage in fewer cross-ethnic contacts and are more 
likely to perceive cross-ethnic conflict.  The oppositional identity serves to protect racial 
identity, as well as provide members with integrity.   
 This is certainly a controversial position, and one in which many scholars of the 
black community disagree.  Many cite evidence that black Americans have similar values 
as white Americans (Wilson 1996), and that “black culture” is not substantively different 
from white culture.  Cook and Ludwig (1998) refute the ethnographic studies used 
commonly by Ogbu with the National Education Longitudinal Study.  They find that, 
controlling for socioeconomic background, black schoolchildren expect to stay in school 
longer than whites, drop out at lower rates than white students, and are equally likely to 
attend school regularly as whites. 
Cross (1995) contends that oppositional identity is merely one stage of the 
development of black identity, and that many African Americans eventually affirm a 
bicultural or multicultural identity (see also Tatum 1997).  It is not necessary, according 
to many social psychologists, for a strong group identity to be associated with negative 
feelings toward out-groups.  Group members generally try to create positive comparisons 
between their in-group and other groups, but they accomplish this more by assessing their 
in-group positively than by assessing the out-group negatively (Stephan and Stephan 
1985, 615; Gaertner, Dovidio, Nier, Ward, and Banker 1999).  Gurin, Hatchett and 
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Jackson (1989) contend that African American identity is based on pro-black sentiments 
and group political consciousness, not anti-white sentiment.  This form of African 
American identity is based on a sense of common fate, and is actually associated with 
greater knowledge and sympathy for the power disadvantages of other groups of color in 
America.  They find that the exclusivist form of black identity is rare in the national black 
population.  Because members of racial minority groups interact frequently with 
members of the dominant group, and they struggled with the ideas of conflict and 
harmony between groups, they are less likely to have negative attitudes toward whites 
(Gurin, et al. 1999).   
 Here too, the theories set up contradictory hypotheses.  On the one hand, we 
might expect members of racial minorities, especially those living in close proximity to 
others in their group, to exhibit higher levels of knowledge, participation, tolerance and 
efficacy because of strong racial identity.  On the other hand, however, there are good 
reasons to expect that racial minorities will reject these as “mainstream values” and 
instead, oppose them in order to protect a sense of dignity for their racial identity.   
 This chapter addresses several issues related to racial composition and democratic 
values.  To clarify, the hypotheses that will be analyzed in this chapter are:  1) Members 
of racial minorities, especially blacks and Latinos, have lower levels of knowledge, 
efficacy, tolerance and participation than white adolescents; 2) Blacks and Latinos have 
higher levels of democratic values in smaller schools; 3) White adolescents have higher 
levels of knowledge, participation and efficacy, but lower levels of tolerance, in 
homogeneous (predominantly white) communities than in heterogeneous ones (power-
threat theory); 4) Low-income whites have the lowest levels of tolerance than more 
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affluent youth; 5) White adolescents living in heterogeneous communities have higher 
levels of all democratic values than those in homogeneous communities (contact 
hypothesis); 6) Members of racial minorities living in co-ethnic communities will have 
higher levels of democratic values than those living in heterogeneous environments 
(group consciousness); 7) Members of racial minorities living in co-ethnic communities 
will have lower levels of democratic values than those living in heterogeneous 
environments (oppositional identity). 
 
 Results 
 The first task is to determine whether there are racial differences in the levels of 
democratic values.  Indeed, African-American and Latino in the NHES students have 
lower levels of political knowledge and participation than white and Asian students 
(Table 6.1).  There are no racial differences in political efficacy and tolerance, but this is 
most likely because these variables lack adequate variance.  Interestingly, Asians are the 
most likely to participate in school activities, and there are no significant differences 
between white and black students’ likelihood of participating.  Latinos are about 13 
percent less likely to participate than whites and blacks, and almost 20 percent less likely 
than Asians to get involved in school activities. 
 African-American and Latino students are less likely to be involved in activities 
outside of school than either Asians or whites.  This is not surprising, given that many out 
of school activities are privately funded.  Music lessons, dancing, sports leagues, and Girl 
and Boy Scouts must all be paid for by parents, and since many more African-American 
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parents and Latino parents have low incomes than white or Asian parents, these types of 
activities are off-limits for their children.  To the extent that participation in these  
 
Table 6.1:  Differences Between Whites, Blacks, Latinos and Asians on Democratic 
Values in NHES 
  N Mean 








      40.29 
      24.33**** 
      22.60**** 
      38.98 








        1.39 
        1.27 
        1.24 
        1.27 








        1.45 
        1.45 
        1.41 
        1.39 










          .72 
          .71 
          .58**** 
          .77*** 










          .69 
          .57**** 
          .52**** 
          .64** 
Differences were calculated using independent sample t-tests.  Each group was compared 
to whites. 
**p<.05  ***p<.01  ****p<.001 
 
activities is beneficial to academic success, as well as the development of democratic 
values, African-American and Latino adolescents are at a distinct disadvantage (Niemi 
and Junn 1998; Torney-Purta, Lehmann, Oswald, and Schulz 2001). 
 Next, I look at whether attending smaller schools is beneficial to racial minorities, 
specifically Latinos and blacks.  Scholars studying the effects of small schools argue that 
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blacks and Latinos are the most likely to attend the largest schools, to be in poverty-
stricken homes and neighborhoods, and they benefit most from attending smaller schools 
where they can obtain individualized attention.  However, I do not find that black 
students are any better off in the smallest schools (Table 6.2).  They are equally 
knowledgeable, participatory, efficacious and tolerant in the largest schools as in the 
smallest schools.  Once again, I also examined whether schools with enrollments of 600-
900 students (the second-smallest category) had advantages (Lee and Smith 1997).  Black 
students are more likely to participate in school activities in these schools (77 percent 
compared to 66 percent in the largest schools).  There were no other differences between 
schools of this size and the largest schools, however. 
Table 6.2:  School Size Effects for Blacks and Latinos on Democratic Values in NHES 
 
  N Mean 
 
Black Students 




      22.22 
      25.00 




        1.29 
        1.29 




        1.37 
        1.52 






          .69 
          .66 






          .58 
          .53 
 
Latino Students 




      22.22 
      21.41 




        1.19 
        1.27 




        1.34 
        1.41 
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          .65 
          .55**** 






          .55 
          .52 
Differences were calculated using independent sample t-tests.  
****p<.001 
 
 Similarly, the only advantage the smallest schools have over the largest schools 
for Latino students is in their participation in school activities.  Latino youth are 10 
percent more likely to participate in smaller schools than in larger schools.  They are not 
more knowledgeable or efficacious, however.  These findings, and those from previous 
chapters, indicate that school size does not have much effect on the majority of 
democratic values I analyze here.   
 Now, I turn to an analysis of the racial composition, or racial context, in which 
young people grow up.  First, I examine the effects of racial diversity on democratic 
values.  Racial diversity is a measure of the racial and ethnic make-up of the community.  
A racially heterogeneous community is not simply one that is not all-white or all-black.  
Instead, it is one in which some proportion of different racial and ethnic groups is 
represented.  Using the Sullivan (1973) index of diversity, I am able to analyze how 
growing up among many different peoples is different from growing up around 
individuals of mostly one race or ethnicity (see also Hero 1998).17   
                                                     
17 The formula for calculating the level of diversity is as follows: 1 – [(Percent Latino 
population)² + (Percent Black population)² + (Percent White population)² + (Percent 
Asian population)² + (Percent Native American population)²].  Although Hero does not 
include Native Americans in his diversity scale at the state level, there are several 
communities in these data that have high proportions of Native Americans.  I excluded 
only one category – percent biracial.  This proportion was generally no more than 1 
percent of the population in any community. 
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 Table 6.3 shows racial heterogeneity makes a significant difference in the levels 
of knowledge and participation of young people.  Once again, political efficacy and 
tolerance prove to be complicated.  In order to examine a difference of means, I divided 
the racial diversity scale into quartiles.  The lowest quartile is the most homogeneous, and  
Table 6.3:  Differences of Means between Racially Heterogeneous Communities and 
Homogeneous Communities on Democratic Values in NHES 
 
  N Mean 




      38.49**** 
      29.57 




        1.32 
        1.34 




        1.44 
        1.41 






          .72**** 
          .64 






          .67**** 
          .60 
Differences were calculated by using independent samples t-tests.  Heterogeneity is based 
on the racial diversity scale, and then divided into quartiles. 
****p<.001 
 
is generally made up of all-white communities, with a few mostly-black communities as 
well.  The highest quartile is the most heterogeneous community, and includes 
neighborhoods and communities that have some proportion of each racial group.  A 
cross-tabulation indicates that racial diversity is highly related to community size; cities 
are heterogeneous and small towns are homogeneous (table not reported).   
 Political knowledge, participation in school activities, and participation in 
activities outside of school are much higher in racially homogeneous communities.  Since 
we have already discovered that these values are found at higher levels in small towns 
than in urban areas, these results are not particularly surprising.  Even so, the implications 
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of these findings are important.  This year marks the 50th anniversary of Brown v. Board 
of Education, and not only are neighborhoods and communities increasingly segregated 
by race, but students are actually better off in segregated communities than in diverse 
ones.  It is certainly the case that racial composition is bound up with community size and 
socioeconomic status, and these results do not control for these, but in general terms, 
students have higher political knowledge and participation rates when they live around 
individuals who are like them. 
 The next set of results shows this even more starkly.  Looking only at white 
students, those living in areas of almost complete white homogeneity score about 3 points 
higher in knowledge and are 4 percent more likely to participate in school activities than 
are students in areas where whites are a minority (Table 6.4).  Interestingly, white 
students are more efficacious in areas where they are a minority than in environments 
where everyone else is white.  It may be that white students in areas of high black and 
Latino concentration are more efficacious because they are given more attention by 
teachers and others within the community.  The relevant theory suggests just the opposite 
– that individuals would have higher efficacy in areas where they are a majority.  Finally, 
I find no evidence that poor whites have higher levels of democratic values than affluent 
whites (table not reported). 
 These results provide some evidence that interracial contact may not be beneficial 
for these democratic values.  Young people are more knowledgeable and participatory in 
less diverse environments than in communities characterized by high levels of racial 
diversity.  This suggests that young people may indeed feel a sense of threat from other 
racial groups; this seems especially the case when examining white adolescents.  Yet, the 
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perception of threat does not seem to be more common among low-income youth than 
others (see also Lay and Gimpel 2003).  It is important to point out, however, that the 
preconditions of contact theory are not present here.  It is rarely the case that racial 
groups have equal status positions within society, and that situations involve groups 
working together to achieve common goals.  Thus, I would not rule out the possibility 
that under these circumstances, heterogeneity might prove more beneficial to these 
values.  However, the serious question is whether these preconditions can ever be met 
within U.S. society as it exists today. 
Although I would like to present analyses of blacks in predominantly black 
communities, and Latinos in Latino communities, it is not possible to present similar 
results for other racial groups because the numbers of survey respondents become 
prohibitively low.  For example, there are only three black students in the sample who 
live in areas of the lowest black concentration.  Indeed, of 3,910 cases in the data, only 
177 students are whites living in areas of the highest non-white concentration.  This is 
indicative of the high rates of segregation in the U.S., and also presents a problem for 
statistical analysis when there are so few cases to analyze. 
Table 6.4:  White Students in Predominantly White Communities and Democratic Values 
 
  N Mean 




      40.37* 
      37.14 




        1.35** 
        1.47 




        1.44 
        1.43 






          .73** 
          .69 
Participation in Out-of-School 
Activities 
White Homogeneity 923 
177 
          .68 
          .68 
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Heterogeneous 
Differences were calculated by using independent samples t-tests.  White heterogeneity is 
the percentage of the white population divided into quartiles.   
*p<.10  **p<.05 
 
 Therefore, I now turn to using the Metro Civic Values Study to analyze the effects 
of living in different racial contexts for students of different races and ethnicities.  First, I 
calculate a measure of racial diversity, just like the one from the NHES.  It is worth 
pointing out that these indexes indicate how closely the Maryland sample mirrors the 
national sample.  The average level of diversity in the national sample is about .35, or a 
community with some heterogeneity, but a level that is still below parity between the 
races.  In the MCVS, the average level of diversity is about .41.   
 Looking at the differences between the most heterogeneous and the most 
homogeneous communities in the MCVS, we see that those living in homogeneous 
communities are slightly more knowledgeable and intolerant than those in diverse 
communities (Table 6.5).  Young people growing up in diverse environments are, 
however, much more likely to say they will vote.  It is important to remember that in 
Maryland, most of the diverse communities are in wealthy Washington, D.C. suburbs.  
The homogeneous communities are small towns in rural Maryland, as well as those in the 
city of Baltimore.  Thus, we would likely expect children from the suburbs to say they 
will vote more often than others, but we would also expect them to have higher levels of 
knowledge.  The students in homogeneous small towns are bringing up the average level 
of knowledge – to an even higher level than in the suburbs. 
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Table 6.5:  Differences between Racially Heterogeneous Communities and Homogeneous 
Communities on Democratic Values in MCVS 
 
  N Mean 




     72.17* 
     71.86 




      49.14 
      49.64 




      48.27* 
      43.18 




          .64**** 
          .70 
Differences were calculated by using independent samples t-tests.  Heterogeneity is based 
on the racial diversity scale, and then divided into quartiles. 
*p<.10  ****p<.001 
 
 It is necessary to turn now to multivariate results, so that I control for the effects 
of socioeconomic status that may be confounding some of the bivariate findings.  Table 
6.6 shows racial diversity does not significantly affect the knowledge, efficacy and  
intolerance levels of whites or blacks.  It does help nor hinder members of these racial 
groups to live in a heterogeneous or homogeneous environment.  The effects of diversity 
are likely washed away by the controls for individual income, educational aspirations and 
grade level.  Latinos, however, are less efficacious in diverse environments than in more 
homogeneous ones.  
 Rather than look exclusively at diversity, I also look at the interactions of race 
within co-ethnic contexts, or rather, those environments where individuals are surrounded 
by others who are most like them.  The results are quite intriguing (Table 6.7).  First, 
although African-American students score almost 10 points lower in political knowledge 
than non-black students, when they live in an area of high black concentration, their 
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levels of knowledge increase by six points.  The results are the same for Latino students, 
but are even more substantive.  Latinos score about 7 points lower in knowledge than 
non-Latinos, but when they are surrounded by Latino neighbors, their knowledge scores 
increase by 33 points.  It is worth noting that because the model includes controls for 
income, educational aspirations, and attitudes about civics courses, the students in the 
analysis are likely the best students.  These are students who enjoy their civics courses, 
and who plan to attend college.  When members of racial minority groups live in 
neighborhoods and communities among others who are like them, they have significantly 
higher levels of knowledge.  
 The same is not true for whites living in predominantly white neighborhoods.  
There is no difference between these adolescents and whites living in communities that 
are not majority white.  Similarly, whites living in heavily black or Latino communities 
are just as knowledgeable as those in relatively homogeneous ones (table not reported).  
Black youth living in heavily Latino communities, or in predominantly white 
environments, are also no different from blacks living in non-Latino or in non-white 
communities.  However, Latinos growing up in predominantly black communities 
score17 points lower in knowledge, and Latinos in heavily white neighborhoods score 
about 15 points higher in knowledge (table not reported).  In general, the knowledge 
levels of Latino youth are most susceptible to the racial composition of the environment.  
Latino youth are most advantaged in environments with a strong Latino presence; white 
neighbors also are beneficial, but not as much as are Latino neighbors; and, African-
American neighborhoods are actually detrimental to their level of knowledge.  
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Table 6.6:  Estimation of Fixed Effects for Racial Diversity and Political Knowledge, 
Efficacy and Racial Intolerance in MCVS 
 Political 
Knowledge 










 (Standard Errors) 
Intercept            -9.887 
        (22.332) 
       33.885**** 
        (3.488) 
        43.970**** 
         (3.682) 
Black 
Intercept           -6.517** 
          (2.346) 
         -.293 
        (1.516)     
           3.688** 
          (1.704) 
     Racial Diversity           -1.556 
          (3.082) 
        -2.395 
        (2.768)     
           -.552 
          (2.589) 
Latino 
Intercept         -10.177 
          (6.836) 
         3.663 
        (2.595)      
        -13.120** 
          (5.290) 
     Racial Diversity           14.948 
         (12.152) 
      -11.978** 
        (4.531)     
          14.098 
           (8.608) 
White 
Intercept            10.309**** 
            (2.539) 
           .624 
        (1.355)      
            7.320**** 
           (1.492) 
     Racial Diversity              1.002 
            (2.550) 
         2.492 
        (2.791) 
           -3.938 
           (2.848) 
Controls 
Civics Courses Taken             -.038 
            (.292) 
          .453** 
         (.194) 
            .320* 
           (.175) 
Parental Income              .274**** 
            (.041) 
        0.113*** 
       (0.031)      
          -.111*** 
           (.039) 
Grade Level            6.518*** 
          (2.016) 
        1.185*** 
         (.333) 
            .020 
           (.245) 
No Plans to Attend 
College 
          -7.734*** 
          (2.216) 
       -2.643**** 
       (0.599)     
           1.314** 
            (.502) 
Dislikes Civics Courses           -8.548**** 
          (1.865) 
       -8.168**** 
       (1.199)     
           1.620*** 
            (.523) 
Percent Reduction in 
Error from FUM 
   
NOTE: Regression coefficients were derived using HLM.  Italicized variables are 
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individual, level-1 variables.  The level-2 variables are indented and placed underneath 
the level-1 variable for which it was controlled.  *p<.10  **p<.05  ***p<.01  ****p<.001 
 
We might attribute this to the poor quality of schools in the predominantly 
African American communities.  Urban schools, including those in Baltimore, Maryland, 
are notoriously underfunded and have serious problems with teacher turnover and 
parental interest.  We would expect Latino students to have lower levels of knowledge in 
these environments.  However, we would also expect African American students to have 
lower levels of knowledge here.  If the issue is one of school resources, we should expect 
all students to suffer to some extent.  Yet, black students have higher levels of knowledge 
in these environments than in any other.   
Because a great deal of the scholarship on racial context contends with racial 
tolerance, the final set of analyses deal with this issue.  Are young people more or less 
tolerant in co-ethnic environments?  In other words, are whites more accepting in 
communities that are predominantly white, and are black youth more tolerant in 
neighborhoods that are heavily black?  And, how do adolescents respond in environments 
where they are in a minority?  If they are more tolerant in these environments, we might 
conclude that interracial and inter-ethnic contact is positive.  If they are less tolerant, 
perhaps these young people feel threatened by individuals who are different from them. 
Just as African-American and Latino youth had higher levels of knowledge in co-
ethnic communities, their levels of tolerance also vary according to whether they live 
around others who are like them.  Black adolescents are generally less tolerant than non-
black youth, but when they live in predominantly black communities, they become even 
less tolerant (Table 6.8).  It is important to remember two factors here: 1) the dependent 
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Table 6.7:  Estimation of Fixed Effects for Co-Ethnic Communities and Political 
Knowledge in MCVS 
 Political Knowledge 
 Gamma Coefficients 
(Standard Errors) 
Intercept                             -8.771 
                         (21.734) 
Black 
Intercept                            -9.897*** 
                           (2.630) 
     Percent Black in Community                             6.329*** 
                           (1.694) 
Latino 
Intercept                            -7.247** 
                           (2.661) 
     Percent Latino in Community                           33.524** 
                         (14.618) 
White 
Intercept                            12.267**** 
                           (2.222) 
     Percent White in Community                            -2.666 
                           (1.881) 
Controls 
Civics Courses Taken                              -.049 
                             (.297) 
Parental Income                               .265**** 
                             (.040) 
Grade Level                             6.464*** 
                           (1.981) 
No Plans to Attend College                            -7.246*** 
                           (2.661) 
Dislikes Civics Courses                            -8.568**** 
                            (1.886) 
Percent Reduction in Error from FUM  
NOTE: Regression coefficients were derived using HLM.  Italicized variables are 
individual, level-1 variables.  The level-2 variables are indented and placed underneath 
the level-1 variable for which it was controlled.  *p<.10  **p<.05  ***p<.01  ****p<.001 
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variable measures intolerance, so higher values indicate more intolerance and 2) the 
dependent variable is mostly a measure of tolerance of immigrants (see Chapter 2).   
This certainly explains the attitudes of Latinos.  In general, Latino youth are no 
more or less tolerant than anyone else, however, when they are living in predominantly 
Latino communities, the levels of tolerance skyrocket.  Latinos living amongst other 
Latinos are 61 percent more likely to support immigrants and immigration than Latinos in 
other environments.  Communities with large proportions of Latinos usually consist of 
many immigrants, and thus it makes sense that living in these areas would engender 
strong support for immigrants and immigration.  What is surprising is that Latino youth 
outside of these communities do not overwhelmingly support immigrants.   
 Upon examination of other environments, Latinos are actually less tolerant toward 
immigrants in predominantly black communities (Table 6.9) and are no more or less 
tolerant in white communities.  Latino youth are 16 percent more intolerant when they 
grow up within a heavily black neighborhood.  These young people are not as likely to be 
first-generation immigrants as are those who live amongst other Latinos.  Because their 
neighbors are mostly black, they may, in fact, more closely identify with African- 
Americans than with Latinos.  Given the negative stereotypes many Americans have of 
immigrants, these young people may try to distance themselves from their Latino 
brethren.  It is also possible that they perceive some threat to their prospective status by 




Table 6.8:  Estimation of Fixed Effects for Co-Ethnic Communities and Racial 
Intolerance in MCVS 
 Racial/Ethnic Intolerance 
 Gamma Coefficients 
(Standard Errors) 
Intercept                             45.934**** 
                            (3.554) 
Black 
Intercept                             1.460**    
                             (.669) 
     Percent Black in Community                             4.047***    
                           (1.003) 
Latino 
Intercept                            -0.098    
                           (2.274) 
     Percent Latino in Community                           -61.106***   
                          (16.025) 
White 
Intercept                              5.751****    
                           (1.266) 
     Percent White in Community                            -1.044    
                           (1.770) 
Controls 
Civics Courses Taken                              0.319*      
                             (.185) 
Parental Income                            -0.109** 
                           (0.040) 
Grade Level                            -0.117    
                           (0.222) 
No Plans to Attend College                             1.494***    
                           (0.492) 
Dislikes Civics Courses                             1.408**    
                           (0.521)      
Percent Reduction in Error from FUM  
NOTE: Regression coefficients were derived using HLM.  Italicized variables are 
individual, level-1 variables.  The level-2 variables are indented and placed underneath 
the level-1 variable for which it was controlled.  *p<.10  **p<.05  ***p<.01  ****p<.001 
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In terms of social identity, the racial and ethnic composition of the community has 
serious implications for Latino youths’ identities.  In heavily-Latino areas, they seem to 
strongly identify with and support one another, but in predominantly black areas, this 
support for other Latinos disappears.  What about for African American youth?  Black 
youth are more intolerant of immigrants in predominantly black communities, and their 
levels of tolerance are not affected by living in heavily Latino, or heavily white 
communities.  These results do not suggest that blacks feel a greater sense of threat in 
environments where they live amongst Latinos.  They indicate, rather, that black identity 
is more closely tied to the proportion of blacks in the community, and that as the 
proportion of blacks increases, African American youth become more knowledgeable, 
but also more intolerant.  The higher levels of knowledge indicate a sense of group 
consciousness and an acceptance of mainstream values.  Similarly, the lower levels of 
tolerance among blacks in black communities may also be indicative of a heightened 
awareness of one’s racial identity.  When one lives in an all-black or predominantly black 
environment, “there is no need to include in one’s identity the functional skills and 
sensitivities that make one efficacious in interactions with nonblack peoples” (Cross 
1995, 199).  These results do not support the idea of black youth in predominantly black 
environments taking on an oppositional identity.   
The levels of knowledge and tolerance of white adolescents do not vary 
depending on the racial composition of their environment.  Whites are no more or less 
tolerant in predominantly white, black or Latino communities, suggesting that their 
attitudes are not related to perceptions of threat from members of racial minorities.  Yet,  
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Table 6.9:  Estimation of Fixed Effects for Black Communities and Racial Intolerance in 
MCVS 
 Racial Intolerance 
 Gamma Coefficients 
(Standard Errors) 
Intercept                             -45.187**** 
                             (3.439) 
Black 
Intercept                                .841 
                              (.789) 
     Percent Black in Community                              5.431*** 
                            (1.048) 
Latino 
Intercept                            -11.950*** 
                             (3.587) 
     Percent Black in Community                             16.383** 
                             (7.100) 
White 
Intercept                               5.067**** 
                             (1.095) 
     Percent Black in Community                                 .075 
                             (2.291) 
Controls 
Civics Courses Taken                                 .294 
                              (.182) 
Parental Income                               -.105**** 
                              (.040) 
Grade Level                              -.030 
                              (.230) 
No Plans to Attend College                               1.329** 
                               (.484) 
Dislikes Civics Courses                               1.600*** 
                               (.530) 
Percent Reduction in Error from FUM  
NOTE: Regression coefficients were derived using HLM.  Italicized variables are 
individual, level-1 variables.  The level-2 variables are indented and placed underneath 
the level-1 variable for which it was controlled.  *p<.10  **p<.05  ***p<.01  ****p<.001 
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contact with members of other races and ethnicities also does not change their attitudes 
for the better.  It may be the case that racial identity is not particularly salient for whites, 




 The results of this chapter, along with the results from the other chapters, clearly 
indicate that school size is not significantly related to democratic values.  Small school 
advocates claim that members of racial minorities benefit greatly from smaller schools, 
but I have found no evidence to suggest this.  Black students and Latino students are no 
more knowledgeable, efficacious or tolerant in smaller schools.  Latino students are 
slightly more likely to participate in school activities, but whether this finding, and the 
other meager support for smaller schools in other chapters, is enough to warrant a 
restructuring of schools across the U.S. is highly suspect.  In the final chapter, I discuss 
the reduction of school size, its possible benefits, and its viability as a policy tool to 
improve educational quality. 
 The more interesting implications of the results in this chapter are with the racial 
composition of the environment.  Admittedly, as a supporter of the liberal values of 
equality and justice, I sought out in this research to find evidence supporting integrated 
communities.  As a matter of equality, it seems necessary that schools and communities 
not be segregated by race and ethnicity.  As a believer that one cannot be “separate but 
equal,” the implications of this chapter are a serious challenge to democratic values.  
Racial heterogeneity depresses political knowledge, tolerance and participation.  
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Bivariate results show that whites are more knowledgeable and participatory in 
predominantly white environments.  Among whites, the racial composition ceases to 
influence these values only when we control for parental income, educational aspirations 
and attitudes about civics courses.  Thus, for whites that are college-bound and have 
positive affect toward school, the racial composition does not matter.   
 I found significant gains in political knowledge among blacks and Latinos when 
they live in co-ethnic communities.  Yet, when Latinos live in black communities, their 
knowledge levels decline.  And, although Latinos living amongst other Latinos are more 
tolerant of immigrants, Latino and black adolescents living in predominantly black 
communities are significantly less tolerant.  It is difficult to reconcile these competing 
values.  On the one hand, political knowledge is higher when racial minorities live 
surrounded by others who are like them; on the other hand, when blacks live around other 
blacks, they are less tolerant.  What is the remedy?  In the case of knowledge, living in 
highly homogeneous communities might be a good thing, but for tolerance, it certainly is 
not. 
 Two issues are at stake – how can we balance the values of knowledge, efficacy 
and participation on one side, with tolerance on another?  All are positive values that 
parents, educators, and community leaders hope that all children take on.  Yet, in this 
chapter and the last chapter, I have found that economic and racial heterogeneity, while 
fostering tolerance, inhibit the other values.  What are the consequences of promoting one 
of the values above the others?  What happens, for example, if tolerance is given a 
privileged value position, at the expense of participation and knowledge?  Or, vice versa?  
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In the final chapter, I attempt to come to terms with the normative conclusions of the 
results, taken as a whole, in the dissertation. 
 The second issue at stake here is the viability of policy proposals that seek to alter 
the racial composition of a community.  Whether attempting to integrate or segregate a 
community, any policy proposal is controversial and risks intervening on personal liberty.  
Such strategies have met with limited success in the past – busing, integration of housing, 
and affirmative action policies in higher education.  Is there a legitimate way of 
constructing communities with desirable racial compositions, whatever they may be?  It 
may be especially troubling given some of my results indicate a move away from policies 
that seek to integrate communities.  If political knowledge and participation are highly 
valued, integrating individuals of different racial and ethnic backgrounds may not give 
the results policymakers hope for.  Yet, can the U.S. turn back the clock, and will citizens 




Conclusions and Implications 
  
This project has generated several research questions and hypotheses.  The 
previous four chapters each dealt with one dimension of the project, but there were 
several issues addressed within each dimension.  This final chapter will seek to 
consolidate the major findings from the entire project, and offer both normative and 
policy implications of the research.  I discuss the consequences of the minimal effects of 
school size on democratic values, as well as the tension between tolerance on the one 
hand, and participation in school activities and political knowledge on the other.  First, I 
address the limitations of this research.  It is important when considering the broader 
implications of one’s work to consider the strengths and weakness of the research design, 
and the data employed to examine research questions.   
The next section of this chapter examines the findings related to school size, and 
their implications for education policy.  Given that I found little support for significant 
benefits of smaller schools for democratic values, is a policy that requires large schools to 
downsize in some way a worthy policy goal?  Are some schools more worthy of this 
policy direction than others?  How would the activists within the small schools 
movement react to the findings that small schools really do not make much difference 
when it comes to these aspects of political socialization? 
The next part summarizes the findings from chapters 4-6 related to community 
size and economic and racial composition.  Does the local community context influence 
democratic values, and in what ways?  And, what are the consequences for the 
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development of democratic values of growing up in a small town versus a central city?  I 
found that some democratic values are at higher levels in smaller towns compared to 
other communities, and that poverty does not have the same negative effects within small 
towns as it does in more densely populated suburbs and central cities.  Finally, young 
people growing up in racially heterogeneous communities are slightly more tolerant of 
other ethnic groups, but are slightly less political knowledgeable and participatory.  
The third section of the chapter discusses the normative issues that arise from 
these findings.  At this point, I consider the dependent variables.  There is likely to be 
very little disagreement that each of the democratic values that I study is an attitude or 
behavior that is valued by citizens in a democratic nation.  However, the order in which 
one places these values is likely to vary across individuals and communities, and this 
hierarchy is extremely important in terms of both philosophy and public policy.  This is 
especially true when valued items are in opposition to or conflict with one another – if, as 
I have found, environments that foster political knowledge or participation are also those 
that allow intolerance to fester.  How do we reconcile these competing values?  Society is 
likely to be unwilling to sacrifice one of the values for another, and thus, some balance 
must be struck.   
Then, I deal with the policy issues that arise based on these findings, and 
specifically what types of policies promote or detract from the goals of raising 
adolescents’ levels of democratic values.  If we know that racial heterogeneity, for 
example, promotes political knowledge but detracts from racial tolerance, what sorts of 
policies can be designed to address this dilemma?  If small towns are better places to 
foster democratic values than are central cities and suburbs, what characteristics of small 
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towns can be replicated in these other environments?  It certainly is not feasible, nor 
desirable, to have everyone in the U.S. move to a small town, but it may be practical to 
consider why these communities are better able to achieve these goals than others are and 
what might be transferable to different types of environments. 
In addition, I add political composition to my discussion here.  Due to issues with 
data collection, I was unable to include a separate chapter on the political environment.  
However, it is too important an aspect of the local context to leave out completely.  It has 
very significant impacts on political socialization, and so I summarize findings from 
previously published work, and discuss the implications along with the other dimensions 
of context. 
Finally, the last section of the chapter suggests an agenda for future research.  At 
the end of any project, there seem to always be as many, or more, questions remaining as 
were answered.  I will discuss the types of data that should be collected to adequately 
conduct projects of this nature, the problems with the measures within the data in this 
project, as well as research questions that should be addressed in future work. 
 
Limitations of Research 
I have alluded throughout the dissertation about problems with the NHES 
constructs for political efficacy and political tolerance.  The issue with political efficacy 
is less that the questions are poorly constructed, and more that with only two questions 
related to political efficacy, it is difficult to create an indicator with adequate variability 
to be useful in multivariate analyses.  The questions related to political tolerance, 
however, are outdated and do not incorporate the type of questions experts on tolerance 
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research suggest.  The questions ask about abstract tolerance for books in the library and 
speeches against religion.  Here too, it is difficult to conduct multivariate analysis with 
such limited variability.  But also, most citizens appear tolerant when asked about 
abstract principles or groups and issues about which they do not have strong opinions 
(McClosky 1964; McClosky and Zaller 1984; Sullivan and Transue 1999).  Sullivan’s 
research has shown that when researchers ask individuals about their least-liked group, 
they are more unwilling to allow this group the broad range of civil liberties and rights 
that appears when questions are asked in terms of abstract principles (Sullivan, Piereson, 
and Marcus 1982).  Surveys that seek to examine political tolerance should incorporate 
this methodology. 
The measurement of participation was less than ideal as well.  Students were 
merely asked whether they had participated in school activities and out of school 
activities.  There is no way to differentiate between those students who are involved in 
five activities versus those who may only join one group.  In addition, we cannot examine 
the effects of different activities.  What are the differing effects of participation in the 
band versus volunteering on the Key Club, or joining the Spanish Club?  This 
information would help schools with limited resources know which activities are better at 
improving self-esteem, developing interpersonal skills, and improving levels of tolerance.   
The out of school activities variable is even more complicated, and findings 
should be considered with this in mind.  There is simply no way to determine the type of 
activity the student was thinking of when he or she responded.  This could encompass 
church activities, Boy Scouts, piano lessons, or volunteering at a homeless shelter.  Each 
of these activities is qualitatively different in nature, and we should expect each of them 
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to have somewhat differing predictors and effects on various outcomes of interest.  It is 
imperative, if we truly wish to understand the effects of non-school related activities, to 
know the number of activities in which students are involved, as well as the nature of the 
activity. 
Inevitably, trade-offs must be made in any research design.  At the end of the 
chapter, I discuss the main problems with complete reliance on large-n survey data on a 
project like this one.  However, this design also had important strengths.  I sought out to 
test expectations and hypotheses related to several bodies of research and drawing from 
theories across several disciplines.  Although other approaches may offer more depth into 
particular cases or examples, this research establishes trends and tests specific 
relationships between important factors that had not previously been addressed by other 
scholars.   
 
Small Schools as a Policy Option? 
 One of the main questions this project sought to address is the relevance of school 
size for political socialization, especially democratic values such as political knowledge, 
efficacy, participation and tolerance.  I would conclude, based on the cumulative findings 
of each chapter, that school size does not make much difference for the outcomes studied 
here.  Two positive benefits of smaller schools stand out: students are more likely to 
participate in school activities in smaller schools than in larger ones, and, children in 
urban areas benefit slightly from a reduced school size.  These results deserve some 
explanation, as do the non-findings.   
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 First, although larger schools offer more opportunities for school activities in 
absolute terms, this does not result in more students becoming involved (Barker and 
Gump 1964; Coladarci and Cobb 1996).  Arguably, some students will get involved no 
matter what type of school, or how large the school is.  Other students need some 
incentive, or some mobilization to join a team or a club.  In larger schools, it is often the 
case that only those students in the former category participate in school activities.  And, 
they generally participate in many activities, serving several leadership roles at once.  
Those in latter category are likely to be overlooked, and do not have the individualized 
attention of their teachers and administrators, and possibly their parents, to motivate them 
to join.  In a small school, like the one portrayed in the motion picture Hoosiers, students 
like Jimmy Chitwood are asked to join the basketball team by his coach.  In a larger 
school, Jimmy’s talent may have been ignored because of the extra attention it required to 
get him interested in this activity.  Teachers and coaches simply do not have the time it 
takes to get marginally interested students involved.  In this respect, smaller schools are 
significantly better at fostering the value of participation in young people. 
 Participating in school activities provides opportunities for adolescents to learn 
new skills and meet new people, and students who participate in school activities have 
higher self-esteem, are more likely to take advanced courses, spend more time on 
homework, and have higher postsecondary educational aspirations and GPAs (Marsh 
1992; Coladarci and Cobb 1996; Graham 1964).  Extra-curricular activities also have 
beneficial effects on race relations in desegregated schools (Crain, Mahard, and Narot 
1982).  Those students with the least involvement in school activities have the highest 
levels of alcohol and drug use, delinquency, and depression (Downs and Rose 1991).  
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Although curricular track and other individual background characteristics are related to 
school participation, many of the benefits of participation remain significant even 
controlling for these factors (Yarworth and Gauthier 1978).  Participation in athletics is 
associated with higher self-esteem for both boys and girls (Holland and Andre 1987; 
Steitz and Owen 1992), but other types of activities have not been examined as closely to 
determine their effects.  Niemi and Junn also find that students who are active in their 
school have higher levels of political knowledge and efficacy (1998).  Finally, students 
that participate in school activities are more likely to become politically active as adults 
than are those who do not get involved in their schools (Astin, Sax and Avalos 1999; 
Fendrich and Lovoy 1988). 
 Because of their importance, school administrators and teachers should find ways 
to motivate more students to get involved in school activities.  In small schools, the 
incentive may be there because without the participation of the few students that are 
available, activities simply would not be possible.  It is nearly impossible to field a 
football team with fewer than 22 people, or to have a school band without brass or 
percussion sections.  Larger schools should work harder, and institutionalize extra-
curricular activities as an important part of education because each student is not a 
necessity as in a small school.   
A step in the right direction would be including school activities as part of the 
curriculum, and setting aside a part of the school day for participation in these activities 
(Klesse 1994; Reynolds and Karr-Kidwell 1996).  Schools should also provide the 
needed funds for uniforms and summer camps or practices, as well as transportation 
home from the after-school activity.  Many students cannot stay after school because they 
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must work, or because they have no way to get home except the school bus, which 
generally only makes one route immediately following the close of the school day.  Many 
of the costs associated with school activities are prohibitively expensive for lower-
income students, such as purchasing a musical instrument or a uniform.  If the school 
could either incur these costs itself, or provide payment plans for students for whom this 
poses a problem, this may go a long way toward getting traditional non-participants into 
action.  Recruiting could also play a role in increasing involvement, as could prohibiting 
the same students from holding leadership positions in several different activities.   
  The second important finding related to school size is that students growing up in 
central cities are more knowledgeable and participatory when attending smaller schools 
than in larger ones.  This is not surprising, given the findings related to student 
achievement from other scholars.  Because many public schools in urban areas are so 
large, we should expect those in cities to benefit most from a reduced size.  Similarly, 
large size actually benefits students in suburbs, because of their increased opportunities 
and because many of these students have the institutional support to take advantage of the 
opportunities.  What is confounding about these results is that blacks, Latinos, and poor 
students do not experience advantages in smaller schools.   
The prevailing wisdom presumes that because many of the students in urban 
schools are members of a racial minority and are poor, these schools should be targeted 
for policy change because of the detrimental effects of poverty.  Yet, I was able to find 
very little support that students in these groups are any better off in a small school than a 
large one.  Thus, the benefits of small urban schools, at least regarding democratic values, 
are likely not related to this aspect of their composition.  Instead, smaller urban schools 
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may have more resources, better teachers, more parental involvement, a better learning 
environment, or another one of the many related explanations that I did not consider 
because of the design of the study. 
Finally, these non-findings are just as interesting as the significant findings.  
Admittedly, I was surprised by the results because having read most of the scholarship on 
smaller schools, I became convinced that reduced size would likely promote democratic 
values, just as they advance other educational outcomes.  That poorer students are not 
advantaged could be explained by the inclusion of small town children, who are similarly 
poor as urban children, but have higher levels of knowledge, etc.  Yet, the fact that black 
and Latino students are not advantaged in small schools goes against the prevailing 
wisdom of activists as well as empirical research by educational scholars. 
Some small school activists may contend that I am not examining the type of 
schools they are advocating.  One of the main arguments made by almost all small school 
advocates is that “small school” does not simply denote fewer students under one roof.  
The small schools movement is about changing education as much as changing the 
average size of schools.  Raywid and Schmerler contend that if small schools are to work, 
“a virtually whole new set of policies must be written at the system level or a new 
flexibility quite foreign to bureaucracy must permeate all existing policy” (2003, 87).  
Thus, simply breaking larger schools into smaller units, without structuring them around 
a focused mission and with leaders who are committed to a new way of educating 
children, is not going to produce significantly improved outcomes.  Traditional policies, 
such as a seniority system for teachers, demands for school accountability and federal 
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requirements for research-based school reform, and old bureaucratic rules and structures 
would have to change.   
According to many educational scholars, small schools should be created under 
new guidelines and policies that place the school’s mission and a “sense of community” 
at the center.  Faculty and administrative hires should be based on the like-mindedness of 
the teacher, principal or superintendent with the mission of the school and his/her 
potential colleagues, rather than solely on experience and education.  Many reforms made 
by one administrator have been quashed by his successor, and if smaller schools are to be 
successful, there must be continuity in policy from one leader to another.  Policy should 
be codified and institutionalized, and not simply changed informally through waivers and 
“exceptions to the rule.”  Schools, teachers and students should be judged on levels of 
improvement, rather than a rigid level of achievement at which all students are expected 
to reach at the same time and in the same way.  And, many argue that the assignment of 
students to particular schools should be based less on location and residence and more on 
the school’s mission, curriculum, and climate (Raywid and Schmerler 2003). 
Because I examine traditional public schools, and am not able to single out 
schools that were created to be small from those that are small because they pull from a 
smaller population of students, I may indeed be overlooking an important piece of this 
puzzle.  The fact that I find no relationship between school climate and school size is 
likely to be looked at by many small school advocates as evidence that I am really not 
looking at “small schools” in the way they define them.  If schools have not been created 
specifically to be “small schools,” then the same culture or climate that is found in larger 
schools with similar structure and design prevails, and importantly, the advantages 
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documented by Deborah Meier and other activists should not be expected.  Without 
having some way to compare traditional small schools with newly created and redesigned 
small schools, I cannot officially declare that school size does not matter for political 
socialization. 
Yet, if “smaller schools” are not simply about the number of students in the 
school, then the movement to reduce the size of schools is really more concerned with 
restructuring the educational system than in simply reducing size.  As becomes clear in 
their policy proposals (such as those in Raywid and Schmerler 2003), small school 
advocates wish to transform the way children are assigned to schools, the basis on which 
hiring decisions are made, and the way in which students are treated within school.  
These policies are much larger in scope than simply reducing school size.  Based on my 
research, I disagree with the calls for system-wide reform.  Instead, policies should be 
focused on urban schools.  In many ways, advocates understand that these are the 
communities and schools most in need of reform.  Most of the research and funding has 
gone into urban areas.  Yet, many still claim that the educational system in the U.S. is 
fundamentally flawed.   
 
Does Community Context Matter for Political Socialization? 
 School size was only one aspect of this project, and perhaps the more interesting 
results for political scientists are those in relation to community context.  I sought out to 
examine whether the size and composition of the local environment had any direct 
influence on political socialization into democratic values.  My hypotheses were that 
context would certainly matter, and that some communities would be better places to 
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foster democratic values than others.  The results clearly indicate that community context 
does have a direct relationship with democratic values.  Adolescents growing up in 
smaller towns have higher levels of political knowledge and participation than students in 
many suburban communities and urban areas.  And yet, young people in small towns are 
less racially tolerant than those in other places.   
 The first chapter reviewed the literature on the importance of social context to 
explaining the values and attitudes of adults, and set up expectations for why and how the 
local environment would influence the socialization of young people into these particular 
democratic values.  To many, it seems obvious that the local environment matters.  One 
can look at a map of partisanship in the United States (“red America” versus “blue 
America”) and see that place makes a difference.  Even so, my study and its findings are 
important because much of the research on political socialization does not specifically 
examine how the environment may influence the process.   
 I also found economic and racial/ethnic composition to have important influences 
on democratic values.  Although it is true that all things equal, it is easier to raise children 
to be good citizens in affluent communities than in impoverished ones, community-level 
poverty has variable effects across communities.  The difference in political knowledge 
levels between the most affluent suburbs and the poorest, and the most affluent central 
city neighborhoods and the poorest is larger than the knowledge gap between the most 
affluent small towns and the poorest small towns.  Thus, while it is still true that growing 
up in a richer small town is better (for knowledge) than coming of age in a poorer one, 
these differences between wealthy and poor in other areas are less important in small 
towns.  In essence, poverty does not have the same detrimental impact on political 
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knowledge in smaller towns as it does in the suburbs and in central cities.  This is partly 
due to a lower cost of living and a more narrow income distribution in smaller towns.  
Yet, many communities today are characterized by an increasingly narrow income 
distribution.  The best explanation is the existence of a strong network of support for 
residents of poor small towns that does not exist in these other communities. 
 Even though small towns foster the values of knowledge and participation, 
tolerance suffers in these homogeneous environments.  Youth living in racially 
heterogeneous communities are generally less knowledgeable and participatory, but are 
more tolerant.  Controlling for parental income, exposure to civics coursework, attitudes 
about civics, and college plans, whites, blacks and Latinos living in co-ethnic 
communities have higher scores on the knowledge test and are more likely to participate 
in school activities, but are less racially sensitive. 
 I have offered several possible explanations for these findings.  In many suburbs, 
although certainly not all, children have support from home, as well as comparatively 
good public schools, each of which would facilitate a higher level of achievement and 
participation.  Although young people from smaller towns come from less affluent homes 
and attend schools with fewer resources, they have the support of communities that are 
characterized by strong social networks.  As we know, urban schools suffer from an 
alarming lack of resources and low levels of achievement, and yet, African American and 
Latino students who were college-bound and liked their civics courses performed better 
in environments where their groups have a substantial presence.  This is likely due to 
some combination of a different set of expectations on the part of teachers and 
administrators, a system that does not divide students into academic units solely by race, 
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and the existence in students of a strong racial identity that facilitates political 
knowledge, interest and participation.   
 Each of these types of communities can often be characterized similarly in one 
important way:  each is racially, ethnically and economically segregated.  As many social 
scientists have documented, very few communities today are integrated across different 
racial and economic characteristics (Massey and Denton 1993).  Small towns are 
notoriously homogeneous – relatively few non-whites live in these communities outside 
the South.  Urban neighborhoods are similarly homogeneous, and many suburbs are 
characterized as either “all black” or “all white.”  I found that the higher the level of 
diversity in a community, the lower the levels of knowledge and participation. 
The key question, then, in terms of policy is whether it is possible to create 
environments that facilitate political knowledge and participation without dampening 
tolerance, and in normative terms, how to balance these seemingly competing values.  
The first step is to recognize the social significance of the dilemma.  Are the benefits to 
knowledge and participation from living in a racially homogeneous environment 
substantial, while intolerance only increases a small amount?  If so, policies should seek 
to create or sustain relatively homogeneous environments where these values and 
behaviors can develop, as the benefit to participation and knowledge might outweigh the 
damage to tolerance.  Or, is the level of intolerance consequential?  If this is the case, 
then diversity may overrule the advantages to political knowledge and participation.   
By looking at the results from chapter 6, we can see, for example, that African 
American students’ levels of knowledge increase by about six points (on a 100-point 
scale) in predominantly-black environments; their levels of tolerance decline by about 
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four points.  We might conclude, then, that it seems to be a wash, and that neither 
outcome is substantial enough to warrant changing policies; or, at the least, that policies 
seeking to enhance knowledge might not have a substantial negative influence on 
tolerance.  Even so, it might be necessary to conduct a different type of research at this 
point.   
Statistical analysis is excellent at pointing to trends and general directions, but to 
truly understand the interactive processes in neighborhoods and communities, it may be 
necessary to conduct hands-on research in the field.  Policy solutions “based on 
inferences from observed behavior, as gathered in surveys and evaluations alone, will 
neglect dimensions that were not included in the data gathering” (Lin 2000, 2).  Thus, the 
decision to focus exclusively on “community” as a geographic entity gives an idea of 
what is going on in particular communities, but to understand why these trends occur, it 
is necessary to include the beliefs and practices of the people within the community, 
which can only be inferred from these analyses.  Although I cannot make definitive 
judgments about policy directions, I can offer some suggestions based on the inferences 




If the results had shown that certain types of environments foster all the 
democratic values in the same way, the normative implications would be relatively 
straightforward.  They would likely concern the conflict between individual liberty to 
choose where to live and the creation of environments that might be best for the political 
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socialization of children.  However, my results show that some environments are better 
than others at fostering some democratic values – participation and political knowledge – 
while they are not generally the best places to cultivate tolerance for diversity.  Rather 
than focus on issues of liberty and equality, then, I will instead emphasize the balance of 
these competing values. 
Value pluralism allows for deep disagreement about the ordering of values, and 
that disagreements are likely to be somewhat intractable.  The world according to value 
pluralists has “no single, univocal summum bonum that can be defined philosophically, 
let alone imposed politically” (Galston 2002, 30).  Pluralism is not to be confused with 
relativism, as pluralism allows for a minimum conception of decency and morality, such 
that there are non-arbitrary distinctions between right and wrong.  Yet, above this 
minimum level, there are multiple conceptions of good that cannot be “reduced to a 
common measure of value” (Galston 2002, 30).  Value pluralists contend there is no 
single good or value that overrides all others in every circumstance.   
In the study of mass political behavior, scholars have researched “value 
hierarchies,” or how individuals order important societal values, such as liberty, justice, 
equality, and social order (Rokeach 1973).  In a liberal society, most would not have a 
problem accepting that individuals can disagree about how important values should be 
ordered.  The fact that I might place equality above liberty, or in the case here, political 
knowledge above tolerance, does not prohibit another individual from having a different 
ordering system, nor does it imply that my ordering is in any way more appropriate than 
another’s.  The value hierarchies are important because they often determine one’s 
political preferences or ideology.  Liberals (in the political sense) tend to favor equality 
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more than liberty, and conservatives tend to give liberty pride of place over equality or 
justice.  These hierarchies influence one’s policy preferences, as well as how one may 
vote.  Yet, few would agree that this form of reasonable disagreement over important 
values is detrimental to democracy.  In fact, many would contend, as do I, that this type 
of disagreement among individuals, to the extent that it remains civil, is at the heart of 
democracy.    
The problem with value hierarchies is in their aggregation.  People are 
comfortable with the idea that individuals can disagree, and will have different 
ideologies.  Yet, when the different value hierarchies are aggregated to the community or 
societal level, some people want there to be one ordering system that is based on 
individuals’ preferences.  Because it is based on what the people in society prefer, this 
system should govern political decisions.   
In the case of political knowledge, participation and tolerance, let us assume that 
political knowledge and participation were deemed to be more important than tolerance.  
Education policy (as one example) would emphasize those curricula and settings that are 
best at fostering knowledge and participation.  Educators would focus on, for instance, 
giving students opportunities for participating in school activities, as well as practice at 
democratic participation, such as mock elections and decisions about classroom practices.  
Teacher training and promotion would be based on the extent to which they are able to 
improve students’ levels of political knowledge on standardized tests such as the NAEP 
skills test.  In contrast, if tolerance were seen as more important than political knowledge 
and participation, curricula would be specifically geared toward giving students 
opportunities to learn about other cultures, and to interact with individuals who are 
 183
different from them.  Schools would shun programs that foster nationalism or patriotism, 
and instead teachers might be given incentives for creative programs designed around 
multicultural education. 
It does not seem optimal to prescribe either one of these solutions.  Those that 
would place tolerance before knowledge and participation will not be happy about the 
first alternative, and those that give knowledge and participation pride of place would be 
upset with any alternative that places other values before these.  Value pluralism offers a 
solution for reconciling competing values that does not require the sacrifice of important 
values in all situations.  This reconciliation between competing values is to examine the 
particular situation.  This theory provides for a solution that reinforces the overall thesis 
of this dissertation:  context matters.   
Where in some cases tolerance should have pride of place over knowledge and 
participation, there will be other circumstances in which tolerance will cede importance 
to these other values.  It is not difficult to imagine these situations; in fact, concrete 
experience often provides the most compelling arguments in favor of value pluralism.  
Let us suppose that a community has just discovered a group of teens has defaced a 
synagogue by spray-painting swastikas and other anti-Semitic language and symbols.  
This is an excellent opportunity for families, churches and schools to place tolerance 
ahead of other values, and to organize programs and provide forums for students to 
discuss this and other instances of intolerance and bigotry.  Programs of this nature were 
common in many communities following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, as 
community leaders and educators saw the opportunity as a way to teach residents and 
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young people about other cultures and ideologies, and to emphasize tolerance as an 
essential democratic value.   
One could easily come up with scenarios in which political knowledge and 
participation are more important, however.  At least every two years, in every community 
in the U.S., there is a national, general election.  Including primaries and local elections, 
there may be many more opportunities for an emphasis on participation and knowledge.  
Schools, families and communities can utilize these opportunities to inform residents and 
young people about important political issues, candidates and political parties.  Elections 
offer occasions for socialization unlike almost any other (Sears and Valentino 1997).  
They seem to be a perfect occasion for underscoring the importance of one’s vote, and for 
helping students accept a partisan label that will serve to motivate their participation later 
in life.  
It is important to note that in my study, the type of tolerance that I found to be 
significant was racial or ethnic tolerance.  Although homogeneous communities were 
better at fostering knowledge and participation, racial tolerance was significantly lower in 
these types of environments.  Racial intolerance is much different in form and 
consequence than political intolerance.  Value pluralists would allow for opportunities 
when tolerance is subordinated to other values, but because pluralism is not the same as 
relativism, there are forms of intolerance that are unacceptable in all circumstances.  
Because tolerance is such an essential democratic value, we should specify exactly which 
forms of intolerance might, in some cases, be less important than other values. 
There are attitudinal and behavior manifestations of intolerance.  Disagreeing 
with the ideas Republicans espouse, and beating up Republicans are two very different 
 185
forms of intolerance.  The former might be acceptable, to the extent that these attitudes 
inform individuals about their own ideologies and opinions, and motivate them to get 
involved in politics.  The latter, however, is never, under any circumstances, acceptable.  
This would be one of those instances in which value pluralists would agree that some 
values (safety) are superior to others (liberty).   
Thus, we can generally agree that behavioral manifestations of intolerance are 
prohibited.  Within the attitudinal realm, the important distinction is between ideas and 
people.  If one dislikes the ideas of socialists, for example, this is probably an acceptable 
form of intolerance.  Yet, when he takes his dislike of socialist ideas a step farther, and 
begins to dislike or discriminate against socialists themselves, this is a problem.  We can 
“hate the sin, not the sinner.”  This distinction is especially important in terms of racial, 
ethnic, and economic intolerance.  There are likely to be very few legitimate ways in 
which one can disagree with the ideas of racial minorities and the poor, without 
employing negative stereotypes and discriminatory attitudes toward racial minorities and 
poor people.  I contend, then, that intolerance as it applies to ideas is potentially 
acceptable, but other forms are not. 
The type of intolerance that I found, racial intolerance, is likely to be 
unacceptable in any circumstance.  In my estimation, the fact that homogeneity detracts 
from tolerance is largely due to individuals not having opportunities to meet and interact 
with individuals of other groups.  People must rely solely on media accounts and 
stereotypes to infer about others.  There is substantial evidence that the media contribute 
greatly to negative stereotypes, especially about blacks and immigrants (Gilens 2000; 
Mendelberg 2001; Entman and Rojecki 2001).  That racial minorities are also more 
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tolerant in co-ethnic communities is most likely because in these environments, they 
perceive less discrimination and prejudice, and have stronger racial identities.  The next 
section discusses the policy relevance of my findings, especially as related to racial 
intolerance. 
 
Public Policy and Community Context 
I first concentrate on policies that schools might consider in order to enhance the 
democratic values of knowledge, participation, efficacy and tolerance, and then address 
how state, local and federal authorities can devise policies that keep these values in mind.  
The key question, again, is how to enhance each of the values at the same time, or at a 
minimum, to improve some without detracting from others.  Schools may need to play an 
increasingly important role in socializing young people into democratic values because 
many parents are playing a lessening role in this process (Braddock, Dawkins and 
Wilkins 1995), and because schools can help break the cycle of nonparticipation and 
cynicism that parents may pass along to their children.   
First, in general terms, schools and teachers should recognize the important role 
they play in the development of political values.  The current educational climate focuses 
heavily on accountability, standardized testing, teacher training and school choice.  The 
current focus of federal and state education policy is on standardized testing, especially in 
reading and math.  I suggest, along with the authors of The Civic Mission of Schools, that 
schools, as well as state and federal government entities, take civics or government 
classes as seriously as they do other subjects (Gibson and Levine 2003).  No one 
disagrees that basic reading and math are essential skills necessary for the marketplace; 
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yet, learning about history and government are also basic necessities for becoming a fully 
engaged citizen.  The consequences of not developing into a “good citizen” are serious: 
individuals do not participate, and are therefore not adequately represented, and the 
political system is skewed toward certain groups and away from others (Verba, 
Schlozman and Brady 1995).  Until this goal is valued as highly as other educational 
aims, funding for civic education will continue to be rolled back, and it will become 
increasingly difficult to hire highly qualified social studies teachers and provide 
opportunities, such as field trips and work-study or service-learning arrangements, that 
facilitate learning in this subject area.  The rest of the policy suggestions are contingent 
upon the importance of civic education becoming more than mere rhetoric in education 
policy discussions. 
My findings suggest that the strategies to be used to increase democratic values 
should vary across different communities.  Educators in small towns and other 
homogeneous communities, for example, should focus more on building racial and ethnic 
tolerance than on knowledge and participation.  In more heterogeneous environments, 
teachers should instead emphasize strategies that improve political knowledge and 
motivate students to get involved in school activities.   
In homogeneous environments, one of the most important issues to address in 
schools is the lack of interracial and interethnic contact, and the detriment this lack of 
exposure to difference has on young people.  Combating intolerance must require 
adolescents growing up in homogeneous communities, whether they are small towns, 
suburbs or inner city neighborhoods, to confront individuals who are different from them.  
In this year of the 50th anniversary of Brown v. Board of Education, it is troubling that 
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this issue has not yet been resolved.  There are, of course, highly controversial policies, 
such as busing, affirmative action, and school choice that have been tried or are being 
tried.  In lieu of, or perhaps in addition to such radical policy measures, less drastic 
measures can prove useful.   
Schools in these communities can seek to hire teachers and administrators from 
various social classes, regional areas, and racial and ethnic backgrounds.  Although 
schools have very little control over the composition of the community, and therefore the 
student population, they have a great deal of control over hiring decisions.  For students 
for whom this would be their only contact with an individual in another group, this can 
provide an enormously positive experience that may be diffused to attitudes about others 
in the group.  For those already in heterogeneous schools and communities, it is 
important to see “individuals from all racial/ethnic backgrounds…distributed throughout 
the status hierarchy” (Schofield 1995, 266).  For students in minority groups, a black or 
Latino principal or teacher can provide an excellent role model; and for white students, 
this can balance prejudicial or stereotypical attitudes about racial minorities. 
Extra-curricular activities can also play an important role in cross-ethnic, cross-
class contact.  My findings show that children in smaller schools are more likely to join 
in these activities.  I also found that school size and community size are closely related.  
Thus, to the extent that children in smaller towns are more active in their school and 
community, educators can harness these experiences to improve racial and ethnic 
tolerance.  The danger from extra-curricular activities to tolerance comes when teams or 
school groups are very homogeneous, and they come into contact with students in schools 
with different, yet similarly homogeneous, compositions.  Thus, when the “poor school” 
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takes on the “rich school” in basketball, or when the “black school” competes against the 
“white school” in a band competition, this serves to heighten intergroup differences.  In 
addition to competitions, nearby schools should seek strategies to bring student groups 
together under different circumstances.  Statewide programs, such as Girls’ State or 
Boys’ State and statewide conventions can provide students with opportunities to meet 
other likeminded individuals from different places, and with different backgrounds.  
Furthermore, after-school activities include more than just school-related offerings.  
Church activities can also be a way to foster intergroup relations, especially when 
different churches and faiths hold meetings and activities together.   
In diverse communities and schools, although teachers might focus more on 
knowledge building than tolerance, it is important not to sacrifice one value for another.  
Furthermore, a heterogeneous school population does not always, in fact rarely, indicates 
diversity within the school experience for students.  Most secondary schools have at least 
two tracks – the college preparatory or honors track, and the vocational or average track.  
Some schools divide the tracks into three groups, a sort of “small, medium, and large” 
continuum, where the smartest students are at the top and the least capable at the bottom.  
In my opinion, there is nothing inherently wrong with either of these systems.  Some 
people are more intellectually capable than others, and should be in classes that challenge 
them.  Others struggle, especially with particular subjects, and should be in classes where 
they can be taught at a level at which they can keep up. 
 The problem arises because the distribution of students across these tracks is far 
from equal.  Students from lower-class backgrounds, and who are members of a racial 
minority group, especially African Americans and Latinos, are much more likely to be 
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placed in a lower track than are white, middle- or upper-class students (Oakes 1985; 
Alexander, Cook and McDill 1978).  Thus, in many cases, a school may, on the surface, 
look very heterogeneous in its composition, but “resegregation” occurs through the 
tracking system, and affluent white students are unlikely ever to have a class with poor 
students, or those from other racial groups (Hochschild 1984).  Although resegregation 
can occur naturally, as when students of the same race choose to eat together at lunch 
(Tatum 1997), or in friendship choices (Gerard and Miller 1975; Stephan 1978), its 
effects are worse when institutionally sanctioned. 
 According to social psychology, when individuals are divided into groups, 
regardless of the basis of the division, they favor in-group members and discriminate 
against out-groups (Tajfel and Turner 1979).  Segregation through tracking exacerbates 
negative stereotypes and fosters prejudicial attitudes among those in the dominant group 
(Schofield 1989, 1995).  For those in the subordinate groups, tracking systems reinforce 
these stereotypes and undermine achievement and motivation (Oakes 1992; Schofield 
1979).   
Even so, it may be necessary to track students in some way.  Every effort should 
be made, however, that academic tracks not be determined by parental background 
characteristics or race and ethnicity.  One of the big problems, however, is the 
achievement gap, which I discussed in chapter 6.  As long as school achievement varies 
by race and socio-economic status, tracking will continue to be a problem because 
academic tracks will always be related to race and SES.  It does not seem obvious, 
however, that tracking be a part of primary education.  In high school, differences in 
coursework can be quite stark, and here, tracking makes more sense.  To the extent that 
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any tracking system reinforces stereotypes and affects student motivation, the later a 
school system begins to track, the better.  If students do not arrive to high school with 
lower levels of personal efficacy and motivation because they were labeled as “average” 
in the sixth grade, they might make substantial gains in high school. 
In addition to restructuring tracking systems, schools in both diverse and 
homogeneous communities should strive to design programs that focus on cooperative 
learning.  Slavin (1995) documents six different cooperative learning programs found in 
schools across the U.S. and finds that they have positive effects on student achievement 
and on reciprocated cross-ethnic friendship choices.  These programs are institutionally 
sanctioned by school authorities, are designed around groups working together to achieve 
a shared goal or objective, and divide students into groups almost randomly (or, at a 
minimum, not by race or social class).  They create groups that are cleaved on more than 
just race or class (Schofield 1995).  Teachers should recognize the “importance of 
superordinate and authentic goals” and devise programs and curricula that create “a 
community of discourse characterized by cross-cutting identities” (Torney-Purta 1995, 
363).  Cooperative work can lead to close personal friendships with people that one might 
never have met had he or she not been assigned to a particular group (Miller and 
Harrington 1992).  It is important to note that each of these criteria for their success – 
approval of authority, equal status contact, and a shared objective – are all conditions 
Allport (1954) placed on interracial contact if it is to lead to positive attitudes between 
members of different races, ethnicities, and social statuses. 
Finally, the last set of recommendations related to education policy I would make 
concerns the training of teachers.  It is important that teachers have some training in the 
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subjects they are assigned to teach.  People may disagree as to what exactly this means 
(state certification, or major/minor in college), but most agree that it is not a good idea for 
teachers to be placed in classrooms in which they do not fit (Ringstaff and Sandholtz 
2002).  Second, it is essential that teachers be trained to deal with an increasingly diverse 
student population (Zeichner 1995).  Demographic trends point to a future where white 
students will be minorities not only in particular communities, but in the nation as a 
whole.  Teacher training must incorporate this reality, and teachers should be aware of 
varying cultures, languages and histories that different groups face in this country.  
Schools should place a premium on teachers with such training, thereby giving incentives 
to those in education programs to take part in them.  Although a good start, it is not 
enough to provide incentives for teachers to move to undesirable areas, such as inner 
cities or rural areas, to teach.  If they do not know how to cope with the circumstances of 
the communities in which they are assigned to teach, they cannot be effective. 
One of the biggest problems with regard to teaching in today’s diverse 
environments is the low level of expectations many teachers have of lower-income and 
minority students (Goodlad 1990; Reyes 2003).  The low expectations come from a 
combination of outright prejudice against particular groups, good intentions and concern 
for students who must deal with poverty and social problems, and ignorance of other 
groups and cultures.   
 
State and Local Initiatives and Political Socialization 
  One of the most difficult issues with regard to my original research questions, and 
ultimately, my findings, is the extent to which anything can be done about them.  Are 
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there legitimate ways of constructing communities with particular racial, economic or 
political compositions?  How can positive aspects of some communities be replicated in 
others without substantial governmental intervention that takes away individuals’ rights 
to live and work wherever they want?  Although arguably more difficult than the 
suggestions related to schools and teachers, I believe there are certain things localities can 
do to facilitate certain community compositions.  I focus on civic capacity, housing 
strategies, and later, the process of deciding congressional district boundaries. 
 First, I must point out that any strategy that successfully reduces the negative 
effects of poverty and discrimination would help children in every way, including the 
development of democratic values.  The least surprising results of my study are that 
poorer students and non-white students have lower levels of political knowledge, 
participation in school activities, efficacy and tolerance for diversity.  To the extent that 
any policy or program can create a stronger labor market, a more diversified economy, 
build a robust safety net, and reduce negative stereotypes of the poor and racial 
minorities, they are likely to help raise the support of democratic values among all 
children, both directly and indirectly. 
 Yet, it is also important to recognize that the negative effects of poverty varied 
across different communities.  In some cases, growing up in an impoverished small town 
provided benefits over and above some middle-class suburbs.  Thus, eradicating poverty 
(to the extent that this is ever possible) is not likely to be enough to improve child 
development outcomes, including the development of democratic values.  Good and 
successful programs are unlikely to flourish in distressed neighborhoods, whose “social 
fabric and institutional infrastructure are so weak and overwhelmed by social disorder 
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and decline” (Brown and Richman 1997, 166).  Sampson describes communities with 
sparse acquaintanceship networks, unsupervised teenage friendship groups, a weak 
organizational base, and low levels of participation in community activities as socially 
“disorganized,” and argues that these characteristics are fodder for a variety of negative 
social outcomes (2001).  As the community continues to break down physically, 
financially and socially, residents have lower and lower levels of efficacy about their 
ability to change things.  Families experience a breakdown of social ties, and the ability 
to garner consensus on issues erodes, perpetuating the cycle of nonparticipation and 
despair (Furstenberg and Hughes 1995).   
 The benefits of small towns over suburban and urban communities are likely 
found in the networks and relationships that are developed there.  In small towns, 
residents know one another and they know whom to trust and whom to avoid.  
Relationships are developed over generations.  These strong bonds form what may, in 
some communities, be described as the “village” in Hillary Clinton’s famous book 
(1996).   
 How then, can suburban and urban communities develop these kinds of 
characteristics that help foster many positive outcomes, including democratic values?  
First, it is important to recognize that although feelings of alienation are part of the 
experience of living in a socially disorganized neighborhood, it is not the case that no 
social bonds are formed.  Residents of poor, urban communities still communicate with 
one another, and must trust one another at some level if they are to survive.  Neighbors 
and family members often rely on one another for childcare and financial assistance in 
times of crisis.  Jones (1986) describes a “collective ethos” that binds people together 
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because of shared struggles and a lack of knowledge or information about alternative 
ways of living.  This lifestyle is sometimes all people know, and the affective bonds they 
share with their neighbors often compete with financial needs, preventing them from 
leaving the community.  Thus, it is rarely the case that social capital has to be built from 
scratch; something exists, and if harnessed and directed correctly, can provide a 
foundation for improving the circumstances in distressed neighborhoods.   
 Other potentially useful strategies for improving social capital in disorganized 
communities include increasing opportunities for positive social interactions through 
reinforcing shared values and norms, after-school and mentoring programs that bring 
adults into contact with children and adolescents, celebrations of a community’s history 
and rituals, and recognizing community leaders.  Providing opportunities for individuals 
to work in community-based organizations (CBOs) not only influence those who are 
working, but also affects their family and neighbors.  CBOs can often help in the 
solutions of discrete problems, but also “reknit the web of social and institutional 
networks that support families” (Brown and Richman 1997, 172-173; see also Grogan 
and Proscio 2000).  It does not require an official CBO, however.  Most communities 
have some public forum in which certain groups within the neighborhood are likely to be 
overrepresented, and others are underrepresented.  Giving opportunities to those who 
have been underrepresented on city councils and neighborhood initiatives can help 
improve levels of efficacy and cynicism. 
 Although I agree that these sorts of proposals can help, there are two important 
considerations.  Both are more theoretical than practical issues, but have implications for 
the evaluation of such plans as listed above.  The concept “social capital” has become 
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such a buzz-word that it has largely lost its meaning.  The advantages of policies to 
improve social capital are obvious – theories based on social capital appeal to 
behavioralists who tend to believe that social outcomes are a product of individual 
behavior; they also appeal to structuralists who tend to argue that outcomes are the result 
of discriminatory or faulty institutions.  How can one theory be appealing to both camps?  
The reason is that, as defined, it is nearly impossible to make causal conclusions because 
it is difficult to know where social capital begins.  For example, a common claim is that 
individuals with a higher degree of social capital are more trusting of others.  Yet, are 
they more trusting because they have higher social capital, or do they have higher social 
capital because they are more trusting?  Similarly, do communities have cleaner, safer 
streets and better schools because of a high level of social capital, or did the safe 
community generate social capital because of its lack of social problems?  It is nearly 
impossible to tell.  Putnam’s own research on Italy indicates that social problems and 
social capital go back centuries, and that a community’s present status is linked to its past 
(1993).  This suggests that it may be quite difficult to change a community’s level of 
social capital.  If programs are likely to fail in neighborhoods without strong, positive 
networks, and yet, these relationships are the aim of the policy, then what is likely to 
work?  Policymakers must, at a minimum, recognize these difficulties when constructing 
policies. 
 The second consideration is that many assume that social capital is self-
replenishing.  As people begin to interact more with their neighbors and friends, their 
levels of trust will grow and they will become more interested in community activities.  
However, as Stone and his colleagues point out, interactions – especially those 
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surrounding a contentious political issue – do not always lead to greater trust and more 
civility (2001).  Instead, interactions may erode trust and dampen the spirits of 
cooperation.  As people work together, group and individual interests often collide, and 
people lose trust in one another, as well as the process of working together. 
 Stone, Henig, Jones and Pierannuzi suggest that rather than social capital, the 
important concept to understand why some communities are better able to mobilize 
around particular policy issues is “civic capacity” (2001).  Civic capacity is the “extent to 
which different sectors of the community…act in concert around a matter of community-
wide import” (Stone 2001, 596).  Depending on the issue at hand, these sectors might 
include business leaders, elected officials, educators, non-profit organizations, religious 
groups, and community-development organizations.  “Capacity” involves both 
mobilization of relevant groups and individuals and the ability to develop a shared plan of 
action.  Stone, et al. discuss how this capacity varies across different communities, and 
the effects of the differing levels of capacity for cities in reforming urban schools in crisis 
(2001).   
In addition to these strategies, many communities across the nation are rethinking 
public housing as a way to create communities with particular compositions.  The old 
way of thinking was to build massive public housing complexes where families could pay 
reduced rents.  This way, the poor were set-off from working-, middle-, and upper-class 
Americans, whose property values were safe.  It helped solve the housing crisis of the 
post-war years because these multi-family dwellings could hold thousands of residents.  
Public housing and other housing policies, such as FHA, also dealt with the tension and 
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struggle surrounding issues of racial integration in white neighborhoods by forcing non-
whites and the poor into their own neighborhoods (Meyer 2000; Sugrue 1998). 
However, by the 1960s, the neighborhoods with large public housing facilities 
were run-down, businesses had fled, crime had become a serious problem, residents were 
jobless, and the schools became wastelands for poor children with no way out.  As years 
passed, the concentration of the poor, especially the black poor, became very high in 
these neighborhoods.  In recent years, the tide has turned against segregating the poor 
into these type of units.  In Chicago, one of the largest complexes in the nation – Cabrini 
Green – was razed; New Orleans also demolished the notorious St. Thomas projects; and 
Atlanta destroyed Techwood in preparation for the Olympic games.  Replacing this 
housing is obviously a problem – thousands have been displaced.  Policymakers believe 
that the long-term advantages outweigh the short-term disadvantages of displacement, 
and the trend is likely to continue in major urban centers. 
The new theory is to mix neighborhoods by socioeconomic status, and to scatter 
the poor throughout a community, so that all (or many) neighborhoods include residents 
who are poor, middle-class, and wealthy.  The advantages to the poor are obvious – safer, 
cleaner neighborhoods, better services and schools, adult role models for children, and 
peer groups that include children with higher educational and occupational aspirations.  
There are disadvantages, however, and ironically, they generally center on breaking up 
the networks and relationships that helped residents of these complexes.  On the one 
hand, scholars claim that the networks are nonexistent or are negative in urban areas, and 
on the other, when policies break the networks apart, they cry foul.   
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Brown and Richman (1997) claim that it may be easier, instead, to rebuild poor 
neighborhoods than to disperse the residents into new neighborhoods.  Wealthy 
neighborhoods are, without a doubt, likely to oppose these policies and fight against 
them.  This may result in middle- and lower-class neighborhoods feeling the brunt of the 
impact, and these neighborhoods may see at least a temporary decline in property value, 
thereby hurting the middle class.  This is never a popular political move for either 
Democrats or Republicans.  Transportation may be another serious concern.  Very few 
poor individuals own their own vehicle, and public transportation is lacking in most 
suburban neighborhoods.  The poor may find it even more difficult to get to work than it 
was from their old neighborhood.  In the end, however, the policies are largely too new to 
evaluate at this point.   
 
Political Composition and Public Policy 
 Before closing this section of the chapter, I must present another aspect of context 
that has important influences on political socialization: political composition.  By 
political composition I mean the rates of turnout and partisan make-up of a community.  
Turnout indicates a relatively participatory community as opposed to one in which few 
residents get out to vote.  The partisan make-up indicates the level of political diversity or 
heterogeneity in an environment.  Is the community dominated by Democrats or 
Republicans?  Or, are election battles traditionally very close contests, where residents 
are almost split down the middle with regard to partisanship?   
 Political composition matters for political socialization through the type of 
information available and the incentives individuals have to participate and maintain an 
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interest in politics.  There is a great deal to be learned during political campaigns (Sears 
and Valentino 1997; Dalton, Beck and Huckfeldt 1998).  A heated campaign during a 
critical period of adolescence can jumpstart a child’s interest in politics, as well as his or 
her acceptance of a partisan label and particular political values and attitudes.  Campaigns 
are more active, and produce more information when they are between two (or more) 
competitive candidates or parties.  In these contests, the political parties run television 
and radio ads, they put on political debates, and candidates give many speeches and 
appearances in order to raise their profile.  In environments, however, where the winner 
of an electoral contest is a foregone conclusion before the election cycle begins, parties 
have no incentive to spend finite resources, and voters have little incentive or opportunity 
to learn about the candidates or to participate in the events.  The political orientation of 
the community, then, influences the supply and content of the political information 
available to residents of the community, as well as the level of mobilization by political 
parties (Gimpel, Lay and Schuknecht 2003).   
 In politically homogeneous areas, or those dominated by one political party, 
almost all people are likely to be less interested and less likely to participate than in 
diverse areas with competitive elections.  Political diversity heightens political efficacy, 
or the sense that one’s vote counts (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Key 1949).  
Individuals that identify with the minority party in communities with only one strong 
party are even less likely to get involved, or to speak up.  Noelle-Neumann refers to this 
phenomenon as the “spiral of silence,” where minorities (racial, political, or other) 
choose to stay quiet, rather than share a dissenting opinion or voice when few others 
agree with them (1984).  Most individuals do not want to risk being ostracized, or made 
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to feel silly, and in environments where their views are unlikely to be represented or 
taken seriously, many will simply opt out. 
 The political environment, then, affects the development of political attitudes 
through the type and amount of information that is offered in the community, as well as 
adults’ reactions to their place in the composition.  Children whose parents are political 
minorities, who feel they have been shut out of the process and who no longer talk about 
or participate in politics are less likely to develop into engaged, interested and 
knowledgeable citizens than are children of parents in the majority, whose views are 
adequately represented by their elected officials and in discussions of important issues.  
These youth learn that their opinion is not as valid as the majority, and may never 
become engaged in politics.  Also, the issues of importance are certainly likely to vary by 
community, and thus, knowledge about politics will differ according to the community in 
which one is raised.  Residents, and therefore young people, in towns along the U.S. 
border are likely to very interested in, and hear a great deal of information about 
immigration.  Young people growing up in Southern Indiana, however, are probably 
much more interested in basketball and farming – and many have never thought much 
about immigration (Gimpel, Lay and Schuknecht 2003).   
Finally, in communities that are accustomed to competitive elections, adolescents 
are brought up surrounded by political conflict, and are inundated with information that 
can help create a generation of politically interested, knowledgeable and participatory 
young people.  Those raised in politically homogeneous areas may never understand the 
value of conflict or see the other side’s perspective on many issues.  Indeed, in 
Cultivating Democracy, my co-authors and I found that Republican youth living in 
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heavily Democratic communities were less efficacious, less interested in discussion, and 
less knowledgeable as a result of being a political minority group (2003, 112-113; see 
also Gimpel and Lay 2004).   
There is a relatively straightforward way to change the political composition of 
communities.  Every ten years, after a Census, congressional district boundaries are re-
drawn to account for population shifts within the states and the nation.  Some states 
inevitably lose a district or more because of their relative population losses, while other 
states gain districts.  The controversial aspect of redistricting, however, is not which 
states gain and lose; it is how the districts themselves are redrawn to the advantage of 
particular groups.  In states where the state legislatures draw the district lines, the party in 
power generally draws the districts to advantage their incumbents and hurt the opposing 
party.  For years, Democrats did just this, and now that Republicans are gaining power in 
many states, they are “righting the wrongs” of their opponents. 
When boundaries are drawn to benefit one particular party over another, however, 
the results are the same: safe districts, with very little competition.  Although this is 
exactly what parties say they want, the effects are ultimately devastating.  Participation is 
lower in areas with less competition, as voters feel they have no incentive to get involved.  
Furthermore, the politics of the area are likely to become more polarized, as officials see 
little reason to moderate their views to appeal to a slim minority of individuals in the 
opposing party.  Children are brought up in one-sided political communities, and rarely 
ever get the opportunity to hear the arguments of the other side.  They are likely to have 
no appreciation for the positive role that legitimate conflict can and must play in politics. 
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Not all states conduct their redistricting plans in this way, however.  States such 
as Iowa and Arizona have independent, either non-partisan or bi-partisan groups that 
decide where the new districts boundaries should be drawn.  In Iowa, after the 2000 
Census, an independent commission redrew the boundaries into five districts, based 
primarily on the compactness of the district.  In 2002, four of the five districts were 
competitive electoral contests.   
Other than fairly drawing district boundaries to create competitive elections, other 
political reforms might involve providing challengers to incumbents with free media time 
and strong party support that would counter some of the advantages of incumbency.  
Schools might also get students involved and interested in politics by allowing them 
credit for volunteering for a political campaign.  Many schools are now requiring students 
to conduct several hours of “community service,” which is often not clearly defined.  
Political activities, such as campaigns, could go toward these requirements.  Schools 
might also bring candidates from different parties and for different offices in to debate or 
speak to the students.  To the extent that schools and candidates can relate these activities 
to the types of issues that interest many students – such as support for public schools, or 
law and order – it would help students understand that politics is not simply an “adult” 
activity and that it has no relevance for their lives. 
 
Agenda for Future Research 
 As is always the case in any project, there were several frustrations with the data 
available to me as well as additional questions that I formed as I completed the 
dissertation.  The agenda for future research based on this project centers on three issues:  
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research designs incorporating communities, urban ethnocentrism, and a closer 
examination of the process of political socialization. 
 More surveys, of both adults and children, should incorporate a community 
design, as did the MCVS.  As the analyses became more complicated, it was increasingly 
difficult to conduct multivariate analyses using the NHES because the survey was 
designed as a random sample of students in the United States.  The survey offered great 
advantages for generalization, but its greatest disadvantage, for my purposes, was that 
with only one or two students per zip code, I could only examine types of communities 
rather than actual communities.  The MCVS was designed with community analysis in 
mind.  I could examine, for instance, the differences between black adolescents growing 
up in heavily Latino communities versus black youth living in predominantly black 
communities, and still control for important indicators in multivariate analysis.  The main 
disadvantage of the MCVS was that it included schools and communities in only one 
state.  Even though several of the findings were confirmed using the NHES, it is difficult 
to generalize to the nation based on data collected in one state.  Fortunately, other 
researchers are now using the same research design to examine communities in Arizona 
and Missouri. 
 In designing data collection around community analysis, it is essential that all 
types of communities are included – cities, poor suburbs, wealthy suburbs, small towns 
and rural areas.  Over the last few decades, there has been an urban ethnocentrism in 
many of the social sciences.  Because of the population shift toward urban areas, the 
concentration of the media in cities, and technology, America is often assumed to have a 
homogeneous culture.  This culture is based on life in urban areas, which has been 
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presumed to permeate all parts of America (Williams 2001).  Yet, most researchers that 
have spent time observing rural communities agree that a unique rural culture persists, 
one that includes a “density of acquaintanceship” (Freudenberg 1986), a greater degree of 
face-to-face interaction, a greater emphasis on self-reliance, and a tendency to distrust 
outsiders (Gagne 1992; Martinez-Brawley 1990; Websdale 1995).   
 This ethnocentrism has serious consequences for research and policy.  As I 
demonstrated in chapter 5, when small towns are removed from my analysis of poverty’s 
effects on political knowledge, the findings closely resemble hypotheses based on 
poverty in urban areas.  One would conclude that poverty has detrimental effects on 
political knowledge.  When smaller towns are included, however, there is little 
relationship between poverty and knowledge.  Weisheit’s research (1993) points out that 
urban ethnocentrism has largely ignored crime and delinquency in rural areas; so much so 
that Americans were shocked with the violence associated with school shootings in the 
late-1990s in small towns, such as Jonesboro, Arkansas and Paducah, Kentucky.  The 
same theories of delinquency that are founded in urban areas may not be applicable to 
these sorts of places.  Similarly, our theories of human development and the effect of 
neighborhoods and communities may not explain behavior in small towns and rural areas 
because many are based on an urban/suburban comparison.  For the sake of our theories, 
as well as the policies that result from our research, it is imperative that we include all 
types of communities, rather than assume that urban culture pervades all types of 
environments. 
 Finally, my research, like much of the scholarship in political socialization, is 
correlational.  I am unable, except through inference, to discuss the causes or exact 
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sources of intolerance in homogeneous areas, or why poverty does not have the same 
effects in small towns as it does in urban areas.  For this, I believe research must move 
beyond the traditional large-n survey-based research.  These surveys provide a valuable 
resource for hypothesis testing and the ability to generalize.  However, they do not allow 
us to truly understand the underlying processes of political development.  Our inferences 
may in fact be right, but without field research, in-depth case studies, or randomized 
experiments, it is difficult to know with certainty that, for example, it is the nature of 
social networks in small towns that drives these outcomes.  My future agenda will 
involve combining these methods to understand how the networks of young people 
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